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I. Introduction
The discussion in this paper is premised on three assump-
tions. First, the United States will need new technologies to
meet its increasing energy demands by the end of the century.
While the world energy demand is expected to double in a
period of twenty to thirty years,' a recent study by the U.S.
Department of Commerce indicates that the country's need for
energy will grow 1.2% per person through the end of the cen-
tury, and that the economy will grow by about 2.2% per year. 2
Second, this increasing demand for energy, deemed essential in
order to maintain an acceptable level of economic activity,
coupled with the oil crises of 1973-74 which gave rise to the
demand for energy security in the United States, will necessi-
tate the exploration of all reasonably promising energy alter-
Copyright retained by author.
* Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University
of Denver.
This article is an adapted version of a study, "Selected Legal and Institutional
Issues Related to Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion (OTEC)," prepared by the author
as a consultant to the Solar Energy Research Institute (SERI), Golden, Colorado. I am
especially grateful to John Lawrence Hargrove, Director of Studies, American Society
of International Law (ASIL), for sharing with me a recent study prepared by ASIL
under an Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) contract and
entitled, "International, Legal, Political and Institutional Aspects of OTEC Demon-
stration and Development," and to R. C. Tefft, President, Tefft, Kelly & Motley, Inc.,
for a study prepared by his firm entitled, "Toward a Legal, Institutional and Financial
Framework for OTEC Demonstration and Commercialization." I have greatly bene-
fited from these studies as well as from my discussions with Jan Laitos, George Mor-
gan, and John Veigel of the Solar Energy Research Institute. However, I alone am
responsible for the contents of the paper.
1. Cited in COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SOLAR ENERGY-PROGRESS AND
PROMISE 1 (1978).
2. Reported in Den. Post, Nov. 23, 1978, at 38, col. 1.
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natives.3 According to the National Energy Plan,' these princi-
pal alternative energy sources available to the United
States-coal, nuclar power, and solar power (direct and indi-
rect)-will be used in the years ahead. Finally, the steadily
rising cost of fossil fuel, especially coal, the likely scarcity and
increasing costs by the year 2000 of petroleum, natural gas, and
U-235, and a growing concern over their detrimental environ-
mental effects, will make these sources uneconomical for large
scale electrical generation. Substitute sources will include
OTEC, non-U-235 nuclear, and geothermal energy.
OTEC, an unconventional energy source and a unique en-
ergy technology, is an attractive alternative for several reasons.
"[It can provide utilities with 'baseload capability' on line 24
hours a day. It can economically generate power at a level of
250 megawatts and up, enough for a moderate-sized city. Using
a renewable resource, the sun, its 'fuel' is delivered directly to
the site in usable form without charge. It is environmentally
benign, emits no poisonous byproducts (barring the remote
contingency of a massive leak of the working fluid-probably
ammonia), and it is necessarily situated unobtrusively off-
shore, away from population centers. All evidence to date indi-
cates that it has no harmful effect on ocean life; indeed, cold
water upwellings are known to be beneficial to fish popula-
tions." 5
Despite these attractive features, however, established
utility companies have thus far shown little interest in pursu-
ing technological studies and hardware demonstrations related
to OTEC. This apparent lack of serious interest stems mainly
from the perception that OTEC is an expensive, unproven, and
risky undertaking. A combination of factors, including un-
proven economics (based on presently noncompetitive esti-
mated costs of OTEC-generated energy), unverified social and
environmental effects, and uncertainty as to the potential of
energy from OTEC as well as how OTEC fits into the national
energy policy is responsible for the prevailing skepticism. Also,
3. See, e.g., Nye, Jr. Nuclear Policy: Balancing Nonproliferation and Energy
Security, 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL., Oct. 1978, at 39. See also 78 DEP'T STATE BuLL., Sept.
1978, at 3.
4. Energy Policy and Planning, Executive Office of the President, THE NATIONAL
ENERGY PLAN (U.S. Gov't Printing Off., April 1977).
5. Whitmore, OTEC: Electricity from the Ocean, 81 TECHNOLOGY REv., Oct. 1978,
at 58-60.
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the absence of an adequate legal and institutional framework
further clouds the picture.
It seems that the uncertainty OTEC faces on technological
and economic grounds will be dispelled by further studies and
demonstration projects which are likely to be undertaken by
the Department of Energy (DOE).' While the "engineering
challenges to be bridged demand solutions of scale rather than
of technical innovation, ' '7 it is estimated that "the OTEC
power plant should have an economic advantage over fossil fuel
plants and nuclear plants well before the year 2000."1
However, these economic and technological issues will not
be discussed here, nor will the financial aspects be investi-
gated.? This study has as its primary focus those legal and
institutional aspects which will ostensibly have a significant
bearing upon the commercialization of OTEC. These issues are
broadly classified as (1) jurisdictional, (2) regulatory, and (3)
environmental. They will be discussed here in the context not
only of existing international law-both customary and treaty
law-but also of the current developments in the law and the
probable changes in it, particularly those resulting from ongo-
ing negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the
6. Id. at 58.
7. Id. at 61.
8. Id. at 63.
9. On technical, economic, and financial aspects, see generally H. KNIGHT, J.
NYHART & R. STEIN, OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION (1977) [hereinafter cited as
KNIGHT, NYHART & STEIN]; SCIENCE POuCY RESEARCH DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, SUBCOMM. ON ADVANCED ENERGY TECHNOLOGIES AND ENERGY CONSERVA-
TION RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND DEMONSTRATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, 95TH CONG. 2D SESS., ENERGY FROM THE OCEAN 25-79 (Comm. Print 1978);
E. FRANCIS, INVESTMENT IN COMMERCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CON-
VERSION (OTEC) PLANT-SHIPS (1977) (Prepared by Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory for U.S. Dep't of Commerce); SOLAR ENERGY RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY AND MARKET READINESS OF EIGHT SOLAR TECHNOLOGIES: INTERIM
DRAFT REPORT 130-45 (1978) (Prepared for U.S. Dep't of Energy) [hereinafter cited as
SERI INTERIM DRAFT REP.]; R. TEFFr, R. KELLY, C. DICK, JR., & K. STEVENSON, TOWARD
A LEGAL, INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL FRAMEWORK FOR OTEC DEMONSTRATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION (1978) (Prepared for ERDA by Tefft, Kelly and Motley, Inc.)
(hereinafter cited as TEFvr, KELLY & MOTLEY, INC. STUDY]; B. WASHOM & J. NILLES,
INCENTIVES FOR THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF OCEAN THERMAL ENERGY CONVERSION TECH-
NOLOGY (OTEC) (1977) (Prepared for RANN, Nat'l Sci. Found.); J. WITWER, J. ALiCH,
S. KOHAN, M. LEVINE, P. MEAGHER, E. PICKERING, F. SCHOOLEY, A. SLEMMONS, & T.
THOMPSON, 1 A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF SOLAR ALTERNATIVES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
FEDERAL RD&D 95-101 (1978) (Submitted to Solar Working Group, U.S. Dep't of
Energy); and 5 SHARING THE SUN: SOLAR TECHNOLOGY IN THE SEVENTIES 392-548 (K. B6er
ed. 1976).
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Law of the Sea (LOS III).I' Several alternatives will be dis-
cussed and recommendations offered in each area in light of the
United States' interests.
This discussion will be prefaced by a short assessment of
the possible arrangements for the siting of OTEC plants, their
functions, and their potential for the United States." The most
likely configurations for OTEC plants will be: (1) an OTEC
facility operating individually as a semipermanent fixture, or
a number of plants moored in clusters of eight to ten plants
around a central collection device, and connected to shore by
a transmission cable, supplying electrical power for general
consumption to a land-based electricity grid; or (2) an open sea
OTEC facility, a plant-ship, migrating and "grazing" on the
surface, seeking the maximum thermal differential gradient
and supplying power for an energy-intensive industry at sea.
Such a facility could, for example, produce onsite ammonia to
be used for the production of fertilizers and industrial chemi-
cals or as a hydrogen carrier for production of electricity, or
aluminum, or engage in energy-intensive commodity process-
ing such as manganese nodules. The energy produced then
could be converted into other forms of energy, such as hydro-
gen, and the products produced onsite transported to shore by
vessel. Such products could also be manufactured and pro-
cessed in such places as Hawaii and Puerto Rico, which are
close to some of the prospective sites of OTEC facilities.
Because of the thermal gradient needed to make OTEC
operative, tropical regions within 100 of the equator, compris-
ing about twenty million square miles, where the surface water
is around 80'F., while the cold water 3,000 feet below is around
10. The Conference which began in Caracas in 1974 concluded its resumed sev-
enth session on September 15, 1978 and will convene its eighth session in Geneva on
March 19, 1979. For a short report on the latest session, see 15 UN CHRONICLE,
Aug.-Sept. 1978, at 41-42. Voluminous legal literature has grown around the
Conference issues. See, e.g., various publications of the Law of the Sea Institute in-
cluding the papers and proceedings of its annual conferences, and its occasional and
special papers; 1-6 NEW DIRECIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA (R. Churchill, M. Nordquist,
S. Lay, K. Simmonds & J. Welch eds. 1973-77); R. Dupuy, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
CURRENT PROBLEMS (1974); S. ODA, THE LAW OF THE SEA IN OUR TIME (1977); THE LAW
OF THE SEA: ISSUES IN OCEAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (D. Walsh ed. 1977); Symposia in
volumes 6-15 of SAN DIEGO L. REv., 6 id. at 339-513 (1969); 7 id. at 371-673 (1970); 8
id. at 453-747 (1971); 9 id. at 383-751 (1972); 10 id. at 425-691 (1973); 11 id. at 535-838
(1974); 12 id. at 491-742 (1975); 13 id. at 483-778 (1976); 14 id. at 507-750 (1977); 15
id. at 357-662 (1978).
11. The assessment is based on a study of sources cited in note 9 supra.
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40°F., offer the most promising sites for OTEC facilities which
fit into configuration one discussed above. For the United
States, however, these sites are limited to the Gulf Coast, Ha-
waii, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific territories. According to the
studies of the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA), a thermal resource of at least 300,000 megawatts
lies just off the west coast of Florida." It is anticipated that the
technological developments expected from DOE's current
OTEC Research, Development and Demonstration (RD&D)
Program would allow the exploitation of this resource. Other
sudies indicate that the off-grid applications mentioned in con-
figuration two type facilities will have a market potential of an
average of 30,000 to 40,000 megawatts during the years 2000 to
2025.13
II. JURISDICTIONAL, REGULATORY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Regardless of the site of an OTEC facility, or its system
and configuration, ownership, operation, energy potential and
use, the move toward OTEC commercialization will be facili-
tated if the prevalent uncertainties regarding the issues to be
discussed in this section are removed and an adequate legal
and institutional framework is established, offering guidelines
to interested parties. The following discussion, which is de-
signed to present a broad outline of such a framework, surveys
the current state of the law, suggests likely changes, identifies
existing ambiguities, gaps and uncertainties, and makes rec-
ommendations to remove them.
A. Jurisdictional Issues
In the United States offshore areas, questions of jurisdic-
tion, that is, questions pertaining to the competence to pre-
scribe and apply the governing law to peoples, events, and
activities in these areas, arise in two contexts: national-
international and Federal-State. In the former, activities are
governed by norms established by multilateral treaties, re-
gional and bilateral arrangements, and customary law, supple-
mented by unilateral action; in the latter, by statutory law and
judicial pronouncements.
1. National-International Issues
The unsettled state of the Law of the Sea is responsible for
the presence of unresolved jurisdictional issues pertaining to
12. Cited in TEFrr, KELLY & MOTLEY, INC. STUDY, supra note 9, at 3.
13. Cited in id.
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the installations of OTEC devices in offshore areas. The law is
still in an evolutionary state and LOS III, which adjourned its
resumed seventh session in New York on September 15, 1978
and will convene its next session in Geneva on March 19, 1979,"
is attempting to formalize a comprehensive and generally ac-
ceptable convention dealing with all aspects of ocean space.
While differences on some key issues, such as the mining of the
deep seabed, still remain unresolved, the negotiations have
shown a remarkable consensus on most issues likely to affect
OTEC deployment and operation. Also, regional and bilateral
arrangements and unilateral state practices and claims are in-
strumental in changing the traditional Law of the Sea.
The basic issue pertinent to the present discussion is a
coastal state's rights in adjacent waters and on the high seas.
Under traditional international law, the inquiry has centered
on the limit of territorial waters, and additionally, since the
1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,'" on the extent
of contiguous zones and the outer limit of the continental shelf.
Beyond these areas, the universally applicable concept has
been freedom of the high seas.
a. OTEC Devices Under Traditional International Law
Regarding the Territorial Sea
Historically, coastal nation states have enjoyed certain
exclusive rights and privileges with respect to adjacent waters
over a narrow belt of three marine miles along their coasts,
measured from the low water mark, which constituted their
territorial waters." These rights are similar to those they exer-
14. 15 UN CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1978, at 41-42.
15. The following four conventions were concluded at the 1958 Law of the Sea
Conference in Geneva: Convention on the Continental Shelf, done at Geneva, April
29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 312 (effective June 10, 1964)
[hereinafter cited as the Continental Shelf Convention]; Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958,
17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective March 20, 1966) [herein-
after cited as the Fishery Convention]; Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva,
April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30,
1962) [hereinafter cited as the High Seas Convention]; Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S.
No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964) [hereinafter cited as the Terri-
torial Sea Convention].
16. See generally arts. 1-13 of the Territorial Sea Convention; M. McDoUGAL &
W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 174-304, 446-564 (1962) [hereinafter cited
as McDOUGAL & BURKE]; Baty, The Three-Mile Limit, 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 503 (1928);
Kent, The Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
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cise over their internal waters and over their land masses, and
were subject only to innocent passage of foreign vessels through
these waters."7 During the last fifty years, however, the breadth
of territorial waters has been marked by a lack of uniformity.
While the international conferences in 1930,11 1958,11 and
1960,21 failed to reach agreement on the limits of the territorial
sea, the 1958 conference did adopt a proposal which could be
read to measure the breadth of the territorial seas restrictively
rather than defining it in affirmative terms. Article 24(1) of the
1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone21 provides a coastal state limited jurisdiction over the
high seas contiguous to its territorial sea. This zone "may not
extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the sea is measured. '2
Article 24 did not guarantee coastal states the same speci-
fied rights in the contiguous zones as they enjoy in their terri-
torial waters; 23 however, it impliedly limited the coastal state's
right to exercise those essential rights beyond the twelve-mile
limit. The Convention thus precluded a coastal state from
claiming territorial waters beyond twelve miles.
Under traditional international law, therefore, an OTEC
device deployed for research 24 or commercial purposes within
17. Arts. 14-23 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
18. See Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion,
League of Nations Publication C. 74. M. 39. 1929. V.
19. See United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official Records (7
Vols.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13 (1958).
20. See Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Summary
Records of Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the Committee of the Whole,
Annexes and Final Act, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 19/8 (1960). Extensive literature exists
on the 1958 and 1960 Law of the Sea Conferences. For a most comprehensive and
thorough study of the various issues discussed in the conferences, see McDOUGAL &
BURKE. See also C. COLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (6th ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as COLOMBOS]; D. BowErr. THE LAW OF THE SEA (1967); Dean, The
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L
L. 607 (1958); Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Fight
for Freedom of the Seas, 54 id. at 751 (1960); Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 73 (1959); Nanda, Some Legal
Questions on the Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L. 343 (1969).
21. See note 15 supra.
22. Art. 24(2) of' the Territorial Sea Convention.
23. This is in view of the distinction drawn between art. 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b) of
the Convention pertaining to a coastal state's right to take preventive or punitive
measures by the infringement of its domestic regulations.
24. Historically, there has been no freedom of scientific research within the terri-
torial sea. On marine scientific research see generally W. BURKE, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
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the territorial limits would be within the exclusive competence
of the coastal state, since the term "sovereignty" has been
continuously used to describe a coastal state's rights in terri-
torial waters. 5
b. OTEC Devices Under the Emerging Law on the Terri-
torial Sea
Although the 1958 convention failed to set a definite limit
on the breadth of the territorial waters, state practices were
fast eroding the traditional three-mile limit. A United Nations
Secretariat study in 1968 revealed that fewer than one-third of
the states reporting (30 of 92) had opted for less than six miles
while nearly half (43 of 92) opted for twelve miles or more, and
only a small number (9) were claiming more than twelve
miles .2
The current product of the LOS HI negotiations is the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT), a massive docu-
ment containing 303 articles and 7 annexes," which sets the
breadth of the territorial sea at twelve miles, 2 and that of
continguous zones for similarly specified purposes as were con-
tained in the 1958 convention at twenty-four miles. Within
this adjacent maritime belt, a coastal state's sovereignty is
recognized as extending to the air space over the territorial sea
as well as to the seabed and subsoil," and is limited only by
the right of innocent passage .3
Although ICNT is to "serve purely as a procedural device
and [to] only provide a basis for negotiation without affecting
the right of any delegation to suggest revisions in the search for
ARTICLES IN THE LAW OF THE SEA INFORMAL SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT (Occasional Paper
no. 25, Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, June 1975); FREEDOM OF
OCEANIC RESEARCH (W. Wooster ed. 1973); Winner, Science, Sovereignty, and the Third
Law of the Sea Conference, 4 OcEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 297 (1977); Wooster, Some
Implications of Ocean Research, l id. at 13 (1974).
25. Arts. 1 and 2 of the Territorial Sea Convention.
26. See Document prepared by U.N. Secretariat, Survey of National Legislation
Concerning the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the
High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/11
and A/AC.135/11/Add. 1 (1968).
27. U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiat-
ing Text from the Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP. 10 & Corr. 1-3 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT].
28. Id. art, 3.
29. Id. art. 33.
30. Id. art. 2.
31. Id. arts. 17-32.
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a consensus,"12 there is an almost universal consensus on the
twelve-mile limit for the territorial seas. Within this zone, the
coastal state will have almost total control over the installation
and operation of an OTEC facility, both for research and com-
mercial use.
c. OTEC Devices on the Exclusive Economic Zone and
the Continental Shelf
(i) Exclusive Economic Zone"
Beyond the twelve-mile territorial sea and the twenty-
four-mile contiguous zone, ICNT recognizes a special area
known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) which extends
seaward to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline
from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.3 ' This
zone has a special relevance for OTEC siting, because ICNT
grants the coastal state
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, con-
serving and managing the natural resources, whether living or
non-living, of the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters,
and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation
and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy
from the water, currents and winds.Y
Additionally, the coastal state's jurisdiction extends within
EEZ to "(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands,
installations and structures; (ii) marine scientific research; (iii)
the preservation of the marine environment. ' 36 Other states
enjoy some of the traditional freedoms of the high seas in
EEZ-freedom "of navigation and overflight and of the laying
of submarine cables and pipelines," 7 but not fishing, scientific
32. U.N. Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, Informal Composite Negotiat-
ing Text-Explanatory Memorandum by the President, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/WP.
10/Add. 1 (1977), reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MATEIuALS 1099, 1100 (1977).
33. See generally D. JOHNSTON & E. GOLD, THE EcONOMIC ZONE IN THE LAW OF THE
SEA: SURVEY, ANALYSIS AND APPRmAsAL OF CURRENT TRENDS (Occasional Paper No. 17,
Law of the Sea Institute, University of Rhode Island, June 1973); Alexander & Hodg-
son, The Impact of the 200-Mile Economic Zone on the Law of the Sea, 12 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 569 (1975); Kronfol, The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Critique of Contempo-
rary Law of the Sea, 9 J. MAR. L. & COMM. 461 (1978); Hollick, The Origins of the 200.
Mile Offshore Zones, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977); Phillips, Exclusive Economic Zone
as a Concept in International Law, 26 INT'L & COMp. L. Q. 585 (1977).
34. ICNT, art. 57.
35. Id. art. 56(I)(a).
36. Id. art. 56(b).
37. Id. art. 58(1).
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research, nor pollution control, which are now under the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of coastal states.
The establishment of EEZ is perhaps the most significant
development in the Law of the Sea since President Truman's
Proclamation on the Continental Shelf in 1945,11 which claimed
for the United States the natural resources of the seabed and
the subsoil of its continental shelf lying beyond the traditional
three-mile limit. A variety of claims for exclusive jurisdiction
by coastal states over the high seas area beyond their territorial
seas followed the Truman proclamation, the most notable ini-
tially being claims by several Latin American countries to a
200-mile territorial sea 3' and more recently by Canada to a 100-
mile pollution control zone. 0
Subsequently, when LOS 11 began its deliberations, two
proposals formed the basis of what has finally emerged as
EEZ-one, a 200-mile economic zone, proposed by a majority
of African states," and the other, an exclusive "Patrimonial
Sea" with an outer limit of 200 miles and similar jurisdiction
over the natural resources up to the edge of the continental
margin, adopted at the 1972 Santo Domingo Conference by a
group of Caribbean countries.2 Although these zones were orig-
38. Pres. Proc. No. 2267, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1943-48 Compilation). See generally Hol-
lick, US. Oceans Policy: The Truman Proclamations, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 23 (1977).
39. See Agreement between Chile, Peru, and Ecuador, August 18, 1952, Declara-
tion on the Maritime Zone, art. 3 (II), U.N. Legislative Series, Laws and Regulations
of the Regime of the Territorial Sea 723-27 (1957). See generally B. MACCHESNEY,
SITUATION, DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF THE SEA, 1956, at 264-94, 448, 455-56, 486-87 (1957); B. AUGUST, THE
CONTINENTAL SHELF: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN STATES WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CHILE, ECUADOR AND PERU 187-203 (1960); F. GARCIA AMADOR,
LATIN AMERICA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (Occasional Ppaer No. 14, Law of the Sea
Institute, University of Rhode Island, July 1972). In 1966, Argentina extended its
territorial sea by a decree (Law No. 17, 094-M. 24, Buenos Aires, 29 December 1966)
promulgating that "the sovereignty of the Argentine nation shall extend over the sea
adjacent to its territory for a distance of 200 nautical miles measured from the line of
the lowest tide." U.N. General Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee to study the peaceful
uses of the sea-bed and the ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 2d
Seas., Survey of National Legislation Concerning the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor,
and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present
National Jurisdiction 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/11 (1968).
40. See Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act of 1970, CAN. REV. STAT. C. 2, at
3-25 (1st Supp. 1970).
41. Organization of African Unity: Declaration on the Issues of the Law of the Sea,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/86 (1972). See also U.N. Docs. A/AC.138/79 (1972); A/CONF.
62/33 (1974).
42. The 1972 Declaration of Santo Domingo is contained in U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/80 (1972).
1979
250 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
inally conceived as essentially resource-control zones, the
coastal states' powers are greatly enhanced by the grant of
''exclusive jurisdiction" to them regarding exploration and
exploitation, pollution control, and scientific research.
Although ICNT does not specifically mention coastal
states' jurisdiction over OTEC activities within EEZ, it would
be a valid conclusion that coastal states will have exclusive
competence over the deployment and regulation of OTEC in-
stallations within their EEZ for research purposes or commer-
cial operations. Any reasonable interpretation of ICNT provi-
sions will support this conclusion. To illustrate, article 56(a)
grants a coastal state "sovereign rights" within EEZ for "other
activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the
zone, such as the production of energy from water, currents and
winds." This would obviously include the energy produced by
an OTEC operation. Article 60 explicitly provides for a coastal
state's "exclusive right to construct and to authorize and regu-
late the construction, operation and use of: (a) Artificial is-
lands; (b) Installations and structures for the purposes pro-
vided for in article 56 and other economic purposes; (c) Instal-
lations and structures which may interfere with the exercise of
the rights of the coastal State in the zone." Article 247(2) pro-
vides that "[mlarine scientific research activities in the exclu-
sive economic zone and on the continental shelf shall be con-
ducted with the consent of the coastal State." Moreover, there
is such an overwhelming consensus among the participants at
LOS III on EEZ that even if the efforts to formalize a compre-
hensive treaty on the Law of the Sea were to fail, EEZ will in
the near future be accorded legitimacy by state practices,
transforming it into a rule of customary international law.
It appears that the coastal state's permission would be
required to install an OTEC device in its EEZ either for re-
search purposes or commercial operation. Until now, no nation
state has adopted specific legislation addressing this issue.
However, once OTEC technology and economics are proven,
such legislative measures prescribing conditions for access to
EEZ and outlining the legal and institutional arrangements
under which a foreign entity is permitted to operate an OTEC
facility within that zone will, in all probability, be adopted by
countries wishing to attract a foreign owned/operated OTEC
facility within its EEZ. Bilateral and regional arrangements
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regarding the deployment and operation of an OTEC device
within a coastal state's EEZ would be another way of establish-
ing conditions for the installation of OTEC devices.
(ii) Continental Shelf
Under the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental
Shelf,43 "sovereign rights" of the coastal states in the continen-
tal shelf (defined as beginning at the seaward limit of the terri-
torial sea and continuing to the 200-meter isobath)," are re-
stricted to "exploring it and exploiting its natural resources,
45
leaving unaffected the "legal status of the superjacent waters
as high seas, or that of the airspace above those waters."4 A
coastal state's consent is imperative for any scientific research
concerning the continental shelf and conducted there. 7
Thus, although theoretically an OTEC device of another
nation could be moored on a coastal state's continental shelf,
while the device itself is located on the high seas, provided it
did not interfere with the coastal state's exclusive right to ex-
ploit natural resources in that area,4" the prospects that this
would happen are unlikely without the consent of the coastal
state. A coastal state's special rights in adjacent waters with
regard to scientific research and pollution control are widely
accepted, and with the emergence of EEZ, such a possibility
without the coastal state's consent could be ruled out.
ICNT modifies the definition of the continental shelf by
providing that it extends to the outer edge of the continental
margin or to a distance of 200 miles when the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend that far.4 While other
ICNT provisions"0 do not substantially change the prior law,
43. See note 15 supra.
44. Art 1 of the Continental Shelf Convention. The Convention left the legal
definition of the continental shelf, a compromise formula, open-ended - up to a depth
of 200 meters, or a technologically exploitable distance.
45. Id. art. 2.
46. Id. art. 3.
47. Id. art. 5(8). Although it adds that the coastal state "shall not normally
withhold its consent" if a qualified institution makes a request, it grants the coastal
state the right "if it so desires, to participate or to be represented in the research, and
that in any event the results shall be published."
48. Based on arts. 4-5 of the Continental Shelf Convention, Knight makes this
argument in Knight, International Jurisdictional Issues Involving OTEC Installations,
in KNIGHT, NYHART & STEIN supra note 9, at 45-73.
49. ICNT, art. 76.
50. Id. arts. 77-85.
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articles pertinent to OTEC siting should be noted.
Article 80 on "Artificial Islands, Installations and Struc-
tures on the Continental Shelf," provides that article 60, which
grants the exclusive right to the coastal state to construct,
authorize, and regulate construction, operation and use of such
artificial islands, installations and structures, applies mutatis
mutandis. Similarly, Article 247 adopts the consent regime for
scientific research on the continental shelf, although some of
the obstacles for conducting research in the waters above the
continental shelf have been ameliorated."'
The conclusion is inescapable that a coastal state will have
exclusive competence over the installation of any OTEC device
located over its continental shelf for research or commercial
purposes.
d. OTEC Devices on the High Seas
(i) Traditional Law
Under the freedom of the seas concept, every nation has
unrestricted access to the high seas, but none is permitted any
long term appropriation of any part of the high seas for its
exclusive use.52 This principle was recently reaffirmed by the
U.S. Supreme Court.53 The practical reasons for the universal
acceptance of this principle lie in (1) the increasing use of the
ocean as an international highway for commerce during the
pbst-Industrial Revolution era, which coincided with the period
of Western colonialism in the 18th and 19th centuries, and (2)
the lack of effective occupation of large areas of ocean claimed
by major powers."
In 1958, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas codified
the essence of the freedom of the seas by providing
both for coastal and non-coastal states:
1. Freedom of navigation;
2. Freedom of fishing;
3. Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
4. Freedom to fly over the high seas.
51. See, e.g., id. arts. 243-53.
52. Cited in COLOMBOs at 51.
53. U.S. v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1959) [Footnotes in the opinion omit-
ted].
54. See CoLOMnos at 60-61.
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These freedoms and others which are recognized by the gen-
eral principles of international law shall be exercised by all states
with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in their
exercise of the freedom of the high seas. 55
Obviously, these freedoms-commercial navigation, mili-
tary uses, fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipe-
lines-give rise to conflicting uses of the high seas. For the
management of these conflicting uses, the standard is that of
reasonableness with regard to the interests of other users, that
is, not unreasonably interfering with their uses. The deploy-
ment of an OTEC device for research or commercial purposes
could be justified under this "reasonable use" concept. The
recent U.S. legislation authorizing the construction of deep
water ports beyond the limits of its territorial sea, 5 which was
justified on this reasonable use theory, 57 offers an appropriate
precedent. Since states traditionally have the primary respon-
sibility for regulating the activities of vessels flying their flags
on the high seas, applying that analogy to OTEC devices, any
OTEC installation owned or authorized by a state on the high
seas would be under its authority and control. Similarly, under
the laws of nationality, nationals are always and everywhere
subject to the laws of their nation state" and their activities on
an OTEC device on the high seas would be governed by the
laws of the state of their nationality.
(ii) LOS III and the Deep Seabed
Current negotiations in LOS III are still stymied on the
nature and scope of the proposed regime for deep seabed min-
ing.59 Nevertheless, pertinent ICNT provisions which have a
55. Art. 2 of the High Seas Convention. See note 15 supra.
56. The Deepwater Port Act of 1974, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as DPA]. For legislative history and purpose see [1974] U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 7529. See generally Krueger, Nordquist, & Wessely, New Technology and
International Law: The Case of Deepwater Ports, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 597 (1977); Com-
ment, Territorial Status of Deepwater Ports, 15 SAN DIEoo L. Rav. 603 (1978); Note,
The Regulation of Deepwater Ports, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 927 (1975).
57. See Hearings on S.1751 and S.2232 before the Special Joint Subcomm. on
Deepwater Ports Legislation of The Senate Comm. on Commerce, Interior and Insular
Affairs, and Public Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 606-19 (1973)(Statement of John
Norton Moore).
58. See generally H. VAN PANHUYS, THE ROLE OF NATIONALTY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw (1959); Brownlie, Relations of Nationality in Public International Law, 39 Barr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 284 (1963); McDougal, Lasswell & Chen, Nationality and Human Rights:
The Protection of the Individual in External Arenas, 83 YALE L. J. 900 (1974).
59. For a recent commentary, see LaQue, Different Approaches to International
Regulation of Exploitation of Deep-Ocean Ferromanganese Nodules, 15 SAN DGO L.
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bearing on the deployment and operation of an OTEC facility
will be considered here. This discussion will be prefaced by
noting the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749
of December 17, 1970,60 which declared, among other things,
that
1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the
area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heri-
tage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means
by States or persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
thereof.
ICNT attempts to give concrete shape to the "common
heritage" concept. It declares the area constituting "the sea-
bed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction"6' (Area), and its resources to be "the
common heritage of mankind,"62 and envisages the establish-
ment of an International Sea-Bed Authority (ISA) to organize
and control activities in the Area. No state is to claim or exer-
cise sovereignty there and no exclusive appropriation is permis-
sible. 3 The legal status of the waters superjacent to the Area
or that of the airspace above those waters are left unaffected.6"
While activities in the Area are defined as "all activities of
exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the
Area,"65 in subsequent provisions,6 activities are construed
broadly as covering, among other subjects, those of marine
scientific research, transfer of technology, and protection of the
marine environment and human life. However, again in Article
150, activities are construed narrowly, referring only to explora-
tion and exploitation of resources. Thus, there is considerable
ambiguity regarding ISA's control in the Area.
REv. 477 (1978). See also Charney, The International Regime for the Deep Seabed:
Past Conflicts and Proposals for Progress, 17 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1 (1976); Note, A New
Combination to Davy Jones' Locker: Melee over Marine Minerals, 9 Loy. CHI. L. J.
935 (1978).
60. G.A.Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970)
(adopted by a vote of 108 to 0, with 14 abstentions: the United States voted for its
adoption).
61. ICNT, art. 1(1).
62. Id. art. 136.
63. Id. art. 137(1).
64. Id. art. 135.
65. Id. arts. 1(3), 133(a).
66. Id. arts. 143-49.
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Resources are defined as "mineral resources in situ,'"
which are subject to ISA's licensing and regulation." Minerals
include "water, steam, hot water."" While it can be argued
that ISA's jurisdiction extends to "fresh water aquifers and
similiar sub-surface water sources, not the cold water lying
near the seabed that might be used by an OTEC device,"" a
broad interpretation by ISA of these provisions is quite possi-
ble, under which OTEC deployment for scientific research or
commercial purposes could be covered.' Also, despite the cur-
rent provision, under which ISA has no jurisdiction over the
superjacent waters of the high seas,72 it is probable that its
jurisdiction in the near future will extend to activities in the
water column and on the surface,73 thereby affecting OTEC
operations. Such an outcome would be consistent with the
growing demands of the developing states for a strong ISA
which could give meaning to "the common heritage" concept.
Similarly, the mooring of an OTEC device on the high seas,
which would require corings and other physical investigations
of the ocean floor and the seabed, could be perceived as an
economic use of the Area, and therefore subject to ISA's juris-
diction. Additionally, ISA could assume jurisdiction, should
such mooring pose any actual or potential interference to
seabed mining activities which are to be regulated by ISA. Of
67. Id. art. 133(b).
68. Id. Annex R".
69. Id. art. 133(c)(i).
70. Knight, OTEC and the Law of the Sea: The Jurisdictional Problems, in
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, INTERNATIONAL, LEGAL, POLITICAL AND INSTI-
TUTIONAL ASPECTS OF OTEC DEMONSTRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 15 (Study prepared for
ERDA, Sept. 1978) [hereinafter cited as ASIL STUDY].
71. Knight acknowledges this possiblity: "It is therefore not only conceivable but
likely that if sufficient information were presented in international fora to indicate that
OTEC and similar energy-producing devices might be substantial sources of economic
wealth or political leverage, underdeveloped countries would move either in LOS-3
or in another forum to seek a regulatory regime governing such activities beyond the
exclusive economic zones of coastal states." Id. at 15.
72. ICNT, art. 135.
73. See, e.g., The Maltese Draft, a working paper introduced by the Delegation
of Malta in the United Nations Seabed Committee in 1971, Draft Ocean Space Treaty
- Working Paper Submitted by Malta, in REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL
USES OF THE SEA-BED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL
JURISDICTION, 26 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 21) 105, U.N. Doc. A/8421 (1971), which
treats "international ocean space," the area beyond clearly defined limits of national
jurisdiction, as a unitary concept, encompassing seabed, water column, and surface,
the whole constituting the "common heritage of mankind." Id. pt. IV (emphasis
added).
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course, ISA could assert jurisdiction over marine scientific re-
search in the Area which is to be carried out "exclusively for
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of mankind as a whole."',
Consequently, it appears that under the envisaged seabed
regime, OTEC activities on the high seas could be subjected to
the jurisdiction of the proposed ISA. Perhaps two exceptions to
ISA jurisdiction are possible: (1) A coastal state might extend
its competence to an OTEC facility which lies beyond its EEZ,
but which poses an actual or potential threat to its living and
nonliving resources by adversely affecting the marine environ-
ment, or (2) if there is no accord at LOS III on a deep seabed
regime and the existing law applies under which the deploy-
ment of an OTEC facility on the high seas could be justified
under the "reasonable use" concept.
e. Recommendations
The major United States objectives which determine its
policy on national-international jurisdictional issues include
freedom of navigation and the establishment of an equitable
regime for deep seabed mining. Since energy sources in the
oceans including OTEC are of considerable significance to the
United States, U.S. negotiators at LOS III should pay close
attention to the implications of the emerging treaty on OTEC
siting and deployment in adjacent coastal waters as well as on
the high seas. The primary questions for consideration would
be: (1) Is it in the United States' interest to seek freedom of
OTEC siting and deployment in the emerging twelve-mile ter-
ritorial seas and EEZ? (2) What kind of regime regarding
OTEC activities on the high seas should the United States
seek? (3) If efforts to finalize a comprehensive treaty on the
Law of the Sea fail, what kind of claims would be in the United
States' interest to assert?
Apparently, ICNT provisions regarding the extension of
coastal states' boundaries to a twelve-mile territorial zone and
a 200-mile EEZ are acceptable to the United States. Conse-
quently, there are two policy options open to the United States
regarding these zones. One is to accept the coastal state's ex-
clusive competence in the region, which will exclude any U.S.
OTEC siting in foreign waters within these zones and without
74. ICNT, art. 143(1).
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the coastal state's consent; and the other is to seek freedom of
OTEC activities within these zones.
There does not seem to be any chance of reversing the
widely accepted policy of exclusive coastal state competence in
the territorial waters, even if the U.S. were to vigorously seek
an exception for OTEC activities. Similarly, despite some
ambiguities regarding EEZ,75 no exceptions in favor of OTEC
activities in this zone are likely to be accepted by a majority
of nations at the current LOS III negotiations. The United
States could, perhaps, still seek such an exception if it were
found to be in its interest and could make appropriate reserva-
tions to the finalized treaty. However, in light of the recent
developments regarding a coastal state's assertion of its compe-
tence in coastal waters, especially pertaining to marine pollu-
tion and natural resources, it is unlikely that such a United
States assertion would be recognized by other states. Thus, it
is recommended that the United States accept the 200-mile
coastal state competence regarding OTEC siting and deploy-
ment. This course of action would appear to be beneficial to the
United States as well, since the U.S. has a major OTEC source
lying off the west coast of Florida within its 200-mile zone. The
recent United States extension of its fishery zone7" and the
establishment of zones to enforce navigational safety rules7
and to control pollution 71 indicate that there would be a strong
demand in the U.S. Congress to assert such control. It is recom-
mended that as a first desirable step, Congress enact legislation
creating a Coastal Energy Conservation and Management
Zone extending to a 200-mile limit. Under this proposed legis-
lation, the United States will claim jurisdiction for the specific
purpose suggested by the title-energy conservation and man-
agement. The proposed legislation will be an interim measure,
seeking limited jurisdiction patterned after the DPA79 model.
The proposed Act will be superseded by the legislation required
to implement the EEZ provisions of the Law of the Sea Treaty
when it is concluded.
75. See notes 65-67 supra and the accompanying text.
76. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
Stat. 33, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1976).
77. 33 U.S.C. §§ 151-232 (1976), prescribe the enforcement of navigational safety
rules.
78. See Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1593-94, § 58(a)-
(c) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976)).
79. See note 56 supra.
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The high seas, on the other hand, present a different set
of challenges. Since the United States will presumably have
the necessary technology and wherewithal to engage in OTEC
activities on the high seas for research as well as for commercial
purposes, perhaps the United States could seek to modify
ICNT at the next session to specifically exclude OTEC activi-
ties from the competence of ISA. However, if the current dis-
cussion in LOS III negotiations on the deep seabed regime is
any indication of what might be the regime pertaining to
OTEC activities, such prospects do not look promising. The
developing countries seek a strong ISA and probably will not
accept OTEC activities being excluded from its jurisdiction,
for they could argue that OTEC uses a resource covered under
the concept "common heritage of mankind." If a treaty does
not emerge, the United States could rely upon a reasonable use
theory to engage in OTEC activities on the high seas.
The DPA offers a model of legislation for this purpose. The
U.S. Congress specifically declared therein that nothing in the
Act "shall be construed to affect the legal status of the high
seas, the superjacent airspace, or the seabed and subsoil, in-
cluding the Continental Shelf."80 The U.S. President is author-
ized and requested under the Act to enter into negotiations
with the neighboring governments of Canada and Mexico to
determine "the desirability of undertaking joint studies and
investigations designed to. . . eliminate any legal and regula-
tory uncertainty."81 As a condition to the issuance of a license
for the ownership, construction, and operation of a deepwater
port, the Secretary of Transportation must determine that "the
deep water port will not unreasonably interfere with interna-
tional navigation or other reasonable uses of the high seas, as
defined by treaty, convention, or customary international
law. '82 Also, the designation of safety zones is "[slubject to
recognized principles of international law,"8 3 and the Secretary
is required to prescribe various regulations which relate to ac-
tivities involved in site evaluation and preconstruction testing
at potential deepwater locations which may interfere with au-
80. Id. § 1501(b).
81. Id. § 1521(2).
82. Id. § 1503(c)(4).
83. Id. § 1509(d)(1).
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thorized uses of the outer continental shelf.84 Additionally, the
environmental review criteria which are to be used to evaluate
a proposed deepwater port include "the effect on alternate uses
of the oceans and navigable waters, such as scientific study,
fishing, and exploitation of other living and nonliving re-
sources. '"85 The duration of a license is limited to twenty years.8'
2. Federal-State Issues Related to OTEC Devices87
In the United States' coastal waters, there still remain
unresolved questions regarding the demarcation of authority
between the Federal government and the adjacent coastal
States. Further uncertainty is likely when the United States
decides to expand its territorial seas to a twelve-mile limit and
subsequently to claim its 200-mile EEZ; the two probable pros-
pects with or without a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty.
The primary question is, what would be the States' rights in
the newly acquired territory?
Since Federal-State jurisdictional issues may affect the
research and demonstration phase of OTEC, as well as its ad-
vanced development phase for commercial purposes, this sec-
tion will briefly describe, in an historical context, the current
law on Federal-State jurisdiction in coastal areas, which will be
followed by a discussion of the probable impacts of the United
States extension of its boundaries in the oceans on Federal-
State authority in the extended zones and on OTEC research
and development.
a. Current Law
The 1945 Truman Proclamation," which extended United
States' jurisdiction to its continental shelf, left unresolved the
question of Federal versus State authority over the shelf."s
However, in a number of cases in the following five years"0 the
84. Id. § 1504(b)(2). The regulations are to be subject to recognized principles of
international law. Id. § 1509(a).
85. Id. § 1505(a)(3).
86. Id. § 1503(h).
87. For a thorough and incisive study of Federal-State issues in the U.S. coastal
waters, see M. BAu, LAW OF THE SEA: FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS AND THE ExTENsION
OF THE TERrORIAL SEA (The Dean Rusk Center for International and Comparative
Law, University of Georgia, Monograph No. 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as M. BALL].
88. See note 38 supra.
89. See 13 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 484 (1945).
90. See, e.g., U.S. v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); U.S. v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707
(1950); U.S. v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38-39 (1947).
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Supreme Court held that the Federal government had para-
mount rights in and full dominion over the resources in the
territorial sea. Since several States had already granted leases
for offshore oil production in the three-mile limit, these Su-
preme Court decisions generated strong political pressure," to
which the U.S. Congress responded in May 1963, by enacting
the Submerged Lands Act." This Act gave the States title and
ownership of land and resources lying beneath the water ex-
tending seaward to its three-mile limit, 3 subject, however, to
the continued U.S. authority and rights over such lands and
waters "for the purposes of navigation or flood control or the
production of power."' 4 Under the Act, the United States ex-
pressly retained "all its navigational servitude and rights in
and powers of regulation and control of said lands and naviga-
ble waters for the constitutional purposes of commerce, naviga-
tion, national defense, and international affairs.""
Six years after the enactment of the statute, a Federal
district court specifically recognized the paramount power of
the United States to control such waters for the purposes of
navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. More recently,
Federal courts have confirmed that under the Act, Congress
did not surrender to the States its constitutional power to regu-
late foreign commerce, 7 and have given recognition to the pri-
macy of ongoing Federal interests in the seabed, 8 over the su-
perjacent waters and their resources," and surface activity in
the three-mile territorial sea.lN
In August 1953, just three months after the enactment of
91. See, e.g., E. B.AirLmv, THE TIDLANDS OEL CONTROVERSY 68-74, 88 (1953); Krue-
ger, The Development and Administration of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands of the
United States, 14 ROCKY MTN. MiNERAL L. INST. 643, 674-77 (1968); Comment,
Jurisdiction Over the Seabed: Persistent Federal-State Conflicts, 12 URBAN L. ANN.
291 (1976).
92. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1970). For legislative history and purpose of the Act,
see [1953] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1385.
93. 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a),(b)(1970).
94. Id. § 1311(d).
95. Id. § 1314(a).
96. See Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 174 F. Supp. 500 (D. Alaska 1959).
97. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 empowers Congress to regulate all aspects of foreign
commerce.
98. See Zabel v.*Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910;
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967).
99. See, e.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 283-87 (1977).
100. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 98 S. Ct. 989 (1978).
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the Submerged Lands Act, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act '0 implemented the 1945 Truman Proclamation by declar-
ing the policy of the United States: "that the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to the United
States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and power of
disposition."'' 02 While the Act recognizes "the character as high
seas of the waters above the outer Continental Shelf," thus
leaving unaffected the right to navigation and fishing in such
waters, 10 3 it specifically provides that:
The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdic-
tion of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed
of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and
fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of
exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources
therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Con-
tinental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provi-
sions of this subchapter. '"
To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with. . .Federal laws and regulations,. . . the civil and crimi-
nal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared
to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil
and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artifical islands
and fixed structures erected thereon.""
Under the Act, the Coast Guard is authorized to make and
enforce regulations "with respect to lights and other warning
devices, safety equipment, and other matters relating to the
promotion of safety of life and property on the islands and
structures" erected on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).'"
While the Secretary of the Interior is authorized to administer
and regulate the leasing of the OCS,'07 the Secretary of the
Army is authorized to prevent obstruction to navigation which
may be caused by artifical islands and fixed structures located
on OCS.10 The Act provides for the application of the civil and
101. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970). For legislative history and purpose of the Act,
see [19531 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2177.
102. 43 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
103. Id. § 1332(b).
104. Id. § 1333(a)(1).
105. Id. § 1333(a)(2).
106. Id. § 1333(e)(1).
107. Id. § 1334(a)(1).
108. Id. § 1333(f).
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criminal law of coastal States existing on the effective date of
the Act to the activities on the subsoil and seabed of OCS
including artificial islands and fixed structures erected there.'"
In 1975 Congress amended the Act to apply current State
laws.1 0
These statutes did not resolve the Federal-State contro-
versy regarding the proper authority and control for the explo-
ration and exploitation of OCS. The States continued to claim
a stronger voice in the decisionmaking process because of the
direct impacts on the States of OCS development. In response
to a U.S. complaint against thirteen Atlantic coastal States
that they were interfering with the exclusive U.S. rights to
explore and exploit the natural resources of OCS, in 1975 the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Maine,"' in which it
reaffirmed its earlier decisions that, as attributes of its external
sovereign powers, the Federal government has "paramount
rights in the marginal seas.""'
More recently, however, the recognition of the coastal
State's interest in activities over OCS has been evident in sev-
eral new developments, including: (1) the formation of regional
OCS advisory boards with State representatives on them;"3 (2)
the devising of a new system under which the Department of
the Interior will share with the States information regarding
lease tracts;"' and (3) the 1978 amendments to the Outer Con-
tinental Shelf Lands Act"' under which States will be given a
significant role in decisionmaking pertaining to leasing.1
Several other Federal statutes permit Federal-State par-
ticipation in planning offshore activities,I" including the Deep-
109. Id. § 1333(a)(2).
110. 43 U.S.C.A. § 1333(2) (Supp. 1978).
111. 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
112. Id. at 522-23.
113. The board's function is to advise the Secretary of the Interior on matters of
discretionary authority under the OCS Lands Act. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SAFETY AND ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION IN OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
5 (1977), cited in M. BALL, supra note 87, at 42 n. 159.
114. 43 Fed. Reg. 3883 (1978) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 250.34); 43 Fed. Reg.
3887, 3889 (1978) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. § 252); 43 Fed. Reg. 3895 (1978) (to be
codified at 30 C.F.R. § 3301.8).
115. President Carter signed the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amend-
ments on Sept. 22, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629.
116. Id. Title II, § 208 (adding a new § 19), 92 Stat. 652-53.
117. See, e.g., The Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. §§
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water Port Act"' and the Coastal Zone Management Act
(CZMA)."19
Under DPA, interested States are given an advisory role
both in the formulation of regulations to carry out the purposes
of the Act,'" and in the issuance of deepwater port licenses.'
Deepwater ports within the three-mile territorial waters of the
United States are excluded from the Federal licensing
scheme,2 2 "thereby leaving deepdraft harbors under the licens-
ing authority of the States and the Corps of Engineers."'2 A
noteworthy feature of the Federal-State sharing of authority in
DPA is that the Secretary of Transportation is not to issue a
license to own, construct, or operate a deepwater port facility
without the approval of the governor of each adjacent coastal
State, 124 which effectively grants the governor veto power over
the deepwater port application.2 5 A State is to be so designated
by the Secretary when it would be directly connected by pipe-
line or would be located within fifteen miles of a proposed
deepwater port. 2 Also, the Secretary could designate a State
as an adjacent coastal State if he determines, pursuant to a
request by the State and the recommendation of the adminis-
trator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion (NOAA) that "there is a risk of damage to the coastal
environment of such Stateieequal to or greater than the risk
posed to a State directly connected by pipeline to the proposed
deepwater port."' 7
Adjacent coastal States are also given preferential rights
1251-1376 (1976), as amended by The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217,
91 Stat. 1566; The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA), Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified in several sections of 16 & 22 U.S.C., the Act provides
for the participation of States' representatives on Regional Fisheries Management
Councils (16 U.S.C. § 1852 (1976)); Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-34 (1976); The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
43 (1976); and The Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1976)).
118. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
119. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
120. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(a),(b) (1976).
121. Id. § 1503(c)-(e).
122. Id. § 1502(10).
123. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1976).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1500(b) (1976).
125. Id. § 1503(c)(9).
126. Id. § 1508(a)(1).
127. Id. § 1508(a)(2). The regulations implementing the Act are contained in 33
C.F.R. § 148 (1977).
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to deepwater port licenses under DPA.' 2 As an original licen-
see, a State may transfer its license provided the transferee
complies with the requirements of the Act.'12 Also, the law of
the nearest adjacent coastal State-the State "whose seaward
boundaries, if extended beyond 3 miles, would encompass the
site of the deepwater port" 30-is made applicable under the
Act to licensed deepwater ports. Another notable provision is
the authorization of an adjacent coastal State to "fix reasona-
ble fees for the use of a deepwater port facility."' 3' Such fees
are subject to the approval of the Secretary of Transportation
and are not to exceed economic, environmental, and adminis-
trative costs of such State .13
CZMA is designed to protect coastal resources by encour-
aging States to manage the coastal areas.'1 Federal-State part-
nership is envisaged, for the Act requires that federally con-
ducted or supported activity within or directly affecting the
coastal zone must be carried out in a manner "which is, to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with approved state
management programs."' ' This "consistency" requirement is
made applicable specifically to the OCS development activ-
ity.'1 "A set of Federal regulations defines terms and estab-
lishes guidelines for the approval of coastal zone management
programs."1X
CZMA Amendments of 1976 created a coastal energy im-
pact program'37 which authorizes $800 million for the creation
of a coastal energy impact fund for loan guarantees and grants
to States which must have an approved coastal zone manage-
ment program or be making satisfactory progress in developing
128. 33 U.S.C. § 1504(h)(2)(i)(2)(A) (1976).
129. Id. § 1503(f).
130. Id. § 1518(b).
131. Id. § 1504(h)(2).
132. Id.
133. See generally Hollings, Congress and Coastal Zone Management, 1 COASTAL
ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 115 (1973); Knecht, Coastal Zone Management-A Federal
Perspective, id. at 123; Zile, A Legislative Political History of the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act of 1972, id. at 235; Symposium-Implementation of the Coastal Zone.
Management Act of 1972, 16 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 717-822 (1975).
134. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1456(c)(1),(2) (1976).
135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1453(4)(i), 1456(c)(3)(B) (1976).
136. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 923 (1978). For NOAA regulations implementing the con-
sistency provisions, see 43 Fed. Reg. 10,510-33 (1978) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt.
930).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(a) (1976).
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such a program.'3 Loans and loan guarantees also are author-
ized to aid coastal States in financing new or improved public
facilities and services needed to handle new or expanded
coastal energy activities. Additionally, grants are authorized
from the fund to help the States plan for the consequences of
increased coastal energy activities and to aid the States in
preventing or mitigating unavoidable losses of valuable envi-
ronmental and recreational resources. 3 9
b. Federal-State Issues in Light of LOS III
When the United States extends its boundaries to a
twelve-mile territorial sea and a 200-mile EEZ, two questions
become pertinent: (1) would the State zone be extended from
three to twelve miles? and (2) if such a State expansion were
to take place, would the Federal government preempt the
States in energy matters, including OTEC? Who would be the
licensing Authority and what would be the licensing
requirements? Since the coastal State is given police power
over such islands and structures, the question arises as to
which laws would be made applicable to them. In regard to the
last question, the model provided by the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 140 and DPA,"' applies the law of the adjacent
coastal State. This would seem to be the desirable approach to
adopt. Thus, the law of the State where the transmission cables
go ashore will apply to the extent that it is not inconsistent
with Federal law. Other possibilities include general maritime
law or the law of the State in which the OTEC firm is incorpo-
rated.
c. Recommendations
The primary concern regarding Federal-State jurisdic-
tional issues in adjacent coastal waters relates to an efficient
management of the 200-mile marine zone. There are arguments
in favor of either leaving the coastal States' boundaries fixed
at the three-mile limit or extending them to twelve miles. A
commentator has aptly summarized the pros and cons:
138. See id. §§ 1456(a),(c),(d), 1464(b). See generally Hildreth, The Operation
of the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act as Amended, 10 NAT. RSOURCES LAW.
211, 221-23 (1977).
139. See Hildreth, supra note 138, at 222-23.
140. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
141. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
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On the Federal side arguments could be advanced that the
interest of inland States and of all citizens, the history of the sea
as of national strategic importance, as well as greater naval and
administrative capacity, weigh in favor of Federal control.
On behalf of the States, it could be maintained that leaner,
more responsive agencies, closer familiarity with daily, mundane
marine-related affairs, and a diversity of local concerns render
the States the preferred government to exercise authority over an
expanded territorial sea."'
Irrespective of who owns the extended stretch of nine
miles, what is sorely needed is a cohesive U.S. policy for a 200-
mile maritime zone and an efficient and strong institutional
structure to implement it. At present, several departments in
the Federal government are involved in both the formation and
the implementation of national policies in adjacent coastal
waters. 13 Instead of a piecemeal legislative effort as a U.S.
response to the demands posed by the extension of its maritime
boundaries, an imaginative Federal oceans policy should be
fashioned which will facilitate an equitable resolution of
Federal-State issues.
During the last decade, a number of studies and reports on
U.S. marine policy, including the 1969 report of the Commis-
sion on Marine Science and Resources (Stratton Commission),
and reports by the National Advisory Committee on Oceans
and Atomosphere (NACOA), have recommended the creation
of a strong, independent, policy-setting body which could effec-
tively coordinate national ocean policies and implementing
activities."' The argument for the formation of a single policy-
formulating authority is that it can balance the various na-
tional interests which are often competing-national security,
national economy, international trade, and the global ecosys-
tem. The argument against such centralization is that a spe-
cialized oceans agency would detract from important programs
based on functional activities, such as OCS gas and oil explora-
tion, which is at present handled by the Department of the
Interior, and "should remain in Interior because of the land
142. M. BALL, supra note 87, at 23-24.
143. See id. at 54-55.
144. For a concise report on these activities, see A. WILSON, U.S. OCEAN POuCY:
COORDNATION AND CONTROL, 1 MARNE POL'Y REP., No. 6 (Center for the Study of
Marine Policy, College of Marine Studies, University of Delaware, Sept. 1978).
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development expertise of the Bureau of Land Management and
the U.S. Geological Survey."'4 5
In October 1977, Senate bill S.22241' was introduced "to
establish a national ocean policy and to set forth the missions
of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
[NOAA]." Asserting that U.S. ocean policy had long suffered
from disparate processes and duplication of effort, the bill
seeks to strengthen NOAA as the leading civilian ocean policy
agency responsible for coordinating national ocean policy. The
current situation is aptly summarized in a recent report by an
observer:
The important question is whether the ocean community
should settle for the problems engendered by the largely uncoor-
dinated program activities in the marine environment, or de-
mand Federal action to improve control of governmental policies.
No executive agency oversees all ocean programs. No Congres-
sional committee oversees all of the great number of program
interests expressed through all the competing uses of the marine
environment. There is no major policy perspective against which
specific development options can be judged for cohesiveness.
There is no responsible body to assist the President in the formu-
lation of immediate goals based on long-term national interest.
There exists no criterion by which international or domestic con-
cerns can be evaluated. The ocean environment encompasses
such a vast array of important interests and considerations that
muddling through by reacting to emergent needs is not in the
best interest of the nation.'
Proposals for the creation of a strengthened policy-setting body
include the formation of a Cabinet-level Marine Affairs Coun-
cil, " a public corporation such as COMSAT, or a public body
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority."'
Based upon a thorough appraisal and evaluation of the
current U.S. offshore policies, especially of Federal-State au-
thority and control in a myriad of activities occurring in this
area, it is imperative that the administration of the govern-
ment's oceans programs be centralized in a strong, effective,
and independent body, and that Federal-State jurisdictional
145. See id. at 2.
146. Introduced in U.S. Senate on Oct. 20, 1977. Hearings were held on April 6,
1978.
147. A. WILSON, supra note 144, at 4.
148. NACOA made this recommendation in June 1977. Id. at 3.
149. See M. BALL, supra note 87, at 56-57.
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and regulatory issues be resolved equitably. The next section
will examine some of these issues, especially the ones relevant
in the contextof OTEC siting and development.
B. Regulatory Issues
Regulatory issues will be considered in this section in two
contexts- international and Federal-State. This examination
will be prefaced by a brief investigation of the legal status of
OTEC devices.
1. Legal Status of OTEC Devices
It is important to determine the legal status of OTEC de-
vices because many rights and obligations of such entities and
those owning, operating, and manning them will flow from
such a determination. The conferring of legal status on OTEC
devices, whether fixed to the ocean floor or moveable either for
stationkeeping or for grazing on the high seas, will legitimize
their presence as well as their operation. The issue is two-fold:
(1) who would authorize their presence and operation by licens-
ing them? (the analogy is that of a flag state authorizing the
use of its flag on a vessel), and (2) since traditionally a regula-
tory mechanism exists to regulate activities of structures de-
signed as vessels on the oceans, would OTEC devices be consid-
ered vessels or quasi-vessels, at least for some purposes? The
question of licensing will be discussed in the next section exam-
ining international and Federal-State regulatory mechanisms.
Whether an OTEC device is considered a vessel will not be
dispositive of the complex legal issues raised by OTEC pres-
ence as a new user of the sea. There are, however, existing
international guidelines, standards, and regulations applicable
to vessels which have been established by the long standing use
of the oceans for commercial navigation. It is useful to inquire
whether the existing standards and regulations-those of
safety, design and construction, collision and navigation, com-
munication, and labor-will apply to OTEC devices and
whether these regulations need to be modified in order to meet
OTEC needs. Otherwise, new arrangements will have to be
devised. In the national context, giving OTEC devices the sta-
150. See generally Nyhart, OTEC Structures as Vessels, in ASIL STUDY, supra
note 70, at 213-33. See also Nanda, The Legal Status of Surface Devices Functioning
at Sea other than Ships (Drilling Rigs, Offshore Platforms, etc.), 26 AM. J. CoMP. L.
(Supp.) 233 (1978).
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tus of vessels could confer upon them substantial economic
benefits, in view of the fact that the U.S. shipping industry is
subsidized by the United States government by means of pro-
viding mortgage guarantees, construction and operation subsi-
dies, and tax advantages. 15'
Only during the last decade have international agreements
regulating activities on the sea broadened their reach to cover
OTEC-type structures. The 1969 Convention on Intervention
on the High Seas, dealing with oil pollution casualties, set the
stage by defining a ship as: "(a) any sea-going vessel of any
type whatsoever, and (b) any floating craft with the exception
of an installation or device engaged in the exploration of re-
sources of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil
thereof."' 15 The Convention added a distinct category of
"floating craft" to that of "vessel," the term traditionally used
in such conventions. The 1972 Convention on the Prevention
of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter' 3
defined vessels to include "floating craft, whether self-
propelled or not."'' 54 The Convention called upon each contract-
ing party to apply means required to implement the present
convention of all "vessels . . . and fixed or floating platforms
under its jurisdiction believed to be engaged in dumping.' 5
The 1973 Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships 18 defines ship to mean "a vessel of any type whatsoever
151. See, e.g., on ship mortgages, 46 U.S.C. .§§ 911-84 (1970); subchapter XI,
"Federal Ship Mortgage Insurance," of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 1271-80 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended by the Federal Ship Financing Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-507. See generally Smith, Jr., Ship Mortgages, 47 TUL. L. REV.
608 (1973). On subsidies and tax advantages, see subchapters V and VI of The Mer-
chant Marine Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1151-83(a) (1970 & Supp. IV 1974), as amended
by The Negotiated Shipbuilding Contracting Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-373 §§ 2,3,90
Stat. 1042; Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 861(e)(1976). See generally Cook, Jr.,
Government Assistance in Financing Title XI Federal Guarantees, 47 TuL. L. REv. 653
(1973); Kominers, Federal Government Aids to Merchant Shipping, id. at 691.
152. Article 11 (2), International Convention relating to Intervention on the High
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, 26 U.S.T. 765, T.I.A.S.
No. 8068, reprinted in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 25 (1970) (entered into force May 6,
1975).
153. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and other Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (entered into
force August 30, 1975).
154. Id. art. II1(2).
155. Id. art. VII(1)(c).
156. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, done
Nov. 2, 1973, reprinted in 12 INT'L LEGAL MATEMALS 1319 (1973).
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operating in the marine environment and includes hydrofoil
boats, air-cushion vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and
fixed or floating platforms."'57 In addition to ships entitled to
fly the flag of the party, the Convention also applies to "ships
not entitled to fly the flag of a Party but which operate under
the authority of a Party.""' Similarly, the 1976 Convention on
the International Maritime Satellite Organization' 9 defines a
ship broadly as "a vessel of any type operating in the marine
environment. It includes inter alia hydrofoil boats, air-cushion
vehicles, submersibles, floating craft and platforms not perma-
nently moored."1 0 It appears that the terms being used now
such as "floating craft," and "floating platforms," would in-
clude OTEC-type structures in the ocean environment. How-
ever, there are many conventions adopted under the auspices
of the International Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), which do not cover OTEC-type facilities. 6 ' Which of
these conventions should be made applicable to OTEC will
depend upon the purpose of the convention and the probable
benefit of its application to OTEC activities-both to the re-
search and demonstration, and the development phases-so
that OTEC commercialization is facilitated and expedited.
ICNT provisions on pollution, on the other hand, would
cover OTEC devices. Dumping is defined to include wastes or
other matter from "vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-
made structures at sea."' 62 The-terms used are "installations
and devices,"'6 3 and "vessels, installations, structures and
157. Id. art. 2(4).
158. Id. art. 3(1).
159. Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization, done Sept.
3, 1976, reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1051 (1976).
160. Id. art. 1(f).
161. These conventions would include: International Convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea, (SOLAS Convention), signed June 17, 1960, 16 U.S.T. 185, T.I.A.S. No.
5780, 536 U.N.T.S. 27; 1974 SOLAS Convention, reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATEMALS 959 (1975); International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the
Sea by Oil, opened for signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327
U.N.T.S. 3, as amended by Amendments to the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, done Apr. 11, 1962, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S.
No. 6109, 600 U.N.T.S. 332; International Convention on Load Lines, done Apr. 5,
1966, 18 U.S.T. 1857, T.I.A.S. No. 6331, 640 U.N.T.S. 133; and International Conven-
tion on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, done Nov. 29, 1969, reprinted in 9
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 45 (1970).
162. ICNT, art. 1(1)(5)(a)(i & ii).
163. Id. art. 195(3)(c & d). The provisions cover all installations and devices in
the marine environment.
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other devices," flying the flag of the mining state or of its
registry." 4 Therefore, regardless of the status of OTEC devices,
they would be regulated under ICNT.
2. International Regulatory Mechanisms and OTEC1I
a. Current Law
It should come as no suprise that no regulatory mechanism
exists for specific application to OTEC, for as a new technology
it has yet to make its debut as a user of ocean space. Of course,
the primary purpose of providing a regulatory framework is to
reduce uncertainty and risks attendant on pursuing OTEC ac-
tivities, an important consideration not only for prospective
investors, but also for eventual commercialization of OTEC.
It seems likely that in the initial stages of OTEC develop-
ment for research and demonstration purposes and subse-
quently for commercial operation, broader guidelines and stan-
dards with built-in flexibility, rather than narrow, precise
norms will be established. Developments in another relatively
new area, transnational pollution,' show that the important
tasks of setting and harmonizing standards and establishing
appropriate machinery for implementation, usually occur first
in regional settings"7 and appear later in a global setting where
such need and feasibility have been clearly demonstrated. Be-
cause of unique regional situations, it is unrealistic to expect
or even pursue universality and uniformity. The Regional Seas
Program of the United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP),65 which has developed in the last four years and is
still developing action plans for seven regions-Mediterranean,
Gulf of Arabia, Red Sea, Gulf of Guinea, Carribbean and adja-
cent regions, East Asian Seas, and South Pacific-illustrates
regional efforts on environmental management.
164. Id. art. 210(2).
165. See generally Faron, International Regulatory Aspects of OTEC Develop-
ment and Operation, in ASIL STUDY, supra note 70, at 86-148.
166. See generally J. BARROS & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
POLLUTION (1974); Nanda, The Establishment of International Standards for Transna-
tional Environmental Injury, 60 IowA L. REv. 1089 (1975).
167. See generally Nanda, supra note 166, at 1101-08, 1126-27; note 168 infra;
Okidi, Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine Pollution, 4 OCEAN
Dav. & INT'L L. 1 (1977).
168. See International Center, Industry and Environment, Executive Report No.
30, Oct. 30, 1978. UNEP has established a special Regional Seas Programme Activity
Centre at its Geneva office.
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Several existing arrangements regulating other activities
in ocean space could be construed to cover OTEC-type struc-
tures and activities on them, or with modifications, could be
made applicable to OTEC. A few examples of such arrange-
ments relevant to OTEC follow for illustrative purposes.
The results of the last major effort to provide a framework
for activities in ocean space, the 1958 Geneva Conventions, do
provide some basis for regulating OTEC. For example, the free-
doms enumerated in the High Seas Convention-navigation,
fishing, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and over-
flights"'-are not exhaustive and it could be argued that
OTEC activities do constitute a "reasonable use" of the high
seas'7 0 and fall within the scope of the freedoms granted under
the Convention.' Other pertinent provisions of the Convention
include those authorizing states to lay submarine cables, pipe-
lines and communications lines, "2 and those related to the
states' regulation of the ocean pollution caused by their activi-
ties.7 3
The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf' contains
prohibitions against: (1) obstruction of the laying and mainte-
nance of submarine cables and pipelines on the continental
shelf,'75 (2) the rights of coastal states affecting the legal status
of the superjacent waters of the high seas, "' and (3) "any unjus-
tifiable interference with navigation, fishing or the conserva-
tion of the living resources of thesea."'" It also provides for the
protection of "fundamental oceanographic or other scientific
research carried out with the intention of open publication."'7
As noted earlier, however, notwithstanding the provisions of
the Convention on the Continental Shelf, the recent develop-
ments regarding extensive coastal states' claims in their off-
shore areas, especially the developments regarding EEZ, make
it highly unlikely that OTEC activities could be conducted on
169. Art. 2 of the High Seas Convention, note 15 supra.
170. See notes 56-57 supra and the accompanying text.
171. Id.
172. The High Seas Convention, supra note 15, arts. 26-29.
173. Id. arts. 24-25.
174. See note 15 supra.
175. Id. art. 4.
176. Id. art. 3.
177. Id. art. 5(1).
178. Id.
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another state's continental shelf without its consent. 79
The question of who would authorize operation of OTEC
devices on the high seas is at present unsettled. Would the
current state practice on vessels, the flag state approach (which
raises a further issue of the flags of convenience),1 0 be made
applicable; or, would the OTEC issue become as controversial
as is the deep seabed mining issue at present?'' It is premature
to suggest the precise nature of the conditions and arrange-
ments for OTEC activities on the high seas, for the current
debate on the seabed mining issue and the conclusions which
are finally reached at LOS 111 will substantially affect the
OTEC licensing and operations.8 2
As noted earlier, most existing standards and regulations
affecting activities in ocean space apply primarily to vessels, a
term recently broadened to include OTEC-type structures.' 3
Institutional arrangements, both in setting standards and pro-
viding mechanisms for compliance are in various stages of de-
velopment. One commentator describes the current state of
affairs:
These arrangements cover areas such as safety, navigational
aids, collision avoidance, design and construction regulation,
inspection, certification, port entry, liability, communications,
and labor and crew qualification. Most of these arrangements
arise in national rather than international contexts, in most cases
because international standards have not been agreed upon, or
because nations have not been willing to subject themselves to
.international authority. Some of these arrangements have been
developed into conventions, which are binding on parties; others
are still undergoing analysis by such forums as IMCO's Legal
Committee in order to match institutional arrangements to the
realities of ocean use .... International forums have just begun
to regulate moored platforms and other relatively novel marine
technology. If OTEC devices are considered vessels, which is
likely, at least for grazing type OTECs, then the various institu-
179. See notes 43-51 supra and the accompanying text.
180. See generally B. BOCZEK, FLAGs OF CONVENIENCE (1962); McDougal & Burke,
supra note 16, at 1008-1140.
181. In addition to the series cited in note 59 supra, see generally Burton, Freedom
of the Seas: International Law Applicable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN.
L. REV. 1135 (1977); Charney, Law of the Sea: Breaking the Deadlock, 55 FOR. AFF.
598 (1977), Galey, From Caracas to Geneva to New York: The International Seabed
Authority as a Creator of Grants, 4 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 171 (1977).
182. Supra note 181.
183. See notes 150-64 supra and the accompanying text.
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tional arrangements currently providing norms and rules of vessel
operation may apply or be amended to apply to OTEC develop-
ment.'"
Regulations applicable to marine pollution which might have
a bearing on OTEC activities will be discussed in the next
section dealing with environmental problems.181
b. Recommendations
It is desirable to devise a regulatory scheme which assists
OTEC commercialization by providing certainty to prospective
investors. What must be carefully avoided is overregulation or
an inflexible and cumbersome regulatory system which can be
stifling, especially for a new technology.
It is not to be expected that a new international regulatory
mechanism will be established in the near future under a con-
vention that deals specifically with OTEC operations. Experi-
ence shows that it was only in the aftermath of the Torrey
Canyon disaster'86 that the current major conventions on mar-
ine pollution from ships were negotiated-the 1969 conventions
on civil liability"7 and intervention on the high seas,' 8 and the
1973 convention on prevention of pollution from ships.' 9 How-
ever, several existing mechanisms could be applied to OTEC
activities. To illustrate, several IMCO conventions currently
applicable to vessels might be modified and made applicable
to OTEC devices. Similarly, a functional approach is possible,
authorizing specialized U.N. agencies to bring OTEC devices
and operations under their regulatory framework: the Interna-
tional Energy Agency, because of OTEC's involvement with
energy production; the World Meteorological Organization
(WMO), due to OTEC's research activities; the Food and Agri-
cultural Organization (FAO), if OTEC generated energy is
used for producing fertilizers or in aquaculture; and the United
Nations Environmental Program, owing to the potential envi-
ronmental effects of OTEC operations. Of course, ISA could
assume jurisdiction because of its umbrella function over the
184. Faron, supra note 165, at 96-97 (footnotes omitted).
185. See notes 240-72 infra and the accompanying text.
186. See generally G. GILL, F. BECKER & T. SOPER, THE WRECK OF THE TORREY
CANYON (1967); Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DEN.
L. J. 400 (1967).
187. Supra note 161.
188. Supra note 152.
189. Supra note 156.
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proposed deep seabed regime.9 0 This is possible, especially in
veiw of the "common heritage" concept,"' the probable OTEC
conflict with deep seabed mining activities,' 2 or the possibly
environmentally adverse effects of OTEC operations.'9 3
It is recommended that, in addition to the prescription of
unilateral U.S. regulations dealing with issues related to licens-
ing and registration, safety, conflicting sea uses, communica-
tions, import and export, foreign labor, insurance, liability and
compensation schemes, etc., attention be given now to the de-
vising of imaginative bilateral and regional arrangements to
apply to situations such as the following:
1. The resolution of apparently competing interests of a
coastal state and the licensing/registry state, where a foreign
registered/licensed OTEC device is operating adjacent to a
coastal state EEZ. The coastal state's interest in preventing
harmful effects within its EEZ must be acknowledged and ac-
commodated.
2. The use of bilateral or regional schemes under which
a combination of a state or states and private enterprises pool
their resources, technology, and know-how to enter into ar-
rangements for research and/or commercial purposes, such as,
joint ventures to construct, operate, and own OTEC devices in
a specific geographic area. The question of such operations on
the high seas, of course, will have to be addressed separately,
perhaps requiring some sort of global arrangement. The grow-
ing experience in working with satellite communication sys-
tems might offer useful guidelines.' 4
3. The need for bilateral or regional consultative mecha-
nisms which will address specific issues regarding the manage-
ment of conflicting claims of ocean uses caused by OTEC pres-
ence. Fisheries arrangements' and existing agreements be-
tween neighbors on international waterways' 9 offer useful pre-
cedents.
190. ICNT arts. 154-92.
191. Id. art. 136.
192. See id. pt. XI (arts. 154-92) and Annexes II & III.
193. See id. pt. XII (arts. 193-238).
194. See generally Colino, International Cooperation between Communications
Satellite Systems: An Overview of Current Practices and Future Prospects, 5 J. SPACE
L. 65 (1977); Frutkin, Direct Community Broadcast Projects Using Space Satellites 3
id. at 17 (1975).
195. See generally NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF
THE SEA 573-86 (U.N. Legislative Series 1976), U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18.
196. See generally Nanda, supra note 166, at 1101-08.
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4. The need for dispute settlement mechanisms.
On the global level, regulations regarding OTEC siting on
the high seas might become necessary because of the possible
conflicts between competing claimants to ocean uses or be-
tween competing claimants to attractive OTEC sites (a contin-
gency not likely to occur in the near future). Thus, mechanisms
might have to be devised to set standards and regulations con-
cerning the licensing and operation, and allocation of OTEC
sites for settlement of disputes, and to insure the efficient and
optimal use of the oceans for OTEC development. In the long
run, it might be desirable to establish an International Energy
Resources Conservation and Management Agency, and a code
of conduct for OTEC activities.
3. Federal-State Regulatory Mechanisms and OTEC
a. Current Law
The need for a thorough assessment of the current Federal
offshore policies and for a Federal-State relationship regarding
adjacent coastal waters has been suggested earlier.' 7 To deal
specifically with OTEC issues, it is necessary to outline a
rough approximation of how OTEC exploitation will occur in
the next twenty years. In a recent study,'98 Tefft, Kelly, Dick,
and Stevenson postulate the following scenario for OTEC ex-




1980 85 90 95 00 05 10 15 20 25
.5 2.5 5 10 50 100 150 200 250
Key Descriptors
1. Successful demonstration of economy of technology and
environmental benignity of full systems by 1985 (.5 on line in 85
is demonstration(s) facilities).
2. Federal stimulation of follow-on exploitation by
a. establishment of benevolent legal regime
b. establishment of stimulative development institu-
tion
197. See notes 142-49 supra and the accompanying text.
198. TEFF, KELLY & MOTLEY STUDY, supra note 9.
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c. provision of substantial Federal financial incentives
3. Establishment of fostering legal, institutional, and fi-
nancing framework by 1980.
4. Operations within framework to develop strategic plan
for exploitation and to assemble facilities ventures concurrently
with demonstration implementation, i.e., 1980 to 1985.
5. Continued operations within framework during 1985 to
2000 at a pace sufficient to establish perfected industrial, legal,
institutional, and financial infrastructure by 2000."'1
The authors conclude that "decisive Federal action will be
needed to carry out this scenario. The Executive Branch pres-
ently lacks the policy direction and the specific legal authority
to take actions in the depth and breadth necessary to build the
legal, institutional, and financial framework needed to under-
lay scenario execution. Thus, new Federal legislation is neces-
sary." 200
The authors offer a model of Federal legislation which
takes into account the necessary interface with international
law as well with State interests. 20' They propose the enactment
of an "Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion, Development, Ex-
ploitation, and Regulation Act of 1980,"20 which would estab-
lish, among other policy objectives, the following: OTEC shall
be subject to exclusive Federal regulation; while in the short
term, Federal participation in OTEC development, ownership,
and/or operation will be necessary to stimulate deployment to
meet the established energy generation goals (by the year 2000,
a minimum of 10,000 megawatts of installed electric OTEC
generation capacity usable within the United States, its terri-
tories and possessions and/or on U.S. flag vessels at sea, and
of 250,000 megawatts by the year 2025),203 a long term objective
shall be non-Federal development, ownership, and operation.
To carry out these policies, the proposed legislation con-
tains four titles: OTEC Development Financing Association;
OTEC Inc.; Duties and Responsibilities of the Secretary of
Energy; and Legal Regime.20
4
199. Id. at 8.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 11-24.
202. Id. at 10.
203. Id. at 11.
204. Id. at 12.
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The authors provide a detailed institutional framework, ' 15
the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this paper. How-
ever, a few selected Federal-State regulatory issues will be ex-
amined here.
On the issue regarding the application of Federal versus
State laws to OTEC activities in adjacent offshore areas, it
should be noted that extensive case law has developed regard-
ing the applicability of the pertinent Federal or State laws to
injuries suffered by workers on fixed or submersible oil-drilling
platforms or rigs.206 Different rules have been applied to injuries
occurring on fixed platforms within the three-mile zone as op-
posed to those occurring beyond the three-mile limit. "7 A land-
mark decision was a 1969 case, Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co.,2 "8 in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that State
law would apply to fixed offshore platforms in preference to
general maritime law. In 1972, the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act""t was amended, allowing a con-
current application of both Federal and State laws in case of
an overlap.210
However, until Congress enacts comprehensive Federal
legislation regarding OTEC, the guidelines on the applicable
law are provided by the Supreme Court test of uniformity ver-
sus locality or diversity:
if a case falls within an area in commerce thought to demand
a uniform national rule, state action is struck down. If the activ-
ity is one of predominantly local interest, state action is sus-
tained. More accurately, the question is whether the state inter-
est is outweighed by a national interest in the unhampered opera-
tion of interstate commerce.2 1'
More recently, in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,2"' the issue was
that of a conflict between Washington State's tanker law regu-
lating oil tankers in Puget Sound, 2 1 the Ports and Waterways
205. Supra note 201; TEFFr, KELLY & MOTLEY, INC., WORKING DrAr, OTEC DE-
VELOPMENT, EXPLOITATION, AND REGULATION AcT OF 1980 (1978).
206. For discussion of these cases, see Comment, Offshore Oil Platforms and
Admiralty Law: Rodrigue in Retrospect, 49 TUL. L. REv. 65 (1975).
207. Id.
208. 395 U.S. 352 (1969).
209. Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251 (1972), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1976).
210. See Comment, Broadened Coverage Under the LHWCA, 33 LA. L. REv. 683
(1973).
211. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
212. 98 S. Ct. 988 (1978).
213. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.170-190 (Supp. 1978).
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Safety Act of 1972 (PWSA),2 " and the Constitution. The Su-
preme Court found certain safety features in the design and
equipment of tankers which were required under Washington
law to be invalid in the face of the preempting requirements set
by PWSA.2 15 The Court applied the uniformity/diversity tests
and based its decision on the need for uniformity of safety
design requirements. Applying the same test, it also struck
down another provision of Washington law, which excluded
tankers in excess of 125,000 DWT211 from Puget Sound. How-
ever, the Court upheld another provision, which required that
tankers over a certain size "take a Washington State licensed
pilot while navigating Puget Sound,"217 reasoning that this pro-
vision was more of an operating rule for local waters.""8
The issues of licensing, the law applicable to OTEC facili-
ties in adjacent waters, and the potential environmental and
administrative burdens upon the coastal States were addressed
by DPA in the context of deepwater port facilities and have
been noted earlier.2 19
b. Recommendations
Federal and State interests coincide in a number of areas
which will probably be affected by OTEC develop-
ment-coastal zone management and land planning, revenue
sharing, State costs and fees, and electricity rate regulations.
The coastal States have a significant stake because of possible
conflicts with other ocean uses, adverse environmental effects,
siting of shore-based support facilities, etc. Thus, it will be in
the mutual interest of the Federal government and coastal
States that a mechanism be devised which is workable and
feasible, effective and efficient, environmentally sound, and
equitable in its reach while dealing with Federal-State inter-
ests. 2 ' These broad policy objectives should be given effect by
a system under which:
1. The licensing and regulatory authority will be the Fed-
eral government.
214. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27, 46 U.S.C. 391(a) (Supp. V 1975). The provision on
safety features held invalid is Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.190(2) (Supp. 1978).
215. 98 S. Ct. at 996-1000.
216. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.190(1) (Supp. 1978).
217. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 88.16.180 (Supp. 1978).
218. 98 S.Ct. at 1000-1002.
219. See notes 120-32 supra and the accompanying text.
220. See generally note 205 supra.
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2. The DOE/Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) will be the lead Federal agency to license and regulate
OTEC activities, similar to the Department of Transporta-
tion/Coast Guard's role as the lead agency for licensing deep-
water port facilities under DPA.
3. OTEC facilities in offshore areas will be considered a
utility in interstate and foreign commerce and will be subject
to regulations and procedures of FERC both as to rate regula-
tion and technical standards.
4. The Coast Guard and the Corps of Engineers will be
responsible for navigational safety and seaworthiness pertain-
ing to OTEC facilities.
Such a scheme will accomodate Federal-State interests by
providing for:
1. a Federal/State revenue sharing scheme, especially
permitting States to recover the economic cost to them of a
federal right-of-way for transmission cables through the three-
mile territorial sea and also for shore-based facilities;
2. an effective Federal/State consultative mechanism;
and
3. administrative advisory boards.
C. Environmental Considerations
A recent study has outlined the following environmental
problems associated with the deployment of OTEC devices in
the ocean:
(1) the potentially toxic effect on marine life of metallic elements
eroded or corroded from heat exchangers; (2) the adverse effect
of mixing natural thermocline and salinity gradients; (3) the po-
tentially toxic effects of working fluid seepage into the seawater
or seawater into the working fluid; (4) the ecological impacts of
concentrations of biocides (such as chlorine) used to prevent bio-
fouling; (5) the safety of workers faced with exposure to chemi-
cals; [and] (6) the effect on the microclimate of slightly lower
air and surface temperatures around the plant. 2 1
It should, however, be noted that this inquiry into the
potentially adverse environmental impact of OTEC activities
is speculative. Nonetheless, it is certainly desirable that these
issues be addressed at this preliminary stage of OTEC develop-
ment. The discussion in this section will open with a brief
221. SERI INTERIM DRAft REP., supra note 9, at 137-39.
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outline of the domestic (Federal-State) issues, and will focus
primarily on international aspects of OTEC-related environ-
mental issues.
1. Domestic (Federal-State) Issues
Potential environmental impacts from OTEC facilities in
coastal waters include those from construction and operation
of such facilities, cables and transmission lines, and onshore
services and support facilities. The existing U.S. legislation
relevant to OTEC activities both during its research and devel-
opment phase and during the commercial phase includes the
OCS Lands Act,' CZMA,2 3 DPA, 22 and the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) .225 Except for NEPA, the
pertinent provisions of these statutes have already been exam-
ined in the preceding sections on jurisdiction 22 and regulatory
mechansims.2 2 Consequently, the discussion here will be con-
fined to NEPA and recent developments regarding the other
statutes.
NEPA requires Federal agencies to prepare records on en-
vironmental effects of and alternatives to "every recommenda-
tion or report on proposals for legislation and other major Fed-
eral actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment. ' '2 2 Since Federal involvement in OTEC develop-
ment is expected to be substantial, at least during the initial
stages, preparation of programmatic Environmental Impact
Statements (EISs)221 will be required during the research phase
of OTEC development. Additionally, while OTEC facilities
will be subject to site-specific EISs, because of Federal time,
money, or effort an OTEC facility received,2 30 it is possible that
222. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970).
223. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
224. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-24 (1976).
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1976).
226. See notes 92-141 supra and the accompanying text.
227. See notes 206-20 supra and the accompanying text.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c). See generally R. LIVOFF, A NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: NEPA AND ITS AFTERMATH (1976).
229. See generally Note, The Scope of the Program EIS Requirement: The Need
for a Coherent Judicial Approach, 30 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1978).
230. Actions with direct effect as well as actions with indirect effects have been
held subject to EIS requirements. Since Federal agencies are required to make a
detailed statement on "major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment," the question regarding the scope of "major Federal actions"
assumes special importance. For a criticism of a broad interpretation of the term
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regional EISs will also be needed, due to the cumulative effect
of a number of OTEC facilities in a region.
21'
Among other significant developments, the Coast Guard,
on December 4, 1978, proposed rules for administering an off-
shore oil pollution compensation fund, 2 2 which will be set up
pursuant to the 1978 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
Amendments,23 3 which President Carter signed on September
22, 1978.234 The Secretaries of Transportation and the Treasury
will administer the fund, which is expected to cover "all marine
oil pollution, including that discharged from onshore facilities
and deepwater ports. 235 Under the 1978 amendments, 236 no
license for the development and production of oil or gas on OCS
will be granted unless it conforms with the requirements of
CZMA.27 Also, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)
is proposing new pollution clean up plans in which coastal
States' interests are recognized. 231 It is also worth noting that
since the total number of coastal zone management programs
stands now at thirteen- California, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, Puerto
Rico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wiscon-
sin231-more active State participation in decisionmaking can
be anticipated.
2. International Aspects
In addition to the primary concern of the coastal state with
its immediate marine environment, its interests also extend to
the protection and preservation of a shared global marine envi-
ronment. The latter is affected by unilateral state actions as
well as collective actions by states. Selected recent develop-
ments of states' actions that might have a bearing on OTEC
thereby requiring EISs for actions which may not be "major Federal actions," see
Friedman, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 - The Brave New World of
Environmental Legislation, 6 NAT. RESOURCEs L. 44 (1973).
231. For a discussion of regional EISs, see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390
(1976) rev'g Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F. 2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
232. 43 Fed. Reg. 56840 (1978). See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 1413 (1978).
233. Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 629 (1978).
234. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 972 (1978).
235. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,840 (1978).
236. Supra note 230.
237. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1976).
238. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 1416-17 (1978).
239. Id. at 1293.
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development will be noted in this section, which will conclude
with a brief comment on pertinent ICNT provisions.
a. Unilateral U.S. Actions Related to the Marine
Environment
During the recent past, the U.S. Congress has adopted
legislation with potential extraterritorial reach in the marine
environment. For example, the Clean Water Act 2" extended
the application of Section 311 (Oil and Hazardous Substance
Liability) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act24' to cover
activities which affect the resources of the 200-mile U.S. fisher-
ies zone or its OCS. Earlier, the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976242 extended the U.S. fishery zone to
200 miles. Other U.S. acts with potential effect on maritime
activities include the U.S. Ports and Waterway Safety Pro-
gram, 2 the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
of 1972,44 the new Coast Guard Regulations concerning naviga-
tional aids,245 and the DPA. 46
The debate continues as to whether NEPA applies to
major Federal actions abroad. 47 The argument for its applica-
tion abroad was recently made at a Senate Subcommittee
hearing by Russell E. Train, former EPA administrator, former
CEQ chairman, and current president of the World Wildlife
Fund. He asserted that House and Senate members attending
a 1968 coloquium, which "served as a basis for NEPA," in-
tended that the law apply beyond U.S. territorial limits, and
that President Carter reinforced that view in his 1977 environ-
mental message. 148 He added that an environmental policy
which "failed to recognize the global nature of the human envi-
ronment would be shortsighted," and that the U.S. should con-
240. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, 1593-96 (1977).
241. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1976).
242. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
243. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1221-27 (1976).
244. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1401-34 (1976).
245. See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 5964, 5966 (1977).
246. 33 U.S.C. 88 1501-24 (1976).
247. See generally Comment, Renewed Controversy Over the International Reach
of NEPA, 7 ENVT'L L. REP. 10,205 (1977); Sierra Club v. A.E.C., 4 id. at 20,685 (D.D.C.
1974); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. U.S. Agency for International Develop-
ment, 6 id. at 20,121 (D.D.C. 1975); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 405 F. Supp. 53 (D.D.C.
1975), injunction continued, 421 F. Supp. 63 (D.D.C. 1976); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMEN-
TAL QUALITY ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY - EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT Appendix G 395
(1977).
248. See 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 304 (1978).
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sider the "significant extra-territorial environmental impacts"
of its actions." 9 However, with regard to the application of
NEPA to the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), the concern of
U.S. business is that EIS requirements for Eximbank would
result in delays in getting loans and added costs to applicants,
thereby depressing the rate of U.S. exports.5 0
The controversy will be settled through an Executive
Order setting out responsibilities of Federal agencies for re-
viewing environmental effects of their overseas projects. Re-
portedly, under a proposed Executive Order, certain Federal
actions having a significant adverse effect upon the environ-
ment of nonparticipating third countries or natural resources
of global importance will be required to have abbreviated envi-
ronmental reviews.25' Eximbank President, John L. Moore, re-
cently explained that the proposed Executive Order would re-
quire short environmental assessments primarily for "projects"
to be financed by Eximbank.2 5 2 Thus, if Eximbank were to
finance the purchase of an OTEC plant for a developing state,
an assessment would be required. It may also be noted that the
Department of Energy has commissioned environmental im-
pact assessments of a small floating OTEC test facility. 53
Since so little is yet known about OTEC activities and
operations, environmental assessments should be conducted
during the research phase. The same applies in the commercial
phase, whether the OTEC plant is to operate in a U.S. coastal
zone, in the coastal zone of another state, or on the high seas.
b. Multilateral Actions
The 1972 U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm254 acknowledged the emerging norms of state re-
sponsibility and liability for transnational environmental dam-
age. Under Principle 21 of the U.N. Declaration on the Human
Environment, states are responsible for insuring "that activi-
ties within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to
249. Id.
250. Id. at 305.
251. Id. at 1049.
252. Id.
253. Noted in Stein, Environmental Aspects of OTEC Development and
Demonstration, in ASIL STUDy, supra note 70, at 154.
254. See Report of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).
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the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction."" 5 Also, under Principle 22, "States
shall cooperate to develop further the international law regard-
ing liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and
other environmental damage caused by activities within the
jurisdiction or control of such States to areas beyond their ju-
risdiction. '5 Principle 7 calls upon states to "take all possible
steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living re-
sources and marine life, to damage or to interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea."' 7
Following the Stockholm conference, several conventions
were concluded, including the London Convention on the
Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 250 the 1973 IMCO Convention on
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,2 159 and the 1974 Conven-
tion on the Safety of Life at Sea.2 0 Also, there have been sub-
stantial bilateral and multilateral efforts to conclude new con-
ventions for the prevention of marine pollution and the conser-
vation and management of the marine environment26 ' which
might have some bearing on OTEC2 11 operations.
c. ICNT Provisions
Part XII of ICNT contains 46 Articles dealing with the
protection and preservation of the marine environment. States
are obligated to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment,22 to refrain from polluting the environment of other
states or areas beyond their national jurisdiction,2 3 and to take
measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollution.6 4
Among specific measures, states are to minimize the release of
toxic, harmful or noxious substances from dumping, 25 and pol-
255. Id. at 5.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 4.
258. Supra note 153.
259. Supra note 156.
260. Reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 959 (1975).
261. In addition to note 168 supra, see generally 4 NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA, supra note 10, at 331-518; 6 id. at 456-562; Hickery, Jr., Custom and Land-
Based Pollution of the High Seas, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 409, 445-54 (1978); Okidi, note
167 supra.
262. ICNT art. 193.
263. See id. arts. 195(2), 238.
264. Id. art. 195(1).
265. Id. art. 195(3)(a)(iii).
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lution from vessels"'6 and "from all other installations and de-
vices operating in the marine environment, in particular for
preventing accidents and dealing with emergencies, ensuring
the safety of operations at sea, and regulating the design, con-
struction, equipment, operation and manning of such installa-
tions or devices." 2 7 In another article ICNT calls upon states
"[iln taking measures to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment . . .not to transfer, directly or
indirectly, damage or hazards from one area to another or
transform one type of pollution into another. ' 26 1 States are also
to assume positive legal responsibility to cooperate in interna-
tional monitoring programs,2 9 and to assess the environmental
impacts of their activities on the marine environment. 79 Article
210 deals specifically with activities in the Area:
1. International rules, standards and recommended prac-
tices and procedures shall be established ... to prevent, reduce
and control pollution to the marine environment from activities
relating to the exploration and exploitation of the Area. Such
rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures
shall be re-examined from time to time as necessary.
2. . . . States shall establish national laws and regulations
to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environ-
ment from activites relating to the exploration and exploitation
of the Area undertaken by vessels, installations, structures and
other devices flying their flag or of their registry.
According to Article 236 on responsibility and liability, states
are "responsible for the fulfilment of their international obliga-
tions concerning the protection and preservation of the marine
environment [and] shall be liable in accordance with interna-
tional law for damage attributable to them resulting from vio-
lations of these obligations. 12 1'
This chapter on the ocean's environment provides stronger
guarantees than ever before. 7 2 OTEC activities and operations
would certainly be covered under many of the principles and
specific provisions contained in the chapter.
266. Id. art. 195(3)(b).
267. Id. art. 195(3)(d).
268. Id. art. 196.
269. Id. art. 205.
270. Id. art. 207.
271. Id. art. 236(1).
272. For a critical appraisal of ICNT provisions on the marine environment, see
Schneider, Something Old, Something New: Some Thoughts on Grotius and the Mar-
ine Environment, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 147 (1977).
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III. CONCLUSIONS
Since OTEC holds sufficient promise to warrant vigorous
research efforts on its systems and technology,273 it is equally
important that an efficient and effective legal and institutional
framework be devised without any further delay. It is for this
reason that a major objective of this study has been to focus
on some of the most pressing aspects related to OTEC develop-
ment. Accordingly, the preceding discussion addressed only
selected issues and either left untouched or barely touched
upon several issues, including the potential application of anti-
trust laws to OTEC activities, 7' liability plans,2T5 utility policy
and regulation, 276 and financial arrangements and incentives
including tax advantages 277 which might facilitate and expedite
OTEC development.
Specific recommendations made here relate to both
Federal-State and international aspects. To recapitulate, a
comprehensive ocean management system for U.S. coastal
areas is recommended, which requires comprehensive ocean
management legislation. In the international arena, it may not
be too early to consider the drafting of a convention which
mandates environmental impact assessments of a state's major
projects which could harm the environment of another state or
the shared global environment, and provides for consultative
mechanisms. 7 This should be followed by the drafting of an-
273. See section I supra.
274. OTEC operations might have implications for antitrust laws, for the large
investment needed for the construction, purchase or operations of an OTEC plant
might require the involvement of several firms and/or states. Similarly, a joint venture
may be an attractive vehicle to market OTEC technology and/or OTEC energy. For
a discussion of some of the issues raised by joint arrangement for developing new
technology or producing new products, see Baker, Antitrust as a Spur to Technical
Progress, 23 AM. U. L. REv. 547 (1974).
275. See generally Faron, supra note 165, at 107-11; Nyhart, Problems of Legal
Responsibility and Liability to Be Anticipated in OTEC Operations, in KNIGHT, Ny-
HART & STEIN, supra note 9, at 129-64.
276. It is proposed that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as the lead
Federal Agency, assume responsibility for formulating and implementing the needed
"utility policy" regarding OTEC.
277. See generally sources cited in note 205 supra; B. WASHOM & J. NiLLFa, supra
note 9.
278. A Senate Resolution, S.49, was introduced in 1978 urging the United States
"to negotiate an international treaty requiring environmental impact assessments on
major projects that could harm the environment of another nation or the global com-
mons. International impact statements could be filed with the . . . (UNEP)." The
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other convention specifically dealing with OTEC activities as
well as a code of conduct. Even if these tasks appear to be
overwhelming, it is imperative that they be undertaken now.
Resolution would require states parties to the treaty to "consult with affected nations,
or with the UNEP in cases involving global commons, to minimize harmful impacts
across international boundaries." 9 ENVIRON. REP. (BNA) 539 (1978).
ASPECTS OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAMS'
Introduction
ROBERT C. GOODWIN, JR.*
The articles that follow represent a sampling of the legal
issues dealt with by the attorneys who work under me at the
Department of Energy (DOE). Although these issues may ap-
pear to have little in common, they are, in fact, parts of a
fascinating collection of interconnected international and
emergency preparedness legal problems in the energy area. The
issues related to information systems on the international oil
market, for example, touch both on one of the major DOE
regulatory programs, the transfer pricing program, and on the
International Energy Agency (IEA). The latter deserves special
mention since implementation of its emergency programs has
been the focus of considerable U.S. Government legal effort.
The agreement on an International Energy Program
(IEP),2 entered into by most of the free world's major energy
consuming countries, established the International Energy
Agency, as well as a number of specific goals and programs.
The most significant of these was an emergency oil sharing
arrangement to be implemented in case of a cutoff or serious
reduction in oil supplies available to the TEA group of coun-
tries. The recent difficulties in Iran, although not of a magni-
tude to trigger IEA action to date, have served as a reminder
© Copyright retained by authors.
* Assistant General Counsel for International Trade and Energy Preparedness,
U.S. Department of Energy. A.B., 1963, Fordham University; J.D., 1969, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and should in no way be
takeri as representing the views of the U.S. Department of Energy.
2. Done at Paris, Nov. 18, 1974, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685.
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that the purpose of the IEP is not simply to deal with politi-
cally motivated embargoes, but rather to address supply dis-
ruptions from any cause.
One of the difficult issues faced regarding the implementa-
tion of an emergency sharing system, was how to utilize the
assistance and expertise of international oil companies without
exposing them to antitrust risks. The solution, with respect to
the U.S. companies involved, was, in the first instance, the
formation of a Voluntary Agreement among those companies
under the provisions of section 708 of the Defense Production
Act, which provided antitrust immunity so long as the proce-
dures of the statute and Agreement were followed. The first
Voluntary Agreement, which set out the permissible range of
U.S. company activities in implementing the IEP, was ap-
proved by the Attorney General on March 28, 1975. In Decem-
ber of that year, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act, which contains provisions on voluntary agree-
ments to carry out the IEP. A new Voluntary Agreement was
entered into pursuant to this authority and remains in effect.
While one of the principal legal problems in regard to the
implementation of the international emergency preparedness
programs has been in the antitrust area, implementation of
domestic emergency preparedness programs has involved con-
siderably more technical legal issues. Specifically, the Stra-
tegic Petroleum Reserve Program has involved real estate ac-
quisition questions, and general procurement and contract law
issues.
As the above discussion indicates, the sampling that fol-
lows is truly that-a sampling. While this collection of articles
may only provide a glance at international energy issues, we
hope that the reader will find the view interesting and informa-
tive.
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International and Domestic Information
Systems On the International Oil Market
REINIER H.J.H. LoCK*
INTRODUCTION
The 1973 world oil crisis, generated largely by the OAPEC
oil embargo, raised anew the question of what role the United
States government should play in the international oil market.
This question has concerned U.S. policymakers ever since the
large scale entry of U.S. companies into the international oil
market in the late 1920's.' Perhaps the most concerted effort
to assert a U.S. government presence took place during World
War II, when Harold Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, led
unsuccessful efforts to purchase major Arabian oil concessions
from U.S. companies for a government "Petroleum Reserve
Corporation" and to build a government-owned trans-Arabia
pipeline.'
Despite this concern, the U.S. based oil companies have
conducted their international dealings in virtually a political
vacuum. The government has had little knowledge of, let alone
control over, their international negotiations and operations.
They have appeared to conduct diplomacy and "foreign pol-
icy" almost as independent states, except at certain, often crit-
ical times, when they actively sought government support for
their international initiatives. Consultation with the govern-
ment, when it did take place, was often initiated by the compa-
nies, very much on their terms, and it seldom allowed the gov-
ernment time to act independently.
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.
Com., 1964, Rhodes University, South Africa; LL.B., 1966, Rhodes University, South
Africa; B.C.L., 1969, Oxford University; LL.M., 1977, University of California (Boalt),
Berkeley.
1. See generally SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS, Ch. 4 (1975); BLAIR, THE CONTROL
OF OIL, 31 et. seq. (1976).
2. SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 94-99.
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The 1973 crisis revealed that inadequate information
would probably have rendered most government initiatives in-
effective, even, if it had desired or possessed the legal mecha-
nisms to assert its presence or influence more directly into the
negotiations between U.S. oil companies and the OPEC pro-
ducing countries.
The critical need for an adequate, intelligent, governmen-
tal decisionmaking information base, irrespective of whether
the government should play a greater role in, or seek to regu-
late, U.S. oil companies' foreign activities, had become obvious
on both the domestic and international levels. In November
1974, most major Western industrialized nations (and Japan)
concluded, under the auspices of the OECD, the Agreement on
the International Energy Program (IEP Agreement) 3 in an ef-
fort to counter the new assertion of concerted power by OPEC.
THE IEP AGREEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
The IEP Agreement called for, inter alia, "a more active
role in relation to the oil industry by establishing a comprehen-
sive international information system and permanent frame-
work for consultation with oil companies."4 The Agreement
established a two-part Information System:' a "General Sec-
tion on the situation in the international oil market and activi-
ties of oil companies;" and the "Special Section" which is to
ensure efficient operation of the emergency preparedness mea-
sures which comprise a substantial portion of the treaty.' Both
sections are coordinated through the Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), the organization created by the
OECD in November 1974 to implement the Agreement's provi-
sions. Policy under the Agreement is developed by "standing
groups," consisting of representatives of nation signatories in
certain functional areas. The Standing Group on the Oil Mar-
ket (SOM) is the primary functionary for the General Section.
Under the General Section, participating countries are
required to report, on a regular basis, "precise data" identified
by SOM and approved by the IEA's Management Committee,7
3. Agreement on an International Energy Program, done at Paris, November 18,
1974, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685 [hereinafter cited as IEP Agreement].
4. IEP Agreement, Preamble.
5. Id. art. 25.
6. An interesting critical analysis of the IEP Agreement, in particular its emer-
gency preparedness provisions, is contained in Willrich and Conant, The International
Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 199 (1977).
7. IEP Agreement, art. 29.
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on specific subjects relating to oil companies operating within
their jurisdiction. These subjects include corporate and finan-
cial structure, crude oil production rates, stocks, acquisition
costs and prices, allocation of crude oil supplies, terms of access
to supplies, and capital investments.' Most of this data is ob-
tained by the governments from their oil companies. The iden-
tification of data required is an ongoing SOM function which
is still in relatively early development.' In pursuance of this
function, SOM is required to consult with companies to make
certain that the system is "compatible with industry opera-
tions" and to develop standards and procedures to harmonize
data reporting and ensure its confidentiality.'"
The data reported is used by both the IEA and participat-
ing countries to assist their national energy planning. However,
much of the data reported is treated confidentially by the IEA
and in a form that will avoid disclosures of "proprietary""
company information or information that might impair compe-
tition within the oil industry. 2 Elaborate procedures have been
adopted to avoid disclosure of proprietary company-specific
data. Most of the data is transferred to the IEA in aggregate,
noncompany-specific form: most of the data received from the
IEA by the U.S. government is classified as national security
sensitive.'3 Only certain types of data are obtained through
systematic reporting. For other types, such as terms of access
to crude supplies, company supply and demand appraisals,
industry structure, and exploration prospects, SOM has devel-
oped a system of regular, formal consultations with individual
oil companies.
Both the General Information System and the emergency
8. Id. art. 27. The list is not exhaustive, and it may be expanded by the TEA's
Governing Board. Id. art. 27(1)(j).
9. Id. art. 31.
10. Id. art. 30.
11. The term is construed quite narrowly in article 28 as being limited to such
matters as patents, trademarks, scientific processes, geological data, individual sales,
and tax returns.
12. Article 27(3) requires that participating countries report "on a nonproprietary
basis" and in a way that will "not prejudice competition" or undermine its laws
protecting competition.
13. To meet current classification standards, the data must be such that its unau-
thorized disclosure could cause identifiable damage to the national security. Exec.
Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Most information received from TEA
could be classified as "foreign government information" which, under § 1-303 of Exec.
Order No. 12,065, is presumed to cause such identifiable damage.
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preparedness activities under the IEP Agreement rely heavily
on oil company cooperation for their successful implementa-
tion. Although almost as an afterthought in the IEP Agree-
ment, the General Section information system and its mecha-
nisms for consultations with companies may, ironically, prove
to be one of the more solid achievements of the Agreement.
The IEA has already developed reporting systems on the
prices and acquisition costs of crude oil imports. It also receives
data on stocks and production. Generally, reporting as to crude
prices and acquisition costs has been confined to OPEC "crude
streams," defined by oil gravity and country and usually coin-
cident with supplier countries. Theoretically, however, Article
27 is broad enough to authorize reporting on any crude stream.
The role of SOM and other IEA organs in developing these
reporting systems could make them important instruments of
IEA policy.
U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORTING SYSTEMS
To meet the information shortcomings exposed by the 1973
crisis as well as the more specific requirements of the IEP Infor-
mation System, DOE and its predecessor FEA, have developed
a group of extensive reporting systems by U.S. based oil com-
panies on their international crude oil dealings. When suitably
linked, these reports should provide DOE with the ongoing,
comprehensive information base necessary for meaningful
analysis of the state and direction of the international oil mar-
ket essential for effective policy formulation. They also will
contribute to fulfillment of IEA obligations and certain domes-
tic statutory and regulatory requirements.
Two existing reporting systems, the Foreign Crude Oil
Cost Report, 4 and the Transfer Pricing Report, 5 will soon be
significantly augmented by a third system, the Foreign Oil
Supply Agreement Report (FOSA).
The Foreign Crude Oil Cost Report (EIA-67) contains data
on the cost of foreign crude oil acquisitions by U.S. based com-
panies and on the volume of exports from producing countries
to the United States. The information on crude oil costs is
provided to the IEA under Article 27 of the IEP Agreement.
The obligation is imposed upon firms who acquire 100,000 bar-
14. DOE Form EIA-67 (formerly FEA-P-328-Q-O).
15. DOE Form ERA-51 (formerly FEA-F-701-M-O).
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rels or more of crude oil per day from countries who are not IEA
members. Reporting is geared to the IEA's classification of
crude streams. Reports on a contract-by-contract basis can be
readily linked with the contract details provided by FOSA re-
ports.
The FOSA Report (form EIA-27) should provide the most
significant information about foreign oil operations. Reporting
is imposed on any U.S. entity which has a right to lift for export
certain volumes" of crude oil in foreign countries." These enti-
ties are required to report all material terms of their contracts
or agreements with foreign producer governments or entities
controlled by them, such as national oil companies. Certain
specified details are also required: prices, fees for services,
other payments to the host government, minimum and maxi-
mum lifting rights, and government imposed production lim-
its.'8 Contracts and other related documents must be produced
if required by DOE.'" In addition, companies are required to
notify DOE of negotiations with producer governments which
might "reasonably lead to the establishment of any supply
arrangement" covered in section 215.3.2(1 DOE can obtain fur-
ther details through consultation with the reporting company.
Hence, some potential for an early warning system on impend-
ing negotiations is built into the FOSA regulations.
Many comments on the proposed regulation received from
potentially affected oil companies argued against a reporting
requirement and urged, instead, a continuation and augmenta-
tion of the voluntary consultations that had taken place period-
ically with the government. DOE concluded that such consul-
tations would not ensure the systematic, current, and ongoing
information base necessary for well-informed policy formula-
tion and timely decisions in the international oil supply area.
However, DOE is encouraging continuation of the voluntary
consultation process to facilitate its understanding of the inter-
national oil situation and sharpen the perceptions of both the
companies and the government.
16. 150,000 barrels per day average for a year, or a total of 55 million barrels in
less than a year, or a total of 150 million barrels over the lifetime of the agreement.
17. Final rulemaking entitled Collection of Foreign Oil Supply Agreement Infor-
mation, 10 C.F.R. § 215 (1978).
18. 10 C.F.R. § 215.3 (1978).
19. 10 C.F.R. § 215.4 (1978).
20. 10 C.F.R. § 215.6 (1978).
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The central concern of most potentially affected (respon-
dent) companies has been the protection of confidential infor-
mation reported under the FOSA system. A significant portion
of the data reported will probably be either "proprietary" or
national security sensitive, or both. One approach to ensure
confidentiality would be for DOE to classify such data as meets
the standards for national security classification under Execu-
tive Order 12,065. This order limits access to persons within the
government to the classified information who are deemed
"trustworthy," i.e., possessing the requisite security clearance,
and who can establish that "access is necessary for the per-
formance of official duties."2
Access within the government to "proprietary" informa-
tion, that is, information regarded as confidential for essen-
tially commercial-competitive reasons, could, under current
law, be limited to those persons who require such access to
fulfill their official duties.
Access may be denied to the public at large under section
552(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Act, which exempts
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential" from the
Act's coverage. 2
To enhance these protections given to FOSA, DOE will
impose carefully controlled limitations on access within the
government to, and detailed procedures for the handling of,
FOSA information classified under Executive Order 12,065, or
information which is determined to be "proprietary. '2 :1
The Transfer Pricing Report form (ERA-51) is designed to
collect information on transfer prices, those assigned to im-
ported oil between U.S. companies and their foreign trading
affiliates, and on crude oil transactions between nonaffiliated
entities. This information is required to administer adequately
the application to refiners of DOE's Mandatory Petroleum
21. Section 4-101 of Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Access
may be denied to the public at large under § 552(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information
Act, which exempts matters properly "kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy" under criteria established by an Executive order. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1) (1976).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
23. An indication of the kinds of procedures that will be adopted with respect to
proprietary information under the Freedom of Information Act is included in a recent
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect to DOE's proposed FOI regulations. 43
Fed. Reg. 40,530, at 40,536.
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Price Regulations. These requirements impose price ceilings on
certain petroleum products based on crude oil costs." Transfer
pricing information also is provided to the IEA under the IEP
Agreement.
The obligation to report is imposed on a monthly basis
upon refiners importing at least 500,000 barrels of crude, or any
crude from a foreign affiliate in that month. Although ERA-51
is limited to refiners, it does provide data similar to that gath-
ered under EIA-67 and the FOSA system but from a somewhat
different perspective. This report, therefore, helps DOE moni-
tor certain cost and price movements, both within the United
States and internationally, and enhances DOE's analytical
capabilities.
Between the essentially interlocking EIA-67 and FOSA
systems, and the additional information provided by ERA-51,
a substantial data base can be provided. It can be supple-
mented further, if necessary, by the monthly Report of Oil
Imports into the U.S. and Puerto Rico designed primarily to
facilitate implementation of the Oil Imports Program.", The
obligation to report details, such as volume and port of entry,
are imposed on oil companies which import crude oil, residual
fuel oil, or finished petroleum products.
The legal authority for imposition of all three major sets
of reporting requirements described above lies in section 13(b)
of the Federal Energy Administration Act (FEAA), as
amended:
All persons owning or operating facilities or business prem-
ises who are engaged in any phase of energy supply or major
energy consumption shall make available to the Administrator
such information and periodic reports, records, documents, and
other data, relating to the purposes of this chapter, including full
identification of all data and projections as to source, time and
methodology of development, as the Administrator may pre-
scribe by regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the
proper exercise of functions under this chapter.
2 6
24. Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 212 (1978). Section
212.84 prescribes standards for establishing the cost of crude oil imports in transactions
between affiliated entities. Basically, an effort is made to emulate the price such
entities would charge if they were dealing at arm's-length, § 212.84(c). DOE estab-
lishes representative arm's-length prices, compares these with the companies' reported
transfer prices, and disallows crude costs attributable to excessive transfer prices.
25. DOE Form ERA-60 (formerly FEA-P113-M-O) [19771 3 EN. MNGM'T (CCH)
18,413, which in 1977 consolidated and replaced three earlier reporting forms. See
42 Fed. Reg. 4,889 (1977) for the announcement of the availability of this form.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 772(b) (1976). The data gathering authority is now vested in the
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All three reporting systems patently meet the require-
ments that they relate to the broad purposes of the FEAA and
that they are "necessary or appropriate" to the exercise of the
Secretary's functions thereunder. For instance, the Secretary's
general functions in the execution of his authority under sec-
tion 5(b) include the collection and analysis of information on
energy demand, production, and reserves, the development of
a comprehensive energy policy and energy trade policies, inte-
grating domestic and foreign energy supply policies, promoting
stability in energy prices, and developing plans and programs
for dealing with energy production shortages. 7 Furthermore,
quite specific authority for much of the information sought lies
in section 15 of the FEAA, which imposes on DOE the require-
ment to report annually in considerable detail on specified en-
ergy matters to Congress and the President."
Detailed information on the financial performance of all
U.S. based energy companies will be obtained from the energy
company financial report system (FRS) (DOE Form EIA-28),
authorized by section 13(b) of the FEAA and specifically man-
dated by section 205(h) of the Department of Energy Organiza-
tion Act. 9 These provisions require, inter alia, that the FRS
yield information on energy company operations segregated
"by energy source and geographic area." ' Under this mandate,
DOE will collect data to compare foreign and domestic finan-
cial performance, sources and uses of cash, investments, rela-
tive performance, revenue, cost and profit differences, and in-
vestment in major foreign regions. Apart from specific interna-
tional data, the FRS will yield a wide variety of detailed infor-
mation in areas such as competition and energy supply and
development. This information could provide an important
complement to the other information systems discussed. To-
gether they should soon provide a relatively comprehensive in-
formation base, especially if effectively linked with the IEA
system, for informed decisionmaking.
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration of DOE by virtue of section
205(c) of the Department of Energy Organization Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(c)(Supp.
1977). The functions of the former Administrator of the FEA are now vested in the
Secretary of DOE by virtue of section 301(a) of this act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,151(a)(Supp.
1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 764(b)(1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 774 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(Supp. 1977).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(2)(C)(Supp. 1977).
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Regulation of U.S. Oil Imports
ROBERT D.R. DE SUGNY*
INTRODUCTION
The importation of oil, into the United States is regulated
by the Department of Energy (DOE) through the Mandatory
Oil Import Program (MOIP). The MOIP was created in March
1959 by Presidential Proclamation 3279 and has undergone
substantial modifications in the intervening years. 2 The pur-
pose of the MOIP is to reduce the threat to the national secu-
rity posed by the dependence by the U.S. on foreign sources of
oil, which are subject to the threat of interruption, and to foster
the development of domestic energy sources and refining ca-
pacity.3
Proclamation 3279 was issued pursuant to the authority
now embodied in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962, as amended by the Trade Act of 1974.1 Section 232(b)
provides that, upon an investigation and finding by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury that a commodity is entering the country
"in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten
to impair the national security," the President "shall take such
action, and for such time, as he deems necessary to adjust the
imports of .. .[the] article and its derivatives so that . . .
imports [of the article] will not threaten to impair the na-
tional security."5 Such an investigation and finding with re-
* Staff Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.A.
(Hons.), 1974, University of Maryland; J.D., 1977, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. In this article "oil" is defined to include crude oil and partially refined and
finished products, whether derived from crude oil, coal, or natural gas. Presidential
Proclamation 3279, as amended, encompasses all of these materials under the term
"crude oil, unfinished oils and finished products," each of which is further defined in
the Proclamation.
2. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862, at 542 (1976).
3. Id.
4. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1976) (corresponds to Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L.
No. 87-794, § 232, 76 Stat. 437, as amended by Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 127(d), 88 Stat. 1993).
5. Id. § 1862(b).
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spect to "petroleum and petroleum products" was made in
1959 and formed the basis for the quota/allocation system es-
tablished by Presidential Proclamation 3279.6 In 1975, another
national security investigation was conducted and the findings
which resulted therefrom were incorporated with the prior find-
ings in Presidential Proclamation 4341, which imposed the sup-
plemental import fee. 6 '
SCOPE OF THE SECTION 232 AUTHORITY
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act authorizes the
President to take "such action . as he deems necessary" to
adjust imports.7 The authority was broadly construed by the
Supreme Court in FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., which upheld
the President's authority to impose license fees." Throughout
the decision, the Court cited with approval those portions of
the legislative history which would support the widest possible
interpretation of the President's authority, such as Senator
Millikin's statement that it included the authority "to take
whatever action he deems necessary to adjust imports . . .
[including use of] tariffs, quotas, import taxes or other meth-
ods of import restrictions."9 Although the Court in Algonquin
did not explicitly address the question of the legality of the
previous quota system, it may be assumed to have been up-
held, sub silentio, since the question presented was whether the
President's authority extended beyond the imposition of quan-
titative controls.
Although the authority to impose quotas under section 232
of the Trade Expansion Act is not susceptible to serious legal
6. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
The Executive Branch has consistently taken the position that the continuing
validity of a national security investigation and finding provides a basis for subsequent
amendments to the original action without the necessity of additional investigations
being conducted. In this respect, numerous modifications to the original MOIP have
been implemented, including the substitution of a system of license fees for the
quota/allocation system in 1973, without conducting additional national security in-
vestigations. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 11 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation). The Attor-
ney General also concluded in a formal opinion issued in 1975 that, although permissi-
ble if desired, no additional national security investigation was legally required in
order for President Ford to impose supplemental fees on oil imports despite the
changes in world oil markets occurring after the OPEC oil embargo. 43 Op. Arr'v GEN.
3 (1975).
6.1 40 Fed. Reg. 3965 (1975).
7. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1976).
8. FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 561-71 (1975).
9. Id. at 564.
VO -L. 8:299
REGULATION OF U.S. OIL IMPORTS
question, a possible legal issue exists as to whether an auction
of the quota tickets, or some other form of allocation, is within
the authority of the President. However, any grant of executive
power carries an implicit authority to implement that power,
and a quota or other form of quantitative restriction cannot be
implemented without a concomitant mechanism for the distri-
bution of the limited quantities which are allowed to be im-
ported.'0 Under the quota system established in 1959, the
mechanism chosen was an allocation to refiners and importers
based on amounts they historically imported; however, there is
nothing in the legislative history which would dictate such a
result or which would preclude some other distribution mecha-
nism, such as an auction, from being adopted." Considering
that allocations based on historical volumes have several dele-
terious effects, including their inherent anticompetitive nature
and the enforcement difficulties they pose, there are excellent
policy reasons for the adoption of a distribution mechanism
other than an allocation system. As a consequence, an auction
of import rights would most likely be viewed as within the
realm of necessary action required to be exercised as part of the
authority conferred.
HISTORY OF THE MOIP
As previously noted, the MOIP was created in March 1959
by Proclamation 3279. It replaced a system of voluntary con-
trols that had failed to prevent oil imports from increasing. At
that time, such imports were approximately half the price of
domestic crude oil.'2 Initially, quota levels were established for
different products and regions of the country in accordance
with then current levels of imports. Allocations of crude oil
import licenses were granted to all refiners, regardless of
whether or not they actually imported crude oil.'3 This system
ensured that the value of quota licenses was evenly distributed
and not received solely by coastal refiners, which would have
given them a large competitive advantage. Allocations of petro-
leum products, such as residual fuel oil, were granted to certain
classes of importers.
10. Id. at 559.
11. See generally 101 CONG. REc. 5298 (1955) (remarks of Sen. Barkley); 101 CONG.
REC. 5588 (1955).
12. See generally Pres. Proc. No. 3279, supra note 2.
13. Inland refiners realized the value of the licenses by arranging exchanges of oil
with actual importers.
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The effectiveness of the quota in limiting imports ulti-
mately proved to be its downfall. Reduced imports resulted in
greater demand for domestic production; however, once excess
capacity was utilized, additional demand induced inflationary
impacts. 4 As a consequence, political pressure grew to alter the
system either to include additional persons seeking to share in
the growing monetary value of the import licenses or to increase
quota levels and thereby lower the indirect, and increasingly
controversial, subsidy to the domestic petroleum industry.
The controversy which quotas engendered led to the deci-
sion in April 1973 to issue Presidential Proclamation 4210,
which provided for the gradual replacement of quotas by a
system of licenses subject to fees which would be available to
all importers.'5 The Proclamation established a fee of $0.21 per
barrel for crude oil and $0.63 per barrel for petroleum pro-
ducts.'" The difference between the two fees, $0.42, became the
effective per barrel level of protection for domestic refining
capacity. Newly constructed refining capacity also was granted
a five-year exemption from the fee on 75% of inputs, which
meant that such capacity would have a total level of protection
equaling $0.573 per barrel.'7 Existing quota levels were contin-
ued in the form of fee-exempt licenses but were subject to being
decreased annually by a specified amount until their complete
elimination in 1980.' 8 However, the quota levels for certain
products (e.g., residual fuel oil. imported into the east coast)
had previously been set at such high levels that only a rela-
tively small amount of such imports are currently subject to
the fee."
In January 1975, President Ford imposed a supplemental
fee on all imports based on the failure of Congress to pass
legislation in response to the energy crisis in the aftermath
which followed the 1973-74 oil embargo. Presidential Procla-
mation 4341 provided for an initial supplemental fee of $1.00
per barrel, which was to be increased in$1.00 increments to a
maximum of $3.00 per barrel. 20 The passage of the Energy Pol-
14. SPECIAL COMMrrEE To INVESTIGATE CRUDE OIL IMPORTS, REPORT (Mar. 6, 1959).
15. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation).
16. Id. at 243.
17. Id. at 245.
18. Id. at 248-49.
19. See Pres. Proc. No. 3389, 3 C.F.R. 108 (1959-1963 Compilation).
20. Pres. Proc. No. 4341, 3 C.F.R. 431, 433 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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icy and Conservation Act 2' in December of 1975 allowed the
President to rescind the supplemental fee in Presidential Pro-
clamation 4412 at a time when it had only reached $2.00 per
barrel.2 2 Since that time, there have been no substantial modi-
fications to the MOIP.
REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT
Part 213 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
contains the regulations governing the MOIP. Under the regu-
lations, fee-exempt licenses are annually allocated2' within the
overall levels specified to applicants based on their inputs dur-
ing a base period.24 The number of fee-exempt licenses for each
product is specified by geographical regions.25
The Proclamation and the regulations also preserve cer-
tain exemptions for "long term allocations" granted in the
1960's to provide incentives for the construction of petrochemi-
cal facilities in Puerto Rico 2 and the Virgin Islands.2 Persons
holding long term allocations are not affected by the sliding
scale reducing fee-exempt imports, nor by any other provision
that could impair their rights.28
Persons not qualifying for a fee-exempt allocation, or who
do not receive a sufficient allocation to cover the quantity of
oil that they currently import, must apply for licenses subject
to the $0.21 or $0.63 per barrel fee, as appropriate.2
Procedures for exceptions from Part 213 are contained in
Part 205, Subpart D. These provisions implement the authority
contained in section 5 of the Proclamation which provides that
exceptions may be granted on various grounds, including where
payment of the fees would represent an "exceptional hard-
ship. '30 Appendix I of Subpart D contains guidelines given
particular consideration in the disposition of exception re-
21. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 89 Stat. 871 (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 15, 42, 50 U.S.C.).
22. 41 Fed. Reg. 1037 (1976).
23. Oil Import Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 213.3 (1978).
24. Id. at 213.9-11.
25. Id. at 213.12.
26. Pres. Proc. No. 3693, 3 C.F.R. 153 (1964-1965 Compilation).
27. Pres. Proc. No. 3820, 3 C.F.R. 165 (1967-1970 Compilation).
28. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(9) as amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-
1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19 U.S.C. § 1862, at 546 (1976).
29. Pres. Proc. No. 3279(3)(a)(1) as currently amended by Pres. Proc. No. 4210,
suora at 543.
30. 10 C.F.R. § 205.50 (1978).
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quests. The guidelines authorize exceptions where, for exam-
ple, imposition of fees would lead to a result unintended by the
Proclamation or would seriously impair the operations of prof-
itability of the applicant's business. 3
CURRENT EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM
Since the adoption of the original program, the world oil
market and its relationship to the U.S. oil market have
changed fundamentally. The Arab oil embargo, the subsequent
several-fold increase in foreign oil prices, and the price controls
under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973
(EPAA), as amended, 3 have completely altered the economic
positioris of persons affected by the MOI. When the license
fee program was initiated in 1973, world crude oil prices were
less than domestic prices and were expected to be roughly
aligned in the future. Those events resulted in an oil market
where a substantial portion of U.S. crude oil has been priced
at levels well below world market prices3 and arguably does not
require the additional protection afforded by the MOIP.
Although the protection offered by the MOIP is currently
overshadowed by the effects of domestic price controls, the
MOIP remains the only long term vehicle for encouraging the
construction of domestic refinery capacity and the protection
of crude oil production. Therefore, once these controls expire,
the MOIP will most likely play an increasingly important role
in the regulation of U.S. oil imports.
OTHER STATUTORY AUTHORITIES WHICH COULD BE UTILIZED To
CONTROL OIL IMPORTS
There are several other statutory authorities under which
the President could conceivably take action to control oil im-
ports. Section 456 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA) provides that the President may implement a proce-
dure by which "the United States may exercise the exclusive
right to import and purchase all or any part of crude oil...
and refined petroleum products of foreign origin for resale in
the United States. 14 Implementation of this authority requires
congressional approval as an Energy Action under section 551
31. Id. § 205.5, app. II.
32. Energy Petroleum Allocation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-56 (1976).
33. The value of lower-priced domestic crude oil is allocated to refiners under the
Domestic Crude Oil Allocation ("Entitlements") Program. See Mandatory Petroleum
Allocation Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 211.67 (1978).
34. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, 15 U.S.C. § 760b(a) (1976).
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of EPCA.n1 Section 456 requires that the President buy and
sell without profit or loss, except for individual cases which
"result in progress toward a lower price for oil sold in interna-
tional commerce."3 In addition, the President must find that
the use of such authority "is likely to reduce prices for imported
oils." The range of action that the President could take to
limit imports under this provision is therefore quite narrow and
it has never been implemented.
Section 101 of the Defense Production Act, as amended,
provides that the President may "allocate materials . .. to
such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to pro-
mote the national defense." Aside from the fact that civilian
allocations must be based on historical supply patterns, there
are three major legal and practical obstacles to utilizing this
authority to control oil imports. First, "national defense" is
defined in the Act to mean military, atomic, or directly related
activity. 9 It is a more difficult standard to meet than the broad
"national security" objectives which allow use of the Trade
Expansion Act authority. Second, the purpose of the Act is to
"allocate" supplies needed for national defense resulting from
shortages, not to create shortages by restricting imports.'" Fi-
nally, the authority may not be used "to control the general
distribution of any material in the civilian market" unless it is
a "scarce and critical material essential to the national de-
fense" and defense requirements cannot otherwise be met."
Normal market conditions would not appear to meet this stan-
dard, although it would most likely be met during an oil em-
bargo.
Under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA), the President may declare a national emergency to
deal with any "unusual or extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States,
to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States."'" Upon the declaration of a national emer-
35. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 551, 42 U.S.C. § 6421 (1976).
36. Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 456, supra note 34, at § 760b(c).
37. Id. at § 760b(d).
38. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 101, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a)(2) (1970).
39. Defense Production Act of 1950 § 762(d), 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1970).
40. See Defense Production Act of 1950 § 2, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2662 (1970).
41. Defense Production Act Amendments of 1953 § 3, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(b)
(1970).
42. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. supp. § 1701(a)
(1978).
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gency, IEEPA permits the President to "investigate, regulate,
direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit, any...
importation . . . of . . . any property in which any foreign
country or a national thereof has any interest."13 The President
is required "in every possible instance" to consult with Con-
gress before exercising the authority and to submit a report to
Congress explaining his action." Although the emergency ac-
tion is subject to several additional procedural requirements,
the only one that poses a serious constraint on the President's
authority is the right of Congress to terminate the emergency
by concurrent resolution at any time.4" In the event of a na-
tional emergency, the authority contained in the IEEPA could,
therefore, be used in addition to the authority contained in the
Trade Expansion Act to control oil imports.
43. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B).
44. Id. § 1703(a).
45. Id. § 1706(b).
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PETER J. SCHAUMBERG*
INTRODUcTION
The authority of the Government to require priority per-
formance of contracts and to allocate materials under the De-
fense Production Act of 1950 (DPA)' was, for many years, the
exclusive domain of national defense programs and regarded as
essential to assure timely procurement. As a result of the 1973-
74 oil embargo, energy was elevated to a level of importance
comparable to national defense, and a need was recognized to
facilitate completion of energy programs and projects essential
to further this nation's energy independence.
In 1975, in an effort to stimulate the energy production and
development necessary to mitigate the effects of any future
embargo, Congress extended to energy programs authority pre-
viously available exclusively to national defense programs, that
is, the priority assistance provisions of the Defense Production
Act of 1950. The 1973-74 embargo underscored the need for
accelerated energy development, and since most energy pro-
jects could not avail themselves of the provisions of section
101(a) of the DPA, section 104 of the Energy Policy and Conser-
vation Act of 1975 (EPCA) added a new subsection (c) to DPA
section 101.2
DPA section 101(c) authorizes the President to require, in
certain circumstances, priority performance of contracts for
supplies of materials and equipment needed to maximize do-
mestic energy supplies.3 The right to obtain a priority rating is
* Attorney, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.A., 1972,
Tulane University; J.D., 1975, George Washington University National Law Center.
1. Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-62, 2071-73, 2091-94,
2151-63, 2164-68 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
3. Id. DPA section 101(c) provides in part the following:
(c) Domestic energy supplies.
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the President
may, by rule or order, require the allocation of, or the priority perform-
ance under contracts or orders (other than contracts of employment)
relating to, supplies of materials and equipment in order to maximize
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available both to public and private energy programs or pro-
jects, and the Department of Energy (DOE) is designated to
play an essential role in distributing scarce materials and
equipment to deserving energy projects. However, for reasons
discussed in detail below, access to the provisions of section
101(c) have been limited, restricting DOE's role to directing
materials to essential energy programs and projects in order to
facilitate energy production and construction.
THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL DPA SECTION
The terminology of the new subsection (c) is similar to that
of DPA section 101(a) enacted in 1950.' In essence, if to do so
promotes the national defense, the President is authorized by
section 101(a) to direct a company to accept an order, and
further to mandate delivery ahead of all other nonrated com-
mercial orders of the supplier. This authority has long been
recognized as an effective tool for assuring that defense-related
programs are not delayed by an inability to obtain deliveries
on schedule.
domestic energy supplies if he makes the findings required by paragraph
(3) of this subsection.
(3) The authority granted in this subsection may not be used to
require priority performance of contracts or orders, or to control the dis-
tribution of any supplies of materials and equipment in the marketplace,
unless the President finds that-
(A) such supplies are scarce, critical, and essential to maintain or
further (i) exploration, production, refining, transportation, or (ii)
the conservation of energy supplies, or (iii) for the construction and
maintenance of energy facilities; and
(B) maintenance or furtherance of exploration, production, refin-
ing, transportation, or conservation of energy supplies or the con-
struction and maintenance of energy facilities cannot reasonably
be accomplished without exercising the authority specified in par-
agraph (1) of this subsection.
(4) During any period when the authority conferred by this subsec-
tion is being exercised, the President shall take such action as may be
appropriate to assure that such authority is being exercised in a manner
which assures the coordinated administration of such authority with any
priorities or allocations established under subsection (a) of this section
and in effect during the same period.
4. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(a) (1970) provides that:
The President is authorized (1) to require that performance under con-
tracts or orders (other than contracts of employment) which he deems
necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense shall take prior-
ity over performance under any other contract or order, and, for the
purpose of assuring such priority, to require acceptance and performance
of such contracts or orders in preference to other contracts or orders by
any person he finds to be capable of their performance, and (2) to allocate
materials and facilities in such manner, upon such conditions, and to
such extent as he shall deem necessary or appropriate to promote the
national defense. (Emphasis added.)
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The national defense requirement of section 101(a), how-
ever, limits its usefulness for energy programs. The term
"national defense" is defined in section 702(d) of the DPA as
"programs for military and atomic energy production or con-
struction, military assistance to any foreign nation, stockpil-
ing, space, and directly related activity." 5 This definition ex-
cludes from the scope of section 101(a) most energy programs
other than atomic energy programs, which often rely upon DPA
section 101(a) for procurement, although use of DPA section
101(a) authority was extended on a limited basis to the builders
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and presumably would be
available to an energy program which had a demonstrable na-
tional defense nexus.
The vast majority of energy projects, however, are not na-
tional defense-related, and the 1973-74 energy supply interrup-
tion underscored the need for expeditious development of en-
ergy resources, unhindered by nonenergy programs competing
for scarce energy development-related resources. Congress re-
sponded by enacting the new section 101(c), extending priori-
ties assistance to energy programs, whether governmental or
nongovernmental, for purposes of materials and equipment
procurement.
PREREQUISITES TO THE USE OF SECTION 101(c)
Section 101(c) priorities are not available for all energy
projects. Congress legislated certain explicit prerequisites to
the availability of priorities for energy programs so as not to
interfere unduly with the national defense priorities under sec-
tion 101(a). Since, for the first time, DPA section 101 priorities
are available to nongovernmental projects, DOE exercises a
critical control function in determining which energy programs
or projects are entitled to priorities assistance.
The President is authorized to exercise the authority to
require allocation of, or priority performance of contracts relat-
ing to, supplies of materials and equipment to maximize do-
mestic energy supplies only if findings are made by the Presi-
dent that:
(A) such supplies are scarce, critical, and essential to main-
tain or further (i) exploration, production, refining, transporta-
tion, or (ii) the conservation of energy supplies, or (iii) for the
construction and maintenance of energy facilities; and
5. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1970).
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(B) maintenance or furtherance of exploration, production,
refining, transportation, or conservation of energy supplies or the
construction and maintenance of energy facilities cannot reason-
ably be accomplished without exercising the authority specificed
in [section 101(c)(1)1.4
As a result of a series of delegations and redelegations of
the President's responsibilities in Executive Order 11,912, as
amended,7 the following must occur before a rating under DPA
section 101(c) may be authorized:
(1) DOE must determine that the proposed use of the au-
thority will maximize domestic energy supplies.'
(2) DOE must find that the specific supplies in issue are
critical and essential' to maintain or further exploration, produc-
tion, refining, transportation, or the conservation of energy sup-
plies, or for the construction or maintenance of energy facilities.
(3) Thereafter, the Department of Commerce must find that:
(a) such supplies are scarce; and
(b) maintenance or furtherance of the purposes de-
scribed in two (2) above cannot reasonably be accomplished
without use of the DPA authority."
A "critical and essential" finding made by DOE will be
based primarily upon evidence that the required items are in
the "critical path" of the energy project. However, the scarcity
finding to be made by the Department of Commerce turns on
6. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
7. Exec. Order No. 11,912, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,825 (1976), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 12,038, 43 Fed. Reg. 4,957 (1978).
8. Congress provided no guidance in the statute or the legislative history of EPCA
as to what was meant by the phrase "maximize domestic energy supplies." However,
the factors to be considered by DOE in determining whether a program or project
maximizes domestic energy supplies are listed in the DOE regulations, 43 Fed. Reg.
6,209, at 6,213 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. § 216.4), and include, but are not
limited to: (1) quantity of energy involved; (2) benefits of timely energy program
furtherance or project completion; (3) socioeconomic impact; (4) the need for the end
product for which the materials and equipment are allegedly required; and (5) estab-
lished national energy policies.
9. The statute and legislation lists again provide no insight into what was meant
by the terms "critical" and "essential." The factors DOE will consider in determining
the critical and essential nature of needed materials and equipment are listed in the
DOE regulations, 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,213 (1978) (to be codified in 40 C.F.R. §
216.4), and include, but are not limited to: (1) availability and utility of substitute
materials or equipment; (2) impact of the unavailability of the specific supplies of
materials and equipment on the furtherance or timely completion of the approved
energy program or project.
10. The only available guidance as to what factors the Department of Commerce
will consider in making the scarcity and need to use the system findings is in proposed
regulations 42 Fed. Reg. 43,038 (1977).
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different criteria: The applicant must be able to demonstrate
that there is a shortage of the necessary materials or equipment
and that attempts to obtain them in normal commercial chan-
nels, even at a premium price, were unsuccessful. This finding
is indispensable, since section 101(c) of the DPA cannot be
used merely to obtain a better price. As stated in section
101(c)(3)(B), there must be a need to use the DPA system in
order to accomplish the program's purpose, that is, no alterna-
tive means of satisfying current needs is available. Further-
more, it must be commercially possible for a contractor to pro-
vide the desired item within the time limits deemed necessary
by the applicant. A DPA priority obviously cannot shorten the
time physically needed to fabricate equipment.
USE OF SECTION 101(c)
Once the appropriate findings are made by DOE and the
Department of Commerce, the priority rating is issued. With
the rating, a purchaser may go to its supplier, and the order
must be placed ahead of other nonrated commercial orders
according to the terms of the priority rating. DOE regulations"
provide that use of the rating is governed by the same Depart-
ment of Commerce regulations as a defense rating under sec-
tion 101(a).12 Congress preferred to integrate the defense and
energy priorities systems, thereby avoiding parallel systems
with competing claims and competing justifications for distrib-
uting scarce resources. 3 If a defense and energy program are
competing for the same limited resources, the Commerce De-
partment would act as arbiter and determine which program
is entitled to the highest priority.
Since the enactment of DPA section 101(c), DOE has re-
ceived six applications for priorities assistance," of which three
were withdrawn before an opportunity for full consideration
was given. Of the three applications processed, the U.S. Army
11. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,213-14 (1978) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. § 216.5).
12. 32A C.F.R. pt. 621 (1977) of the Defense Management System Regulation 1
relates to priorities for certain controlled materials such as copper, brass, nickel, etc.
32A C.F.R. pt. 651 (1977) of the Defense Priorities System Regulation 1 relates to all
other priorities.
13. 121 CONG. REc. S5,364 (daily ed. April 7, 1975) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire).
50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(4), supra note 4, requires that priorities and allocations under
subsection (a) be coordinated with those under subsection (c).
14. This includes applications received by the Federal Energy Administration,
which was responsible for DPA section 101(c) before DOE's organization in October
1977.
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Corps of Engineers received priority authorization in two sepa-
rate instances for circuit breakers for hydroelectric projects.
The third request was by a Federal government agency for a
priority to expedite delivery of a computer system needed for
quantitative analysis to support energy legislation. This appli-
cation was rejected by DOE as legally insufficient in meeting
the tests required by DPA section 101(c) for maximization of
domestic energy supplies.
Although both sections 101(a) and (c) authorize the grant-
ing of priorities for essential needs, there are significant differ-
ences in the scope of the priorities which can be issued. Section
101(a), by its terms, could be utilized to obtain a priority on
any national defense-related contract, except contracts of em-
ployment, including, among other items: equipment, services, 5
petroleum, gas, electric power, transportation, as well as con-
tracts for materials and facilities.
Section 101(c) was intended to be more restrictive in its
scope. In addition to the prerequisites discussed above that the
needed items must be scarce, critical, and essential to produc-
tion, conservation, construction, etc., section 101(c) is limited
by its terms to "materials and equipment,"' which would in-
clude such items as pumps, valves, hardware, pipe, etc. 7 It
would appear that items such as transportation, facilities, and
electric power are beyond the scope of section 101(c).11
The availability of section 101(c) for energy programs out-
side of the United States is limited both by the terms of the
statute and the regulations. Priorities only are available to
maximize "domestic" energy supplies. 19 In addition, DPS Reg-
ulation 1, section 23(a), restricts the scope of the DPA by pro-
15. Basic Rules of the Defense Priorities System (DPS Reg. 1), 32A C.F.R. pt. 651,
§ 13 (1977).
16. "Materials" are defined in section 702(b) of the DPA, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(b)
(1970), as including "raw materials, articles, commodities, products, supplies, compo-
nents, technical information, and processes."
17. A question exists as to whether a priority could be obtained under section
101(c) for certain "services." Section 101(c) also does not specifically mention services,
although the Department of Commerce has read services into that section. See 32A
C.F.R. pt. 621, § 13 (1977).
18. 43 Fed. Reg. 6,209, at 6,210 (1978). The exclusion of energy sources from
section 101(c) priorities is reasonable since, if these items were covered, the Depart-
ment of Commerce would have the authority to allocate energy, and conflicts could
arise between DOE allocation regulations promulgated pursuant to authorities other
than the DPA and the DPA directives issued by the Department of Commerce.
19. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071(c)(1) (Supp). V 1975).
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viding that: "All regulations and orders of BDC [Bureau of
Domestic Commerce], unless specifically stated otherwise in
such regulations and orders, shall apply to transactions in any
state, territory, or possession of the United States and the Dis-
trict of Columbia. '20
These restrictions seemingly would not prevent a domestic
firm from seeking priorities assistance for materials to con-
struct a facility on foreign territory so long as the ultimate
benefit is to maximize United States energy supplies.
CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of DOE in directing scarce materials to
essential energy projects is, of course, limited by the number
of applications for priorities assistance. As noted above, since
the enactment of the EPCA in December 1975, DOE has re-
ceived fewer than ten applications for priorities assistance
under DPA section 101(c). Perhaps this is a result of there
being no shortages of materials and equipment needed for en-
ergy programs. It is also possible, however, that the extensive
applications, requirements, and findings have discouraged po-
tential applicants from resorting to priorities assistance under
DPA section 101(c).
It would be more likely, however, that a lack of general
familiarity by the energy industry with DPA section 101(c) has
resulted in its limited use: priorities assistance always had
been the exclusive domain of the defense industry, with recipi-
ents of Government defense contracts being the primary bene-
ficiaries. However, given the recent emphasis on energy devel-
opment and the resourcefulness of private industry, requests
for priority assistance may begin to proliferate, expanding
DOE's role in allocating scarce resources to essential energy
programs.
20. 32A C.F.R. pt. 651, § 23(a) (1977).
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Crude oil price controls are a part of the great body of
federal and state regulations which govern the activities of the
petroleum industry. Price controls are a rather recent addition
to four decades of petroleum industry regulations, which gener-
ally have fit into one of the following classifications: market
demand prorationing plans, oil import quotas, allocation pro-
grams, and price controls. The market demand prorationing
plan and oil import programs were designed to raise crude oil
prices above their competitive levels, thus stabilizing prices
and transferring funds from consumers to producers. Crude oil
and product price regulations have the opposite effect; i.e.,
they are designed to keep prices below world levels and transfer
income from producers to consumers.
The current regulations prevent owners of lower cost oil
with fixed production costs from seeking the world price of
crude oil as established by the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC). Under this scheme, controls pre-
vent crude oil and petroleum product prices from reflecting the
OPEC price of crude. This lower-than-market domestic price
of petroleum encourages demand, reduces domestic produc-
tion, and increases imports of foreign crude as the marginal
source of supply to satisfy domestic demand, and thus in-
creases the United States' dependence on an uncertain supply
of crude oil. The evidence suggests that these regulations, cou-
pled with environmental restrictions, create a negative impact
on the supply of petroleum in the United States.' Prorationing
plans have diverted investment toward development drilling,
* The views expressed herein are those the authors and should not be taken as
representing the views of either of their employers.
** Program Manager for Public Policy and Regulation, National Science Founda-
tion. B.S., 1966, St. Bonaventure University; M.A., 1970, University of Pittsburgh;
Ph.D., 1971, University of Pittsburgh.
* ** Economist, U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration.
B.S., 1970, University of Delaware; M.A., 1972, University of Colorado; Ph.D., 1974,
University of Colorado.
1. See, e.g., D. Born & M. RUSSEL, U.S. ENERGY PoucY 4 (1975).
315
316 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
away from exploration in highly risky but potentially more
productive petroleum regions or basins. Together, prorationing
and import controls have discouraged necessary investment in
domestic refining capacity. Prorationing, by restricting pro-
duction, has limited the refiners' sources of domestic feed-
stocks, and import limitations have restricted the refiners' abil-
ity to substitute foreign for domestic feedstocks. Likewise, im-
port quotas have reduced competition and efficiency in domes-
tic production, since import quotas are set so that they cannot
replace domestic production, a situation which has allowed
U.S. producers to exercise effective monopoly power through
complete control of both domestic and foreign supplies. With-
out an import quota, the ability of prorationing to restrict out-
put and allow crude oil prices to rise above their competitive
levels would be neutralized by the substitution of imported
crude for domestic production.
Price controls on petroleum tend to weaken any incentive
by the industry to respond to increased demand for products.
Regulated natural gas markets have discouraged producers
from exploring for new fields in the face of declining gas re-
serves. Since natural gas and petroleum are joint products,
price controls on both have contributed to their declining re-
serve positions.
Under any energy program, the average price of domestic
crude oil is regulated to be lower than the price of imported
crude oil, and as such, the average refiner acquisition cost for
domestic crude oil is considerably below that of imported
crude. Under each of the Nixon, Ford, and Carter energy pro-
grams, phased decontrol of domestic crude oil prices has been
deemed preferable to immediate decontrol. Since the domestic
production of crude oil is no longer sufficient to meet domestic
demand, the marginal barrel of crude oil needed to satisfy this
increased demand must come from foreign sources.
From the standpoint of market efficiency, regulations are
usually considered harmful in that they reduce production,
distort market mechanisms, and fail to account for the interac-
tion of supply and demand. For equity reasons, however, regu-
lations are often necessary to protect consumers, assign costs
to externalities, and preserve national security. This paper will
discuss the efficiency aspects of crude oil regulations and their
consequent impacts on price, domestic production, market dis-
tortions, and imports. The study will be divided into three
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parts: Pre-Embargo Controls, Post-Embargo Controls, and an
Economic Analysis of Controls.
HI. PRE-EMBARGO CONTROLS
As demonstrated by MacAvoy 2 and Mead,3 the crude oil
segment of the petroleum industry has been subject to govern-
ment regulation since the 1930's, though the purpose of the
regulations has changed dramatically over the years. Current
regulations are designed to restrain prices and transfer industry
rents4 from the producers of crude oil to the consumers of petro-
leum products. On the other hand, the earliest regulations
transferred funds from the consumers to the producers by re-
stricting supply and thereby stabilizing prices at higher than
open market levels.
A. Domestic Prorationing Schemes
In the 1930's, the major petroleum-producing states joined
together to develop a system of prorationing under which any
given producer was allowed to produce only a percentage of the
maximum efficient rate of recovery from a given reservoir. 5 In
1935 the major producing states executed the Interstate Oil
Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas.' The prorationing plans
encouraged in the compact were designed to prevent overin-
vestment in oil wells and overproduction from any given reser-
voir, with state agencies setting the allowable rates of produc-
tion. Many states have continued to employ alternative forms
of these maximum efficient recovery (MER) plans over the last
four decades, and while no single plan has ever worked flaw-
lessly, MER's have helped to limit the wasteful production and
wild price fluctuations which characterized the early 1930's.
Obviously, the prorationing plans fixed prices and elimi-
nated competition among producers. If permissible production
rates were established at too low a level, refiners would com-
2. FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION REGULATION (P. MacAvoy ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as MacAvoyl.
3. W. Mead, Petroleum: An Unregulated Industry? ENERGY SUPPLY AND Gov-
ERNMENT POLICY 130-160 (R. Kalter & W. Vogely eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as
Mead].
4. Rents may be defined as unrealized gains to the owner of a scarce commodity
which is fixed in quantity, whose market value has increased since the owner's procure-
ment.
5. There have been a number of different prorationing plans. The rationale behind
each type is explained in Mead, supra note 3, at 132-48.
6. The U.S. Congress by joint resolution gave its consent to the compact. See J.
Res. of Aug. 27, 1935, Ch. 781, 49 Stat. 939 (1935).
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plain that they were unable to obtain crude at the current
price; the state agency would then either increase the produc-
tion percentages or raise the price of crude. Production in ex-
cess of state-established limits for interstate shipment was pro-
hibited by the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935.! This state of
affairs was not changed notably by peacetime legislation for
the next twenty-five years.
B. Oil Import Controls
When low cost foreign crude oil threatened prorationing
plans, and thereby the price of domestic crude oil, the Presi-
dent (at the urging of congressmen whose districts were being
affected) established the Mandatory Oil Import Program
(MOIP) of 1959.1 This program set volumetric limits on the
amount of crude oil and related products which could be im-
ported. While the regulations and operation of MOIP under-
went several changes, the effect was to insulate the price of
domestic crude oil from lower world prices. Under this program
the quantities of imported oil were rigidly fixed, and the mar-
ginal barrel of crude oil necessary to satisfy domestic demand
was supplied from domestic petroleum sources.
Declining domestic production of crude oil since 1970, cou-
pled with increased demand, has caused the allowable rate of
production under the MER plans to be fixed at 100% by the
appropriate state commissions. With full production now per-
mitted, there no longer exists any excess production capacity
in the domestic petroleum industry; producers may now pro-
vide as much as is profitable to satisfy domestic demand.
Effective May 1, 1973, President Nixon eliminated
MOIP's volumetric limits on oil imports.' The removal of the
quota system exposed a severe shortage of domestic refinery
capacity. Refineries which would have been constructed in the
United States were built abroad instead, since the quota sys-
tem had restricted entry into the United States of foreign crude
7. 15 U.S.C. § 715 (1976).
8. Pres. Proc. No. 3279, 3 C.F.R. 11 (1959-1963 Compilation), reprinted in 19
U.S.C. § 1862 (1976), and in 73 Stat. c25 (1959). For a detailed account of the history
and politics of the mandatory oil import program from 1959-1973, see Mead, supra
note 3, at 148-54.
9. Pres. Proc. No. 4210, 3 C.F.R. 239 (1971-1975 Compilation), reprinted in 87
Stat. 1187 (1973). License fees, however, continued to be charged on imported oil: $0.21
per barrel of crude, and $0.63 per barrel of product.
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oil supplies. In 1973 domestic U.S. refiners were operating at
almost 100% of capacity.
C. Price Controls
The United States' first major peacetime experience with
petroleum price controls occurred with the Nixon Administra-
tion's announcement of a ninety-day wage-price freeze (Phase
One) on August 15, 1971.10 The current crude oil price regula-
tions of the Department of Energy are an extension of the regu-
lations originally promulgated under Phase One. While the
program affected petroleum products as well as crude petro-
leum, the discussion here will focus only on crude oil aspects
of price controls.
Prior to the summer of 1971, there had been gasoline price
wars among the major brand gasoline dealers. Markets, how-
ever, stabilized prior to the establishment of controls, and at
the initiation of the price freeze, gasoline prices charged by oil
company retail outlets were at normal or near-normal levels.
The integrated petroleum companies enjoyed some flexibility
under the freeze. Traditionally, major petroleum companies
had provided bulk purchasers of gasoline and refined products
with discounts below the posted prices. As the discount con-
tracts expired, the suppliers refused to renew them at the dis-
counted level and insisted on selling their petroleum only at the
full posted price. Thus, despite the freeze, these companies in
effect were able to raise their prices. This practice placed a
squeeze on the profits of independent marketers whose prod-
ucts were subject to the freeze but whose inputs were now
purchased at nondiscounted prices. These price distortions
continued into the second stage of the Nixon wage-price pro-
gram.
Phase Two lasted from November 15, 1971 to January 11,
1973."1 Ceiling prices which had been set during the Phase One
freeze became base prices for Phase Two. Under Term Limit
Pricing (TLP) arrangements, companies were allowed to in-
crease prices of their products for a specified period of time,
10. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 3 C.F.R. 602 (1971-1975 Compilation), 12 U.S.C. §
1904 n (1976). A detailed account of the regulations and the impact of controls during
the Nixon Administration's Economic Stabilization Program is presented in W. John-
son, The Impact of Price Controls on the Oil Industry: How to Worsen an Energy
Crisis, in ENERGY: THE POLICY ISSUES 100-109 (G. Eppen ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited
as Johnson).
11. The first announcement of a change in the structure of controls came in Exec.
Order 11,627, 3 C.F.R. 621 (1971-1975 Compilation).
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provided the weighted-average price increases were consistent
with specific cost passthrough and profit margin rules set by
the newly established Price Commission. Companies were al-
lowed to spread price increases in any manner across products
subject to TLP, but were severely limited in adjusting relative
prices for products excluded from TLP arrangements. In the
petroleum industry, three-fourths of the refinery yield was ex-
cluded. For example, crude oil prices were excluded from TLP
agreements if the crude was resold by refineries, while first-sale
prices of crude oil were included in TLP arrangements.
During 1972 and continuing into 1973, shortages of crude
oil and some refined products began to appear. For example,
the controls prohibited price increases on gasoline and number
two home heating oil above their August 1971 price levels.
However, during the summer months, gasoline prices were at
relatively high levels compared to heating oil prices. Since the
refiners believed that heating oil prices would not be allowed
to follow their seasonal pattern and rise during the winter, they
had no incentive to increase their output of heating oil when
the winter months arrived, and shortages began to occur.
Phase Three"2 was the government's response to these and
similar problems; it was to have provided industry with greater
flexibility in conducting business, within fixed price guidelines.
Business was to comply on a voluntary basis with standards for
cost increases contained in the Phase Three regulations; the
Price Commission was abolished and the Cost of Living Coun-
cil was called upon to monitor compliance with the new stan-
dards. As Phase Three began, the combined factors of pent-up
demand pressure for petroleum products, decreasing domestic
crude production, and a worldwide shortage of crude oil re-
sulted in sharp increases in the price of crude oil and products.
On March 8, 1973, however, the Cost of Living Council issued
Special Rule Number One, 3 which reimposed mandatory con-
trols on the twenty-three major companies in the petroleum
industry," and produced an unfortunate set of incentives which
contributed to the shortage of crude in the United States. First,
the rule restricted the ability of the majors to raise prices above
12. See Exec. Order No. 11,695, 3 C.F.R. 741 (1971-1975 Compilation).
13. 38 Fed. Reg. 6284 (1973).
14. These companies had individual sales in excess of $230 million, and in the
aggregate conducted 45% of the industry's sales.
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specified percentages, and prohibited them from increasing
prices if their profits were over specific base period profit mar-
gin levels. Since the largest companies owned and operated
profitable holdings, their profits exceeded the base period lev-
els, and thus they were prohibited from passing on higher for-
eign crude oil costs to their customers. At the same time the
rule enabled smaller refiners to bid up the price of crude oil.
Since the higher price of foreign crude could not be passed on
by the majors, the smaller refineries succeeded in diverting
crude from the majors. A second negative byproduct of Special
Rule Number One arose from the fact that the major U.S.
producers with foreign operations faced a reduction in profits
on refined products if the crude was sold in the United States
and they were at the profit margin constraint. By selling this
crude oil abroad rather than shipping it to the United States,
the majors were able to maximize profits, since foreign sales
were unaffected by the Phase Three rules. This circumstance
further aggravated the shortage of crude oil in the United
States and placed more pressure on crude oil prices, exacerbat-
ing crude shortages to domestic refiners. A crude oil allocation
program eventually was enacted 5 to alleviate the crude shor-
tages created by Special Rule Number One.
Phase 31/2 froze all petroleum prices from June 13, 1973
to August 12, 1973.16 During this period even the increased
prices of imported crude oil could not be passed through to
consumers in the form of higher product prices. Since imported
crude oil prices were rising, this rule effectively stopped all
crude purchases by refiners and eventually produced severe
petroleum product shortages in the fall of 1973.
Phase Four took effect on August 13, 1973, and continued
until December 1973 when all petroleum price controls were
transferred to the Federal Energy Office from the Cost of Liv-
ing Council." The new regulations benefited immensely from
the failings of Phases Two and Three, with their reliance on
controlling only the major companies: now the pricing of petro-
15. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (EPAA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-
760h (1976), discussed infra.
16. Announced by President Nixon in Exec. Order No. 11,723, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1971-
1975 Compilation).
17. Phase Four regulations were originally set forth in 38 Fed. Reg. 19,462-86
(1973) (proposed), and amended in 38 Fed. Reg. 21,592-613 (1973). Provisions relevant
to crude oil appear at 38 Fed. Reg. 19,481-83 (1973).
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leum and its products by all parts of the industry would be
covered. A two-tiered pricing system was established which
differentiated between controlled "old" oil and uncontrolled
"new" oil. While designed to stabilize the price of crude pro-
duced from existing properties, it also provided an incentive to
producers to seek out higher cost production from new proper-
ties, or to use enhanced recovery techniques to increase produc-
tion from existing properties. 8 "Old" oil was defined as oil
produced from a given property in an amount equal to or less
than the amount produced in the same month of 1972 by that
property. It was subject to price controls fixed at the May 15,
1973 price of crude oil from the given field, plus thirty-five
cents per barrel. The lower tier thus had the effect of prevent-
ing the industry from accruing rents on existing properties.
Uncontrolled "new" oil was defined as production from new
wells on properties not operative in 1972, or production from
1972 properties in excess of 1972 production levels. "Stripper"
oil, from wells producing less than ten barrels per day, was not
subject to controls. In addition, for each new barrel of crude oil
produced on an existing property, a barrel of old oil would be
released from lower tier controls. This "released" oil was free
of controls and was used as an inducement for producers to
increase production above 1972 levels on existing properties.
New and released oil were free to seek the uncontrolled import
price level. Thus, the two-tiered system was designed to in-
crease domestic crude oil production by raising the crude oil
price at the margin for each new barrel of oil, while allowing
the average price for new and old oil to determine refinery
product prices.
Although the two-tiered system did encourage new explo-
ration and development, it created problems for refineries.
Since each refiner did not have access to the same proportions
of controlled and uncontrolled crude oil, the system produced
significant differentials between refiners in ultimate product
prices. Retail gasoline prices in the same city often differed by
as much as twelve cents per gallon."9 The self-sufficient refinery
purchaser had to charge oil into the refinery at the controlled
18. Enhanced recovery techniques are methods of recovering additional energy
from a reservoir by fluid or chemical injections. The oil generated by fluid injections
is called "secondary" oil, while the result of chemical injections is called "tertiary" oil.
19. Johnson, supra note 10, at 110.
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price, and the low controlled prices then had to be carried
through into low product prices. This procedure placed the
uncontrolled crude purchaser at a disadvantage in the product
market, since higher price crude imports were charged into the
refinery at the higher import price and yielded higher priced
refined products. The two-tiered system thus discouraged in-
vestment in expansion of refinery capacity.
III. POST-EMBARGO CONTROLS
The Yom Kippur War of October 1973 resulted in an em-
bargo on the sale of crude oil to the United States by the OPEC
nations. With the threat of a severe shortage of crude oil sup-
plies, the stage was set for implementation of a crude oil alloca-
tion procedure designed to avert the harshest effects to con-
sumers of the impending crude shortage.
A. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA) became
effective on November 27, 1973 and provided for the mandatory
and equitable allocation of crude oil among the nation's refi-
ners on a quarterly basis.20 Under a buy/sell agreement, refiners
having a higher percentage of crude oil supplies than the na-
tional average (in relation to their refining capacity) were re-
quired to resell their crude to refineries with below normal
crude availability. Under the allocation scheme, the Federal
Energy Office (FEO) took over administration of the EPAA
from the Cost of Living Council in December 1973. The effect
of the EPAA was to penalize those companies with preesta-
blished crude supplies and to weaken the market function by
placing FEO in control of crude allocation."
During the period of the embargo (October 1973 through
April 1974), the regulations established under the EPAA re-
mained unchanged. With the end of the embargo in the spring
of 1974, legislation was signed establishing the Federal Energy
Administration (FEA), 2 which was given authority to adminis-
ter the regulations established and formerly administered by
FEO. The only major changes made in the regulations by FEA
in the remainder of 1974 were modifications of the buy/sell
program and creation of a crude oil entitlements program. The
20. 15 U.S.C. § 751-760h (1976).
21. See Mandatory Allocation Regulations amending 10 C.F.R. §§ 200-202 (re-
voked), 205 (added), 210-212 (added), reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 1924-1961 (1974).
22. Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 761-787 (1976).
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original buy/sell program had caused two major problems: (1)
the requirement of crude oil sharing among majors had forced
needless transfers of supplies between majors experiencing
mere short term imbalances, increasing unnecessary bureau-
cratic costs; and (2) disincentives to purchase imported crude
oil, as discussed above. The buy/sell program was modified
on May 14, 1974, to limit the sellers of crude oil to the fifteen
largest refiners, and the buyers to the smaller refiners.2 Some
imported oil disincentives were also addressed.
B. Entitlements Program
In November 1974 the EPAA was supplemented by a
crude oil entitlements program designed to equalize crude oil
costs varying among refiners as a result of the two-tiered price
control system.2 4 Under the program, refiners having crude oil
in excess of the national average were required to purchase
entitlements from refiners having less than the national aver-
age. The purpose of the program was to correct inequities cre-
ated by the earlier price control and allocation procedures; one
intended effect was the creation of a bias favoring smaller refi-
ners. Large OPEC price increases in late 1973 had produced a
tremendous gap between upper and lower tier oil prices. De-
pending on the mix of old, new, and imported oil available to
the refineries, the average price of imports available had con-
tinued to vary considerably. Refineries with more old oil than
the national average were forced to purchase entitlements in
order to use their excess lower tier oil, while those having less
than the average low-cost crude could sell their entitlements.
Small refiners were given additional entitlements as a subsidy
to help them compete with the majors; these entitlements ei-
ther could be sold or used to acquire crude oil at a cost below
the majors' acquisition cost.a The small refiner bias effectively
raised the cost of crude oil to large refiners, whose costs were
obviously key determinants of the final price of refined prod-
ucts. In addition, the bias encouraged the use of smaller, less
efficient refineries.
23. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.61-211.68, 211.71, 212.88 (revoked), 212.94
reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg. 17,288-93 (1974).
24. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 211.66, 211.67, 212.131, reprinted in 39 Fed. Reg.
42,246-50 (1974).
25. See generally MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 12.
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C. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act and the Energy
Conservation and Production Act
Current crude oil controls operate under laws passed in
December 1975 and August 1976. The Energy Policy and Con-
servation Act (EPCA) of 1975 provided for the phasing-out of
price regulations on crude oil over a forty-month time period.,
The plan established a fixed national average price for all crude
oil, which the Federal Energy Administration was given power
to adjust by up to 10% per year. Initially, the average price was
set at $7.66 per barrel, which was the share-weighted average
price of old oil at $5.25 per barrel and upper tier oil at $11.28
per barrel. The upper tier included new oil, released oil, and
stripper oil; a third tier not included in the composite existed
for uncontrolled imported oil, which sold for approximately
$13.25 per barrel. Following passage of EPCA, revisions were
made in existing crude regulations to conform to EPCA, in-
cluding elimination of the released oil category and introduc-
tion of a mechanism whereby the base period production level
for a given field was placed on a declining basis to correspond
with the historical decline rate for each field." In addition, the
lease definition was modified to treat new reservoirs developed
on old leases as new property, thereby making them available
for upper tier rather than lower tier prices.,
The Energy Conservation and Production Act (ECPA) of
1976, modified EPCA by exempting stripper oil from upper tier
controls." However, stripper oil supplies were still to be in-
cluded in the calculation of the upper tier price, which pre-
vented the exemption of stripper oil from having an effect on
the share-weighted average price of crude oil remaining con-
trolled. Tertiary oil supplies were exempted from controls and
allowed to sell at the world oil price, but were not included in
the average price.
Current crude oil controls focus on elimination of rents to
owners of lower cost old petroleum, unlike the rules in the pre-
embargo period, which were aimed at holding down prices and
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (1976).
27. FEA began assuming a decline rate of 8% as an average for all fields, based
on analysis of a number of sites.
28. Amendments to 10 C.F.R. §§ 212.72, 212.75, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 36,172-
85 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6892 (1976).
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forcing producers and refiners to absorb increasing costs. The
current control system prevents domestic crude oil from re-
flecting the OPEC price of crude oil. However, any intended
benefits of the program are not without costs to the industry
and the taxpayer. 30 For the industry there are compliance and
administrative costs, interference with distribution patterns,
and uncertainty as to the direction of future regulation. The
taxpayers bear the costs of increased regulation via higher
prices and reduced efficiency. The various programs discourage
refinery expansion, continue to be biased in favor of less than
optimal refinery utilization, and cause higher marketing costs.
The present controls program is exceedingly complex and diffi-
cult to enforce." Summary comments from other studies illus-
trate these points.
MacAvoy concluded that the costs of today's crude oil reg-
ulations outweigh their benefits: current market conditions
show adequate world supplies of crude and do not warrant
continuation of product pricing and allocation regulations. He
estimated that the petroleum industry pays reporting and
administrative costs for compliance as high as $570 million
annually, while the administrative costs of the program main-
tained by FEA could be costing the taxpayers $47 million per
year.32 In addition, controls could produce longrun inefficien-
cies by encouraging refineries of less than optimal size (small
refiner bias), and inefficiency in the distribution of products.
In analyzing the effects of crude oil controls, Cox and
Wright reached similar conclusions. While they found that the
entitlements program did equalize refiner crude costs, it had
the additional effect of artificially reducing the market price of
products and increasing product demand in the absence of an
appropriate supply response. Further, the EPAA and EPCA
policies increased United States dependence on foreign
sources, since the entitlements program provided a subsidy to
imported crude oil. 33
30. For a detailed discussion of the costs to industry and taxpayers of compliance
and enforcement of petroleum regulations, see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 39-89.
31. For a discussion of procedural problems with the current regulatory program,
see MacAvoy, supra note 2, at 91-138.
32. Id. at 143.
33. Cox & Wright, The Effects of Crude Oil Price Controls, Entitlements and
Taxes on Refined Product Prices and Energy Independence, 54 LND ECON. 1-15 (Feb.
1978).
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Morici's analysis concluded that the benefits of price regu-
lations to petroleum consumers and refiners were outweighed
by the costs to crude oil producers and the loss of efficiency in
production. 3' The cost of transferring windfall profits from
crude producers to product consumers and refiners yields a
negative net welfare gain. Consumers obviously benefit from
lower product prices and higher consumption levels as long as
refineries pass on their lower crude costs, which have not been
fully dissipated by higher refinery costs. However, Morici con-
cluded that this regulated system has the effect of subsidizing
crude oil imports and reallocating domestic resources to less
efficient users.
IV. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTROLS
This analysis first will employ a simple static supply and
demand model to examine the impact of EPCA-type price con-
trols on consumers, producers, and the international oil mar-
kets. Assuming that oil supplies are not perfectly inelastic,3
which is consistent with both theoretical analysis and empiri-
cal work, Figure One illustrates the impacts of EPCA-type
price controls on oil demand and supply.3
Figure 1












34. Morici, Jr., The Benefits and Costs of Crude Oil Price Regulations, 3 J. EN.
& DEv. 366-77 (Spring 1978).
35. I.e., that oil supplies do not respond to changes in oil price. This could be
demonstrated graphically as a vertical line in Figure One.
36. This analysis relies on the work of Cox and Wright, supra note 33, which shows
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In the case of producers subject to price controls, the upper
tier price will equal the marginal cost of production, a figure
normally used 'by producers to compute the profit-maximizing
production rate. Given a positively sloped supply curve, pro-
duction will be lower under price controls than in the absence
of price controls. This production loss equals B minus A on the
supply function. However, the dynamic solution discussed in
the next section may yield far different results.
Because of the exclusion of enhanced recovery techniques
in the EPCA, the upper tier price controls are more likely to
retard exploration and development of new oil properties than
they are to deter investment in enhanced recovery. The new
regulations regarding stripper well pricing may induce some
suppliers with relatively low producing properties to retard pro-
duction for a period of time in order to receive stripper well
classification and therefore maximize profits in the long run.
These types of exceptions in the current regulations tend to
alter the simple static analysis presented supra; they are, how-
ever, relatively small when compared to overall production
magnitudes.
The impact on oil demand is straightforward when using
the static model illustrated in Figure One. Since consumers
base their consumption decisions on the average oil price, their
oil demand will be greater than the level implied by the world
oil price. In this figure, demand increases by the amount B'
minus A'. However, there is an additional impact on the de-
mand curve caused by the crude oil price regulations, which
alter the shape of the demand curve, making it relatively more
inelastic above the average price than would be the case other-
wise. This is due to the fact that if world oil prices increase by
1% for example, the average price to the consumer increases by
somewhat less than 1%, because of the weighting of domestic
and imported oil. Therefore, the demand curve becomes rela-
tively more inelastic above the average price than the simple
static model would suggest. To summarize in hard figures, the
current EPCA price controls impose a wealth transfer from
producers to consumers which Montgomery estimates will
amount to approximately $2 billion by 1985.11
that controls have reduced total, average, and marginal crude oil costs, and therefore,
product prices.
37. W. D. Montgomery, The Transition to Uncontrolled Crude Oil Prices (unpub-
VOL. 8:315
CRUDE OIL PRICE CONTROLS
Price controls also have a diversified effect on the interna-
tional oil market. The effect on imports is the sum of the pro-
duction supply effect and demand response of (B-A) + (B'-A')
in Figure One, which translates into a direct additional de-
mand for OPEC oil. This is further illustrated in Figure Two,
where the demand for OPEC oil is shown with and without
price controls (curves A and B, respectively). As already dem-
onstrated, price controls tend to make the demand curve for oil
more inelastic above the average price, as shown by curve A in
Figure Two. This effect is also relevant when examining the
supply curve for OPEC oil, where a 1% change in the world oil
price will cause less than a 1% change in the average price
facing customers. This effect would clearly impact the profit
maximizing price that OPEC would set; however, the static
model will not indicate in what direction OPEC would adjust
its prices to maximize profits.
Figure 2
The Demand for OPEC Oil
Price
--------- .... ------------------- Market Price




lished paper presented at the National Bureau of Economic Research, Conference on
Public Regulation, Washington, D.C., Dec. 11, 1977).
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Another possible international consequence of price con-
trols is that they might tend to create demand competition
among the oil-consuming nations, causing more rapid deple-
tion of the world's supply of crude. Since price controls in the
United States tend to increase imports, OPEC must deplete its
resources faster than it might otherwise, in order to meet this
demand." This action would effectively leave less oil available
to other consuming countries in later years, which might create
an incentive for them to impose their own price controls in
competition with the United States in order to maintain their
share of consumption. The result, other factors remaining con-
stant, would be a more rapid depletion of reserves.
For any finite resource the timing of extraction is critical
to the producer, since it represents one of the most important
variables in the profit maximization calculation. Therefore, a
dynamic analysis model must focus on the timing of extraction
and on price expectations. To the present, there have been no
theoretical analyses of the behavior of the petroleum industry
under imposed price paths, particularly when these paths are
highly uncertain. A few possible solutions to the dynamic prob-
lem can be suggested, but these should not be construed as
definitive or exhaustive of the possibilities.
If the controlled price is held constant in real terms, as-
suming prices are known with certainty, initial production
would be lower than could be expected absent controls. How-
ever, total production continues to increase over time, as de-
picted in Figure Three by the areas under triangles OAA' and
OBB'. We assume that the areas under both production curves
OAA' and OBB' are equal, implying identical total reserves
under either production curve. However, it is highly likely that
total reserves would be lower in the controlled price situation,
since the level of recoverable reserves is also a direct function
of price. Therefore, the most likely case is that curve OCC'
would be the more accurate representation of production in the
absence of price controls.
Montgomery has shown also that if controlled prices are
38. This assumes that OPEC has excess supply production capacity, which is
presently the case. However, if this capacity disappears, the excess demand would
serve to raise the world oil price for all consuming nations. At that point the U.S.
effectively would be paying for its price controls through foreign exchange differentials
and other macroeconomic occurrences.
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increasing so that the difference between the world price and
controlled prices is greater than the real rate of interest, re-
sources will be depleted sooner than under the controlled situa-
tion, as shown in the second chart of Figure Three. 9 Again, it
is reasonable to assume that the total level of reserves is a
function of the level of the controlled price. Since the controlled
price remains below the market price, the dotted line EE'
would be the most likely solution if price controls were lifted.
It is important to note that FF' could well lie below the market
price solution in most years since this line is determined by the
price/recoverable reserve relationship. Thus, the final solution
to the dynamic problem is even more uncertain.
Figure 341"
A Dynamic Representation of
Oil Production
Production Paths When Market and Controlled Prices are
Constant
C
A "", B Market PricesProduction B '
Probable Market Impact
When Reserves Are Considered
do Controlled Prices
0 A' C' B' Time
39. Montgomery, note 37 supra.
40. Taken from id., with the exception of the dotted lines depicting the impact of
price on available reserves.
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Figure 3, Cont'd
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Since the life of a particular field usually runs between
twenty and thirty years, price expectations are crucial in deter-
mining the extraction rate. In the previous analysis, it was
assumed that these price paths were known with certainty.
However, one of the major impacts of price controls, especially
in recent years, has been to add uncertainty to the determina-
tion of the controlled price. The regulations outlined earlier
have changed dramatically in just the last five years, and there
is no reason for producers to expect any more certainty in the
regulatory environment in the future. This instability is im-
posed on top of the uncertainty introduced by OPEC in their
price-setting decisions. The combination of these factors could
alter the analysis presented drastically. For example, if produ-
cers expected controls to be removed some time far in the fu-
ture, and at the same time expect OPEC to raise prices rapidly,
the profit-maximizing solution might be to withhold current
production. While apparently this is not presently taking
place, it is not difficult to conceive its occurrence in the future.
Figure Four suggests how this uncertainty would alter any ex-
pected extraction path (a solid line) with a probability distri-
bution (dotted lines) drawn about this line.
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Figure 4
Production When the Controlled Price is Uncertain
Production
' . ... 2.: :..
Time
The international implications of the dynamic analysis are
somewhat similar to those of the static model presented above.
The demand reaction to price controls in the dynamic and
static solutions would be identical, however, the dynamic
production decisions would tend to alter the position of OPEC.
As long as slack OPEC production capacity exists, the dynamic
solution would force the excess-capacity members of OPEC to
alter their production in response to the extraction rates of the
non-OPEC producers, in order to maintain the world oil price
at the level they desire. If the spare OPEC production capacity
disappeared, the dynamic production decisions of the non-
OPEC producers would directly affect the world oil price and,
therefore, add an additional variable in the profit-maximizing
decisions of both the non-OPEC producers and of OPEC itself.
Thus, controls can be seen not only to influence domestic deci-
sions, but to impose significant costs on international markets.
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Multinational Firms and the Development of
the Iranian Oil Industry*
KARIM PAKRAVAN**
Between late 1973 and early 1974, the foreign oil industry was
subjected to revolutionary economic changes. Crude oil pricing
decisions, traditionally initiated by the international oil compa-
nies, were taken over by the OPEC' members. . . .The OPEC
members quadrupled the price of crude oil, and the OAPEC
2
members cut back production and put an embargo on shipments
to the United States for political purposes. These actions set in
motion radical changes in national energy policies, in interna-
tional balance of payments, and in the role of multinational oil
companies. The age of inexpensive oil and of market determina-
tion of petroleum prices and outputs had passed.'
The effects of the revolutionary decisions initiated by the
oil producing countries in the early 1970's upon the OPEC
members themselves were scarcely less profound than those
felt by the oil consuming world. The hitherto exploited produc-
ing countries suddenly found in their hands not only a poten-
tially destructive weapon in terms of joint pricing and produc-
ing decisions, but also opportunities to restructure their rela-
tionships with the multinational oil firms.' Iran took advantage
of this opportunity, replacing the Iranian Consortium Agree-
ment5 with a long term supply contract that brought all oil
operations in Iran under the direct control of the Iranian gov-
ernment through its agent, the NIOC." This agreement, in con-
* Editor's note: The reader will note that this article was written prior to the
occurrence of the events which have recently transpired in Iran.
** Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Free University of Iran.
M.S., 1972, London School of Economics; Ph.D., Econ., 1976, University of Chicago.
1. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
2. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
3. N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 301 (1974).
4. A multinational firm is one owning producing assets in at least two countries,
and, in the case of the "Majors" (British Petroleum, Exxon, Shell, Gulf, Texaco,
Mobil, Socal), many more than two countries.
5. Under the terms of the consortium agreement, the seven "Majors" participated
in predetermined percentages: British Petroleum (40%), Royal Dutch Shell (14%), the
five U. S. Majors (7% each), eleven independent oil companies, known as IRICON
(5%), and the Companies Franqaises des Pktroles (CFP) (6%) in exploration and pro-
duction of all petroleum within the consortium area (100,000 square kilometers). The
Iranian royalty was fixed at 12.5% of total revenue, and in addition, shared equally in
net profits. The effect of the consortium in financial terms was enormous: an immedi-
ate tripling of Iran's per barrel revenue (from twenty-five to eighty cents per barrel).
6. National Iranian Oil Company. Under the supply contracts presently in effect,
the NIOC sells petroleum to the consortium at a posted price per barrel, usually
including a minor discount to the multinationals with whom Iran formerly dealt on a
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junction with the joint venture contract,7 (used primarily with
independent oil companies), and the newer service contracts,'
gives Iran unprecedented control over the production and sale
of its oil.' However, Iran, just as all OPEC members, does not
concession basis. The discount is partly used by the consortium to make loans to NIOC
to cover its capital outlays. NIOC is presently renegotiating this purchase agreement
because of its dissatisfaction with the consortium's performance, especially concerning
the "minimum offtake program," whereby the consortium agreed to purchase a mini-
mum amount every year.
7. Under the typical joint venture contract, the government acts in its sovereign
capacity and as a partner in the venture. The joint venture pays taxes to the sovereign
based upon a predetermined percentage of revenue (usually 50%). The government
then, as a partner, again takes some 50% of the remaining profit with a result that the
percentage of profit is 75%-25% in favor of the producing country.
8. The service contract is coming into increasing use throughout the world, but
as yet there is no information available on the net benefits accruing under it to the
host government. Under a service contract, the producing country bears the economic
risk of discovery and owns all production assets. The multinational firm supplies the
technical and managerial expertise of discovery, refining, and marketing for a fee,
usually a percentage of the profit.
9. In a comparative analysis (using these variables: financial return to producing
countries, national sovereignty, and conservation), it seems from available data that
the joint venture regime is more favorable to the producing country than the concession
regime, which was so widely used in the period from 1954-1973, principally in the
consortium agreement.
While, as the following table suggests, the concession regime is slightly more
favorable in terms of financial return,
Table 1
Per barrel disposable Revenue Received
by Iran (cents per barrel)
Producer 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Consortium 80 83 123 133 164 860-960
SIRIP 22 22 22 25 28 24 n.a.
IPAC 40 33 29 51 75 88 n.a.
IMINICO - 24 31 39 66 106 n.a.
LAPCO 18 29 52 89 100 144 n.a.
NIOC 140 200 174 182 200 348 1336
the difference decreases as the price of oil increases. F. FEsHARAKI, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE IRANIAN OIL INDUSTRY (1976).
However, in terms of conservation, the joint venture regime appears clearly supe-
rior. Conservation may be defined as lower production and/or investment in order to
maintain or increase capacity. Two indices that are useful in presenting the relative
conservation efforts of the two regimes are the cumulative drilling-production ratio
(CDPR) and the ultimate reserves-cumulative production ratio (URCPR). Generally,
a higher CDPR will mean a greater effort in maintaining or increasing capacity, while
a lower URCPR will mean a greater effort in conserving the resource through lower
production. Although these indices have not been adjusted for any qualitative differ-
ences in the oil bearing fields, considering the fact that every oil region included
belongs to the same oil basin, these indices do retain explanatory power.
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yet possess the technical knowledge necessary to properly con-
duct all phases of oil production, from upstream to downstream









Computed on the basis of NIOC annual reports 1960-76.
*OSCO after 1973.
This table indicates a better performance for the two joint ventures considered









Consortium 28084 80850 .34
IPAC 299 2457 .12
SIRIP 126 2113 .60
LAPCO 484 1500 .32
Based on a field compilation. Data reported in 1976.
The figure for LAPCO is lowered by the fact that it does not include ulti-
mate reserves for Bahram field, for which no data is available.
Table three indicates a better performance for IPAC and SIRIP than the consor-
tium and LAPCO in terms of a slower depletion of oil reserves.
Conservation is here considered of primary importance because effective resource
management is essential to increase the life of the exhaustible oil supply, and thereby
increase the transition phase from a world economy based on exhaustible fossil fuels
to one based upon an inexhaustible source of energy, such as solar or geothermal
energy. Such a lengthened transition phase is essential to help prevent the disastrous
effects on the world economy that can be expected if the fossil fuels are too rapidly
depleted.
10. Upstream activities consist of exploratory and development activities, such as
geological and geophysical search activities, drilling of exploratory and development
wells, and arranging the technical infrastructure. Midstream activities include the
transportation of oil by pipeline and/or tanker ships. Downstream activities consist of
refining and marketing.
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virtual monopoly over this technical and managerial know-
how. As such technology cannot practically be developed over
the short run, Iran will continue to be dependent upon the
multinationals to properly exploit its oil reserves. This necessi-
tates a discussion of the proper role for the multinational oil
firm in Iran on terms that will maximize the benefits to the
producing country. In this connection, the following fields may
be identified in which foreign operator assistance will continue
to be necessary over the short run: provision of technology in
upstream, midstream, and downstream operations, and the
provision of capital. In what follows, each will be analyzed in
turn.
I. PROVISION OF TECHNOLOGY
Given that foreign oil firms (and this includes independent
as well as multinational oil firms) have a virtual monopoly on
the technology of upstream, midstream, and downstream oper-
ations, as well as the fact that the development of such technol-
ogy is a long and costly process, the solution for Iran would
seem to include the purchase of technical services from foreign
firms while simultaneously developing its own technology. The
development of technology does not mean the importing or
even building of, for example, drilling platforms, but furthering
research and development that can expand on the existing
Iranian technological base. Engaging in this course of action
would require the creation of a general policy of fostering re-
search and development through various incentives, especially
incentives for private industry. This program in the long run
will decrease reliance on foreign operators at all stages of the
extraction process. This, in turn, will allow Iran to maximize
the benefits from the exploitation of Iranian oil." However, in
the short run, the multinational oil firm will continue to play
a large role in the various processes of developing the Iranian
oil reserves. This role can be better understood by examining
each step in the development process.
A. Upstream Operations
In the initial stage of geological and geothermal explora-
11. See Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/5344 (1962). This resolution recognized that
complete and permanent sovereignity over all natural resources rests with the people
of the state in which such resources lie. This of course recognizes Iran's right to exploit
its vast petroleum reserves for its own benefit.
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tion, the crucial factor is the availability of trained personnel.
The NIOC can therefore immediately take over all such activi-
ties, and simply procure the necessary human expertise.
The next step in the exploratory process is the drilling of
exploratory and development wells. This does require sophisti-
cated technology unavailable on a large scale. The interna-
tional drilling industry is highly competitive and, therefore,
quite cost efficient. This invites, on at least a short and me-
dium run basis, the purchase from the foreign operators of such
services until the Iranian domestic drilling industry reaches a
level of technological sophistication that will allow it to com-
pete with foreign operations.
B. Midstream Operations
In the transportation of oil in pipelines, the construction
12. There is also significant evidence that prior to the drastic OPEC pricing deci-
sions of 1973, the oil industry as a whole had begun to enter an era of freer competition.
(See, e.g., N. JACOBY, MULTINATIONAL OIL 299 (1974), for a view that crude oil prices
had become essentially market-determined rather than supplier-announced, in the
major consuming nations in the period from 1957-1973.) This can be seen from a
presentation of the changes in the concentration of the foreign oil in industry in the
period for 1953 to 1972:
Table 4
Summary of Changes in Concentration of the Foreign Oil Industry
By Division, 1953 and 1972
1953 1972
"Seven "Seven
Largest" All Other Largest" All Other
Division Companies Companies Companies Companies
of the Combined Combined Combined Combined
Industry (Percent) (Percent) (Percent) (Percent)
Area of Operation 64 36 24 76
Proven Reserves 92 8 67 33
Production 78 13 71 29
Refining Capacity 73 27 49 51
Tanker Capacity 29 71 19 81
Product Marketing 72 28 54 46
Id.
However, the tendency of the foreign suppliers to control supply through a mecha-
nism known as the Aggregated Programmed Quantity Agreement between the mem-
bers of the Iran Consortium (that is, the seven Majors), as well as the tight control of
marketing outlets by the majors may make such competition more illusory than real.
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of the pipeline can be taken over in the long run by the domes-
tic industry. However, until it becomes large enough to under-
take such enormous projects, such construction projects will
have to be contracted out to foreign construction firms. The
actual naval transfer of petroleum is entirely another matter.
The oil tanker business is becoming increasingly risky. Large
fluctuations in tanker rates in the past year have been very
burdensome both to shipbuilders and tanker fleet owners.
There is, of course, the further risk of pollution of the marine
environment by tankers. Given the strong competition in the
international oil tanker business, as well as the enormous capi-
tal expenditures necessary to build a fleet, a more prudent
policy would be to simply purchase necessary tanker services.
C. Downstream Operations
These operations, consisting of refining and marketing,
require the greatest amounts of technical, financial, and mana-
gerial expertise. It is this facet of the oil development process
that seems to be the most dependent upon foreign oil opera-
tives. This supplies the foreign multinational oil firm offering
such expertise a powerful lever in negotiating with producing
countries. In this area, then, special emphasis in developing a
domestic industry would seem to offer great benefits to Iran.
This must be viewed in terms of development in the long run,
as the tremendous financial and intellectual efforts required
preclude short term development. Viable alternatives in the
refining industry would seem to be (in additon to a gradual
development of Iranian refineries), the purchase, in joint ven-
ture contracts, of refining services abroad, or simply to allow
the crude oil to be refined abroad by the foreign multinationals,
as is presently the case.
Marketing presents a more formidable challenge. Al-
though by 1977, NIOC was exporting (marketing) directly
1,165 TBD,13 this was mostly to Eastern Bloc and Third World
Countries." However, the traditional control of marketing and
distribution by the Majors in the Western consuming countries
has thus far prevented the development of large scale market-
13. Thousand barrels daily.
14. For instance, NIOC recently entered into joint ventures for refineries in both
India and South Africa, as well as concluding barter deals with Brazil (oil for industrial
and agricultural goods involving approximately one billion U.S. dollars) and various
Comecon countries.
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ing activities in such countries. It would appear to be a very
risky and costly undertaking to attempt to preempt a share of
this potentially vast market for Iranian oil. This is true not only
due to the risks inherent in such an enterprise, but also because
of the vast distribution structure that would have to be set up
and staffed. While certainly possible and promising in the long
run, in the immediate future, the multinational oil firm will
continue to play the key role in the refining and marketing of
crude oil.
II. PROVISION OF CAPITAL
The oil industry is capital intensive. This is true not only
because of the tremendous amount of assets necessary to con-
duct even the most modest of operations, but also because the
oil industry is entering an irreversibly increasing cost phase.'5
While Iranian oil revenues are high," they are largely ear-
marked for domestic economic development. Thus, most of the
required capital for further resource development must be pro-
vided by the international petroleum industry. The incentives
necessary to attract the vast amounts of capital required can
be included in the joint venture and long term supply con-
tracts.
III. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the revolutionary economic changes
wrought by the OPEC cartel action of 1973, oil producing coun-
tries as a whole are beginning to redefine their relationships
15. This is caused by the increasing difficulty of locating and extracting a scarce
resource in an industry where the lowest cost oil fields (such as the one exploited by
the Iran Consortium) are all but gone. The search for oil thus must lead to more
offshore drilling and similar costly operations. Of course, world inflation also serves to
increase cost. The following table graphically demonstrates the rapidly increasing
investment per daily barrel, which is an index of the average cost of investment in
capacity for the period 1972-1976.
Table 5
Investment per daily barrel
US $/daily barrel
1973 1974 1975 1976
World 275 415 447 548
Middle East 40 46 52 94
16. Oil revenues for the OPEC countries in 1974 as a result of the pricing decisions
were an additional $60 billion due the OPEC countries from the consuming nations,
N. JACOBY, supra note 12, at 302 (1974).
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with the multinational oil firms, who formerly controlled not
only production, but pricing decisions as well. However, de-
spite the new found control of production and pricing by oil
producing countries, the very nature of the industry, (one re-
quiring very sophisticated technical, financial, and managerial
expertise) mandates a continued active role in the Middle East
industry by the multinational oil firms possessing the neces-
sary expertise.
Iran, over the long run, must work to maximize the bene-
fits derivable from its vast oil reserves by developing its own
technology, especially in the areas of upstream research and
discovery and downstream marketing. This will require a vast
national effort concentrating on expanding and enriching the
existing Iranian base to include the necessary technical, mana-
gerial, and investment know-how needed to make Iran a full
participant in the Middle East oil industry.
Nuclear Power Plant Siting: A Comparative
Analysis of Public Interaction in the Siting
Process in France and the United States
STEVEN A. CHRISTENSEN*
The world is rapidly depleting its energy reserves. When
oil prices skyrocketed in November of 1973, as a result of the
Arab oil embargo, alternative sources of energy were ardently
sought. The oil embargo brought to the attention of millions
what environmental groups have been telling us for
years-natural resources are a finite commodity which we are
expending at such a dangerously rapid rate, that if alternative
energy sources are not developed immediately our present eco-
nomic lifestyle may be short-lived.
The embargo poignantly reminded the United States and
other industrialized nations of the degree to which they depend
on foreign energy resources. This prompted President Nixon to
implement new energy programs, demanding, among other
things, that Americans conserve energy in order to help reduce
our dependence on foreign oil.'
In recognition of the world's need for alternative energy
sources, this paper will examine several nuclear power plant
siting questions with a special focus on public concerns in both
France and the United States.
Dr. Dixie Lee Ray, the former chairperson of the United
States Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), stated in a speech
to the European Nuclear Society that most opposition to nu-
clear power stems from fear.' This fear is a combination of both
the known and unknown effects of the widespread use of nu-
clear power. From sickness and death caused by unseen radia-
tion to fear of a major nuclear accident, the public is becoming
acutely aware of the perils of the nuclear age. The public fear
* B.A., 1975, Brigham Young University; J.D. candidate, 1979, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. See Statement by the President Announcing a Series of Actions to Deal with
the Energy Crisis, 9 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 867 (June 29, 1973). See also President's
Message to Congress, 119 CONG. REc. 12889 (1973).
2. A. LovINS & J. PRICE, NON-NUCLEAR FUTURES: THE CASE FOR AN ETHICAL ENERGY
STRATEGY xvii (1975) [hereinafter cited as A. LoviNs].
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of nuclear power must be balanced against the needs of an
industrial world for alternative energy sources. 3
I. NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE
A. History of Atomic Energy in France
France's first encounter with atomic energy started in the
laboratories of Henri Becquerel and Fr6d6ric and Irene Joliot-
Curie in 1934 with the discovery of artificial radioactivity.' In
1945, following World War II, there was official state recogni-
tion of the potentially peaceful uses of atomic energy.' Since
October 1945, when Charles de Gaulle established the French
Atomic Energy Commission,6 successive French governments
have followed a consistent energy program with two fundamen-
tal goals: (1) to provide energy at a minimal cost; and (2) to
limit French dependence on foreign energy sources.7 At the
close of World War II, the French government nationalized the
majority of the fundamental industries, including Electricit6
de France (EDF), which established a governmental monopoly
over energy-related production.8 The employment of nuclear
reactors for major public and commercial use thus remains
under governmental control and precludes nongovernmental
ownership of nuclear facilities
EDF's initial nuclear energy project was the development
of a natural uranium graphite-gas line of reactors. 0 In the
1960's, France realized that the graphite-gas line of reactors
was outdated and thus decided to employ the American
3. Ralph Lapp, an environmental consultant to the Senate Public Works Commit-
tee, said that "the issue centers upon the nagging question about probability of a major
nuclear accident. . . and. . . a modern industrial society demands power. . . . This
means that sites will have to be found for these plants and there will have to be a
balancing of risk and reward." D. BEHRMAN, SOLAR ENERGY: THE AWAKENING SCIENCE
10 (1976).
4. L. SCHEINMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY POLICY IN FRANCE UNDER THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as L. SCHEINMANI.
5. Id. at 6.
6. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
7. Duirr, L'Energie Nuclaire en France 4, ELECTRICIT9 DE FRANCE (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Dirr].
8. Loi 46-628 (Apr. 8, 1946) [1946] J.O. 2951.
9. See Grzybowski & Dobishinski, Property and Tort in Nuclear Law Today, 10
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 446 (1977).
10. DTrr, supra note 7, at 5. This type of reactor was chosen because, during the
postwar period, France did not want to become dependent on foreign nations for her
development and the fuel needed for this type of reactor was readily available in
France. Id. at 4-5.
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Pressurized-Water-Reactor (PWR)." Export possibilities in the
early seventies were a crucial factor in this decision.'" Then,
shortly after the 1973 oil embargo, the French government de-
cided to accelerate its nuclear energy program. In order to bring
the French nuclear industry under exclusive government con-
trol, the Commissariat 6 1'Energie Atomique (CEA) was au-
thorized to buy back a portion of Westinghouse's interest in
Franatom.' 3
B. Structure of the CEA
After the nationalization of her primary industries,
France's desire to become one of the leading postwar powers led
President de Gaulle to form, under the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, the Commissariat e I'.-nergie Atomique." The CEA,
a scientific establishment vested with a civil personality and a
somewhat unique administrative and financial autonomy, was
placed under the control of the President of the Provisional
Government.'5 Its main purpose, according to the enabling or-
dinance, was to research the practical applications of atomic
energy.'" The organization was subsequently modified, and now
the CEA is under the direct authority and control of the Prime
Minister.'" Beneath the Prime Minister are: (1) the Ad-
ministrator-General who acts as both the administrative
director of the CEA, and as the official spokesman and delegate
of the French Government;" and (2) the High-Commissioner
who controls the scientific and technical aspects of the
agency. "9
C. France and Euratom
Late in 1957, the European Atomic Energy Community
(Euratom) was created upon the signing of the Treaty of
Rome.2° The Euratom Treaty created an international commis-
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. Id. at 11. Franatom obtained the requisite licenses from Westinghouse for
PWR construction and Sogerca was licensed by General Electric for production of
Boiling-Water-Reactors (BWR).
13. Id. at 12.
14. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 1, [1945] J.O. 7065.
15. Id. The administrative functions of a traditional French public institution are
delegated to one of the government ministers in the executive branch. See also, L.
SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 9.
16. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, [1945] J.O. 7065.
17. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 11.
18. Ordonnance 45-2563 of 18 Oct. 1945, art. 2, [1945] J.O. 7065.
19. Id. at art. 3. See generally, 2 ASPECTS DU Daorr DE L'ENERGIE ATOMIQUE 68 (H.
Puget ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as H. Puget].
20. Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 119581 298
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sion which was to supersede national legislation in this area in
order to maximize the management and exploitation of nuclear
energy and materials in Europe. In spite of conflicting political
and institutional ideologies, the Six generally agreed that Eu-
ratom should be vested with: (1) the right to stock fissionable
materials; (2) the power to create and manage common institu-
tions;2 (3) the coordination of research and planning; and
(4) the right to open the market for nuclear materials and
equipment."
Euratom threatened France's desire to remain a major
postwar power. French atomic development was far superior to
that of its potential partners, and France feared a loss of con-
trol over her vital resources.Y It was not until France was as-
sured that she alone would have control over her atomic mili-
tary rights that she assented to the Euratom Agreement.
D. French Legislation in the Nuclear Field
1. Base Installations
Government intervention and regulation of the nuclear
energy industry are a direct result of the potential public haz-
ards of nuclear materials. The French Government, by means
of Decret 63-1228 of December 11, 1963 (Decree of 1963), speci-
fies legislative requirements for "basic nuclear installations. ' ' 2-
The legislation establishes strict conditions which a base nu-
clear installation must satisfy before proper authorization for
construction can be granted. 6
2. The Decision Processes
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility must submit a
U.N.T.S. 169. The treaty was signed by the original "Six" nations of the EEC: France,
Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.21. Id. at art. 86. Under the Euratom Treaty, the Community became the legal
owner of all special nuclear materials produced by the member nations. See also,
Smith, The European Atomic Energy Community: The Limits of Supernationalism,
1 CAL. W. L. REv. 33 (1970). The control and management of these institutions rests
on the degree of commitment from the individual countries. The Euratom Treaty
sanctions the inspection and control of nuclear facilities as a safety measure against
the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Id. at 37.
22. [1958] 298 U.N.T.S. 169.
23. L. SCHEINMAN, supra note 4, at 144-45.
24. Id. at 166.
25. D~cret 63-1228 of Dec. 11, 1963, [19631 J.O. 11092, modified in part on March
27, 1973. These regulations place the more important installations, from planning
through functioning, under diverse controls. See Bourgeois, Nuclear Installation Safety
18, ELEcrmcrrg DE FRANcE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Bourgeois].
26. Id. at art. 3.
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series of safety reports to the various administrative offices in
charge of granting construction permits before a license to op-
erate can be granted. The first of these reports is the prelimi-
nary report, which is submitted to the Minister of Industry,
and enumerates the safety measures to be taken by the owner-
operator. 7 Next, the provisional report is submitted to the
Inter-Ministerial Committee for Basic Nuclear Installations
(CIINB) which predicts the performance of the unit as a whole
and of its various safeguard components.2 Then the final report
is submitted to the CIINB after all tests have been completed,
and specifies the actual measured performance of the unit."
An independent agency is required to examine the pro-
posed safety standards to guard against the possible bias of
reports submitted by owner-operators, and to determine the
advisability of granting a license.3 The proposal must then be
reviewed and approved by several government officials before
the Prime Minister finally authorizes the nuclear installation."
A draft proposal is passed, in the following order, from the
Institute for Health, Physics, and Nuclear Safety," to the
Standing Groups, 33 to the Minister of Health, to the Minister
of Industry, to the CIINB, and to the Ministers in charge of
that particular type of nuclear installation for final review.Y
The request for authorization to build a nuclear installa-
27. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 35. The preliminary reports generally include the
proposed actions of the owner-operators concerning general safety principles, main
technical safety options, design studies, and a preliminary safety study.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. The safety reports are sent to a Standing Group of experts who review the
material and then make a proposal, for or against the facility, to the Central Service
for Nuclear Installation Safety.
31. Id. at 39.
32. Id. at 36. This administrative body was formed in November 1976, by a joint
order from the Minister of Industry and Research and the Minister of Economy and
Finance. The institute's primary function is to perform studies, research, and works
on physics and nuclear safety. It must also assist and advise the Ministers on CEA
matters.
33. Id. at 37. The Standing Groups are divided into three catagories: the first
group is in charge of nuclear reactors, the second group is in charge of particle accelera-
tor safety, and the third group is in charge of other nuclear installations (such as
reprocessing plants). The Standing Group in charge of a particular institution will
evaluate and combine the safety reports submitted by the Institute for Health, Phys-
ics, and Nuclear Safety. The experts will add any technical specifications which they
deem necessary, and the owner-operator must comply with these specifications.
34. Id. at 39.
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tion"' must contain: (1) the characteristics of the installation;
(2) a descriptive notice of the geographic region and the reason
for the site choice; (3) potential environmental effects; (4) pro-
posed control of the nuclear materials; and (5) security precau-
tions.3 Before the administrative functions are complete, the
public must be given an opportunity to express their views of
the project and of the location of the installation.37
E. Environmental Protection
Article 1 of the law of July 10, 1976, requires that an im-
pact study on the environment and the region surrounding the
proposed site be made each time an operating license is consid-
ered.3 The purpose of the impact study is to systematically
determine the effects of a nuclear facility on the environment,
as well as on the local population.3 ' It is the responsibility of
the owner-operator applicant, public or private, to conduct all
necessary impact studies. 0
Once the impact study is completed, a hearing is held to
familiarize the public with the new installation and to receive
feedback from interested citizens." Hopefully, public scrutiny
will insure an objective, high quality, impact study. Publicity
for the hearing must be paid by the applicant, while the
breadth of publicity is determined by the regional prefect.42
35. See Decree of March 27, 1973, arts. 3 and 6 bis.
36. DgILGATION G9N9RALE A L'CgNERGIE, L'19NERIE NUCLIRE: LE PROJET SUPER-
PH IX A CREYS-MALVILLE 27 (1977) [hereinafter cited as DtLgGATION GiNgRALE X
L'NFRGIE].
37. Id. See also Dicret 63-1228, art. 8, (Dec. 11, 1963) [1963] J.O. 11093. Under
the provisions of article 8, the Commission must answer, within three months, an
inquiry into the licensing of a particular installation. The article mandates that the
purpose of the prescriptions is to avert all public danger and inconvenience.
38. Loi 76-629 (July 10, 1976) [1976] J.O. 4203, modified by D~cret 77-1141 (Oct.
12, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4948.
39. D~cret 77-1141, arts. 1 & 2, (Oct. 12, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4948. The impact
study should report the initial condition of the site, including agriculture, forests,
marine life, and so forth. The study should also include probable effects on the environ-
ment and population if a nuclear facility is to be located on .the site.
40. D~cret 77-1131, art. 3, clause 4 (Sept. 21, 1977) [1977] J.O. 4849.
41. Id. at art. 5. When the applicant's dossier is complete, the prefect of the region
reviews the findings, and if all requisites have been met, he will order a public hearing.
42. Id. at art. 6. Public notices must be posted in all communities and areas which
will be affected by the facility. Eight days before the hearing adequate notice must be
given in the local or regional newspapers and, if the prefect deems it necessary, he may
require the sponsor to employ other means of communication.
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The impact study and public hearings are designed to include
the public in the decisionmaking process at an early stage, so
information about fundamental issues, particularly environ-
mental quality and public protection, must be available to all
interested parties. The public recommendations are included
in the licensing proposal.
F. Safety Concerns
According to the Decree of 1963, those installations which
cause inconvenience or endanger the public are placed under
the surveillance of administrative authorities." These facilities
are divided into three classes according to the gravity of poten-
tial danger or inconvenience inherent in their exploitation."
Although atomic research and the construction of reactors and
laboratories are under the direction and control of the CEA,
France has public organizations, outside the control of the
CEA, such as les Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), which
perform an important function in the nuclear industry. These
organizations usually act under either the loi du 19 dkcembre
1917 (the Law of 1917) which regulates dangerous establish-
ments, or under the Decree of 1963 which controls potential
public hazards.
Under French regulatory law, only the operator of a nu-
clear installation may receive a construction permit. When all
other necessary licenses have been obtained, the operator be-
comes responsible for the safety of the installation." Minimum
safety standards are established by the Minister of Industry,
Trades, and Crafts." This ministry controls the Central Service
for the Safety of Nuclear Installations (SCSIN), a group of
experts who study the technical problems associated with cre-
ating, servicing, and shutting down nuclear facilities. 8
Article 11 of the Decree of 1963 requires two types of in-
spectors at all primary nuclear installations." The first kind
43. H. Puget, supra note 19, at 22.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 23.
46. Torquat, L 'Organisation des Pouvoirs en France dans le Domaine de la Surete
Nuclaaire 4, ELECTRICITr DE FRANCE (1978) [hereinafter cited as Torquat[.
47. Id. at 5.
48. DELEGATION GENERALE A L'ENERGIE, supra note 36, at 27. SCSIN is concerned
with the licensing of the facility, and with the general preparation and enforcement of
technical specifications concerning the safety of the installation.
49. Ddcret 63-1228, art. 11, (Dec. 11, 1963) [1963] J.O. 11093.
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of inspector falls under the purview of the Law of 1917, and is
charged with the regulation of primary nuclear installations.'"
Inspectors of the second type are agents of the Service Central
de Protection contre les Rayonnements Ionisants (SCPRI).
Their function is to monitor the radioactive pollutants and to
control the effect of pollutants outside of the installation, with
special emphasis on protection of the public health and
safety."
The public is further protected by the Ddcret 75-713 du 4
aoft, 1975 (Decree of 1975) which establishes an Inter-
Ministerial Commission for Nuclear Security." This commis-
sion is responsible for protecting persons and their property
against nuisances and dangers from the creation, functioning,
or shutdown of nuclear facilities.5" France employs "barrier
analysis" in its safety study of reactors. Barrier analysis entails
a study of the reactor once it has been completed, and can be
used on any reactor-type. 4 This independent approach stresses
safety precautions which must be taken to prevent accidents,
and defers until the end of the analysis the review of the reac-
tor's emergency devices. 5
G. Liability and Damages
The owner-operator of a nuclear facility is responsible for
the safety aspects of its operations, and is absolutely liable for
any damages caused by a nuclear reactor, as set forth by the
1960 Paris Convention. 56 The maximum liability of the opera-
tor is 50 million francs per accident, regardless of the number
of facilities on that site.57 The French Government is liable for
amounts not covered by the operator's insurance, up to a maxi-
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. DMcret 75-713 (Aug. 4, 1975) [1975] J.O. 8116.
53. Id.
54. Bourgeois, supra note 25, at 27.
55. Id. Each reactor has 3-4 tight barriers: (1) the cladding; (2) the primary
system boundary; (3) the primary; and (4) secondary containment barriers. Each
barrier is analyzed for: (1) normal operating conditions; (2) normal transients (start-
ups, power raising, load variations); and (3) accident transients. Id. at 28-29.
56. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, art. 3, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 1082 (1961). Although article 3 indicates that the
operator is absolutely liable, article 9 states that if the damage is caused by unforesee-
able civil conflicts, civil war, or catastrophic disasters, the operator will not be held
accountable.
57. Loi 68-943, art. 4 (Oct. 30, 1968) [1968] J.O. 10195.
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mum of 600 million francs.3 However, the government is liable
only after the operator has paid the full 50 million franc mini-
mum deductible.
Anxiety about potential nuclear hazards, accompanied by
the construction and operation of the world's largest commer-
cial breeder reactor, the Super-Phdnix, has caused concern in
the environs of Creys-Malville where the facility is located.50
The Super-Phdnix is a joint energy program, controlled by the
French Government and operated by the Centrale Nuclaire
Europ6ene d Neutrons Rapides, S.A. (NERSA) organization.
In full operation, the Super-Phdnix will produce 1200 mega-
watts of electricity from its first five tons of plutonium. This
large amount of plutonium explains the overwhelming public
interest in the Super-Phdnix installation.6 The project was ini-
tiated in January of 1973, after which public meetings and
debates were organized between antinuclear groups, environ-
mentalists, agricultural concerns, and the proponents of the
project. 2 Once the debates and studies were finished, the pro-
ject was approved and work commenced in the spring of 1977 .3
H. Public Action in Nuclear Power Plant Siting
Recent surveys in France indicate that since 1974, when
over three-fourths of the population was in favor of nuclear
energy, the number of nuclear proponents has plunged by
58. Id. at art. 5. See also Brussels Supplementary Convention, 2 Ier'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 685 (1963). Under the Brussels agreement, the signatories indicated a will-
ingness to contribute to a maximum recovery of $120 million, but only after the indi-
vidual insurance and the home state have contributed their shares.
59. Residents of the area have stated that they do not want to be the guinea pigs
for the world's first operational breeder reactor. They feel that there are simply too
many unknown factors, and no one knows exactly what may happen. L'ExPRsss, Aug.
8, 1977, at 28.
60. Centrale Nucldaire Europdenne A Neutrons Rapides, S.A. This group was
formed and controlled by France (EDF) which held a 51% interest. France was joined
by Italy (ENEL) with 33%, Germany (RWE) with 16%, and small interests are owned
by Belgium, Holland, and Great Britain. DiLiGATION G#N9RALE A L'ENERGIE, supra
note 36, at 19.
61. L'ExPRESS, April 17, 1978, at 78. The opponents of the Super-Phdnix are quick
to point out that it only takes six kilos of plutonium to create an atomic bomb. Five
tons of plutonium, which is one of the most toxic and enduring radioactive elements
known to man, presents the danger of an explosion never before paralleled. There are
also dangers ranging from the possibility of small leakages of radioactive effulgents to
the possibility of terrorist attacks. Id.
62. DILtGATION GlNgRALE 1 L'9'NERGIE, supra note 36, at 42.
63. Dfrr, supra note 7, at 15.
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about twenty-five percent." Antinuclear forces, especially the
ecology groups, are a major reason for this decline. In the mu-
nicipal elections of 1977, for example, the ecology groups cre-
ated so much friction that the campaign focused almost en-
tirely on ecological issues. 5
The results of these elections show that ecology groups,
such as les Amis de la Terre and les Groupes Scientifiques pour
I'Information sur I'Energie Nuclaire, are becoming a signifi-
cant power in the political arena."6 Not only have elections been
won or lost because of the "green vote," but the pressure they
exert has also created new legislation which allows for the pro-
tection of the environment as well as providing the legal means
by which these groups can exercise their rights. 7
A renewed vigor was witnessed by these antinuclear fac-
tions when the French Government reemphasized its atomic
energy programs and proposed to build at least forty conven-
tional nuclear plants and one breeder reactor at Creys-
Malville.16 Demonstrations in France against atomic power
plants have been relatively peaceful. However, during the pro-
test against the Super-Phdnix in the summer of 1977, violence
marred the demonstration.69 The demonstration at Creys-
Malville had been planned for several months and nonviolence
was stressed so successfully that many local politicians agreed
to participate. 0 Rend Jannin, the prefect of the department in
which Creys-Malville is located, stated afterward, "we made
several tactical errors." Sufficient safety precautions were not
taken.7" Although German demonstrators have been more
prone to violence, demonstrators now come from all over Eu-
rope and violence appears to have increased."
The majority of participants at the Creys-Malville demon-
stration belonged to environmental groups and were not inter-
64. Sweet, The Opposition to Nuclear Power in Europe, BULL. ATOM. Sci. 41, 44
(Dec. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sweet].
65. Sansen, Le Mouvement Ecologique Franqais, 2 Rgv. GONORALE NUCLEAIRE 3
(1977).
66. Id.
67. See generally D6cret 77-760 (July 7, 1977) [1977] J.O. 3663.
68. TME, Aug. 15, 1977, at 31.
69. L'EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 23, 25.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. Sweet, supra note 64, at 43.
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ested in a violent demonstration. However, as the date of the
protest approached, there were many who came solely for a
violent demonstration against the "system." These dissenters
were able to persuade the pacifists that their previous attempts
to stop or change nuclear policy had been entirely futile and
that the time had come for more forceful measures in these
matters.
7 3
The concern of both individuals and interest groups in
nuclear power and the protection of the environment has
caused the Government to delineate the necessary steps for
increased public participation.7' The Government has also in-
dicated a desire to have more individuals participate in mat-
ters that will directly affect their life or lifestyle.
I. Conclusion
Although the French Government recognizes the utility of
nuclear energy and the possibilities it presents for the future
through breeder reactors, other "new energies" are ardently
being explored.7 5 The National Center for Scientific Research,
for example, is one of the world's leading government institu-
tions in the development of solar energy. As the public and
government become more aware of the problems in this area,
new legislative measures are created to promote equitable solu-
tions.
Since France has negligible oil reserves, very little coal,
and no other visible energy possibilities at present, it appears
that the development of nuclear energy is inevitable. The ex-
tent to which demonstrations and public attitudes are able to
change French legislation, and/or stop further development of
nuclear power, appears limited. Whether or not a scientific
breakthrough will allow France to switch completely to solar,
wind, or other "new energies" can be seen only in the future.
Presently, France is aware that without nuclear power massive
73. L'EXPRESS, Aug. 8, 1977, at 28.
74. D~cret 77-760, art. 6-8, (July 7, 1977) [1977] J.O. 3663. See also Circulaire of
Jan. 10, 1977, [1977] J.O. _.
75. As of May 1978, nuclear energy provided 12% of France's electricity. France's
1985 nuclear energy goal has been set at 20%. Le Monde, May 2, 1978.
76. DLUGATION AUX 9NERGIES N'OUVELLES, SOLAR ENERGY FROM FRANCE 22 (1977).
France has a solar furnace at Odefllo-Font-Romeu which is fed by sixty-three flat
mirrors and can reach a temperature of 3,800 *C. There are also several apartment
buildings around France, sponsored by CNRS, which are entirely heated by solar
energy.
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amounts of foreign energy must be purchased. Given the
French spirit of independence, it is doubtful that France would
ever subject herself to the manipulations of energy-producing
nations if French controlled nuclear power were available.
II. NUCLEAR ENERGY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History
Shortly after World War II, the United States created the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and monopolized the nu-
clear energy field through the passage of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1946." This act was soon replaced by the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 which substantially limited the governmental mo-
nopoly of the nuclear field. 8 Although the 1954 Act invited
more participation from private sectors, the nuclear energy
field was slow to develop, due initially to the low cost of alter-
native energy sources.
Change came with the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,
which abolished the AEC and divided its duties between the
newly formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) .7
Regulation and supervision of the construction, maintenance,
licensing, and operation of nuclear power facilities within the
United States was delegated directly to the NRC. The NRC
has divided the licensing process into two steps: (1) a construc-
tion permit for the proposed nuclear reactor;80 and (2) a license
to operate the facility after the reports have been filed and the
surveys taken.8 ' ERDA's functions are to coordinate Federal
77. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (1946) [codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-
2296 (1976)].
78. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 921 (1954) [codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2296 (1976)]. Prior to the 1954 Act, private ownership, manufacture, or opera-
tion of a nuclear facility was prohibited, as the entire field was under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Federal Government. The passage of the 1954 Act invited public
participation in the nuclear field. However, the government retained absolute control
over nuclear fuels which were to be leased from the government. (This is set forth in
42 U.S.C. § 2061 (1978) which provides that the Commission shall be the exclusive
owner of all production facilities except: (1) those dealing with research and develop-
ment, which do not make enough fuel for atomic weapons; and (2) those licensed by
the Commission pursuant to §§ 2133-2134 of the Act.)
79. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1976).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976). Construction permits are granted only after all
relevant siting criteria, environmental impact statements, and public notices of hear-
ing requirements have been met. See also 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(b) (1978).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1976).
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activities relating to research and development of various en-
ergy sources.
B. Preemption
Numerous cases have arisen disputing the NRC's appar-
ent exclusive control over the licensing process, in effect, pre-
empting a state's action on matters within its own domain. "
The preemption doctrine, which was first enunciated in
Gibbons v. Odgen,83 allows Federal regulations to take exclu-
sive precedence over similar state regulations, with the excep-
tion of state regulations that pose no direct conflict, or those
which Congress has not unequivocally declared preempted by
Federal legislation.
Although the preemption doctrine has survived many
years of Supreme Court rulings, it has not been adequately
defined. Individual courts have maintained the power to con-
strue state regulatory statutes according to the particular facts
of the case, " and it was not until Northern States Power Co.
v. Minnesota9 that the question of preemption in the atomic
energy area was decided.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 gave the Federal govern-
ment exclusive jurisdiction and control over the regulation of
all radiation-related hazards in the nuclear field. These joint
judicial and administrative rulings had the effect of totally
preempting the state government from making any indepen-
dent judgments on health and safety issues. " Then, in 1959,
an amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 created a
major provision which granted authority to each state to regu-
late the nonradiation hazards within its own territory. The
amendment provided that, "nothing in this action shall be
construed to affect the authority of any state or local agency
to regulate activities for purposes other than protection against
radiation."87 This allowed states to participate more meaning-
82. Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971). See
generally Yates, Preemption Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954: Permissible State
Regulation of Nuclear Facilities Location, Transportation of Radioactive Materials
and Radioactive Waste Disposal, 11 TULSA L. J. 397 (1976).
83. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) (1824).
84. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1974).
85. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971).
86. Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Environmental Protection, 377 A.2d 915, 928 (1977).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(k) (1976). In order to participate in a formal determination
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fully in the siting process of nuclear facilities, and thus negated
complete domination by Federal agencies.
Judge Van Oosterhout, in his dissenting opinion in
Northern States, spoke out strongly against the notion of Fed-
eral preemption in this area.8 He noted that there had been no
apparent congressional intent to preempt this field; otherwise,
Congress would have stated it explicitly in statutes or in their
hearings on nuclear energy."9
C. Environmental Aspects of the Licensing and Siting
Process
The NRC is not solely responsible for the licensing and
siting process at the Federal level. In the often-cited case of
Claverts Cliffs Coordinating Commission v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission,0 the requisite duties of the licens-
ing process, as set forth in the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), are analyzed in detail." Calverts Cliffs pointed
out that NEPA was created to establish "environmental pro-
tection as an integral part of the AEC's basic mandate. . . and
it must itself take the initiative of considering environmental
values at every distinctive and comprehensive stage of the pro-
cess beyond the staff's evaluation and recommendation. '" 9
However, as broad as this construction may appear, it did not
give an unlimited grant of power to NEPA.' 3
of a nuclear facility siting, the state representative must request a formal hearing
before the Licensing Board as an interested party under 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978).
88. 447 F.2d 1143, 1155 (8th Cir. 1971). "The Supreme Court has uniformly recog-
nized the legislative intent of the state in its laws designed to protect the health and
safety of its citizens and has refused to find federal-preemption over state health and
safety laws, absent a clear and unmistakeable showing of an intent on the part of
Congress to preempt." Id.
89. Id. at 1157. "There is nothing in the statutes which expresses a clear Congres-
sional intent to prohibit the states from taking additional steps deemed necessary to
control air, water and pollution. . . . The language of a statute controls over the
legislative history, which is often ambigious. Congress was aware of the problem and
could have solved it readily by incorporating appropriate language in the Act. It re-
fused to do so." Id.
90. Calverts Cliffs Coordinating Comm'n v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
91. Id. at 1112. Under this section, NEPA is not permitted, but rather is com-
pelled, to take environmental values into consideration.
92. Id. at 1119.
93. [19771 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) 30,172.02. NEPA does not require an
unbalanced weighting of the environmental issues over other factors, such as economic,
or health and safety advantages. The purpose of NEPA is to insure that the agencies
give appropriate consideration to the environmental factors in the decision process, but
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITING
Recent decisions have taken the approach of Judge Van
Oosterhout in granting more power to the states and to local
environmental groups while curtailing NRC's "exclusive" pow-
ers. An example in this shift of control can be seen in the recent
Clean Air Act, which transferred the authority to regulate the
radioactive effluents from nuclear power installations from
NRC to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."
Under the new Act, emission limitations may be enforced
by citizen groups as well as by state and local governments.
The Act permits the state to adopt air quality standards which
are more stringent than those imposed by the Federal govern-
ment. This includes control over radioactive pollutants, and
thus overrules that aspect of the Northern States decision. The
Clean Air Act also requires the EPA to determine, by August
7, 1979, whether the emission of radioactive pollutants at the
various sites will endanger public health. If the EPA determi-
nation is affirmative, the radioactive pollutants will continue
to be under EPA control pursuant to the Clean Air Act."
D. Present Siting and Licensing Requirements
1. Application Process
A license to construct or operate a nuclear facility is con-
sidered only upon completion of the application form. This
application must be presented at a public hearing before the
AEC, and section 189(a) of the Atomic Energy Act requires
that a Notice of Hearing on Application for Construction Per-
mits be printed in the Federal Register thirty days prior to the
hearing. The application must also include safety assessments
and a description of the site, an evaluation of the design and
of the performance of the structures," and, finally, a safety
analysis report. 7
the environmental protection aspect was not established as the exclusive goal.
94. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (1978). It should be
noted that the NRC maintained the responsibility for prescribing limits, and imple-
menting and enforcing the EPA's radiation standArds.
95. Id. Before EPA lists the source of the pollutant, it must first consult with the
NRC and, no later than six months after the listing, the two agencies must agree to
procedures which will minimize a duplication of their efforts with regard to the regula-
tion of the polluting emmissions.
96. 10 C.F.R. § 50.34(a)(1) (1978). Such assessments shall contain an analysis and
evaluation of the major structures, systems, and components of the facility.
97. Id. at (b). The safety analysis report must include information which describes
the facility, and which presents a safety analysis of the structure, systems, compo-
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2. Review Process
First of all, the NRC staff scrutinizes the health, safety,
and environmental aspects of the application, and then drafts
an environmental impact statement. Public comments must
accompany both the application and environmental impact
statement to insure increased public participation." Next, the
Advisory Commission on Reactor Safety (ACRS) must exam-
ine the design of each plant to eliminate possible safety haz-
ards. After the ACRS report is submitted to the Commission,
a public hearing is scheduled. Thirty days notice is required,
and must be printed in the Federal Register."
To increase public involvement and improve community
relations, the Commission has permitted intervenors into the
licensing process on the following grounds: (1) if they can show
an independent injury or, basically, if they can meet judicial
standing requirements; (2) if they live in the immediate vicin-
ity of the proposed facility; or (3) if the Commission feels that
they can significantly contribute to the licensing process.'"
The nuclear installation siting process is one of the most
time consuming aspects of the nuclear development program.
In an effort to speed up this process, Appendix Q to 10 C.F.R.
50 was passed in 1977 to grant the right to request an early site
review to any individual or group.' 01 However, these reviews are
subject to public interest considerations and are not conclusive
until all vital information has been confirmed.'"' Further, the
application for early site approval, if accompanied by a con-
struction permit, will only be effective for a five-year period,
with an additional one-year extension when good cause is
shown. 0'
nents, and the facility as a whole. All current information must be included, such as
results of environmental studies, meteorological monitoring programs, etc,
98. 10 C.F.R. § 51.26 (1978).
99. 10 C.F.R. § 50.58 (1978).
100. The Atomic Energy Act does not mandate public hearings. However, such
participation at an early stage can generate confidence in the Commission, and poten-
tially will cut down the amount of time necessary for subsequent public hearings which
may be required by law.
101. 42 Fed. Reg. 22,882 (1977).
102. Id.
103. Id. This new provision will allow any person, state, or other entity to request
a review of the site suitability issues. However, there will be no issuance of a partial
decision concerning the site unless the request for review is made during the construc-
tion permit proceedings. Id. at 22,887.
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As in France, hearings are conducted by nuclear siting
experts because of the technical nature of the issues involved." 4
However, interested individuals may participate in these hear-
ings by filing a petition to intervene pursuant to 10 C.F.R.
section 2.714 (1978).10 5
3. Specific Siting Criteria
Public involvement in the energy field has two major
objectives: (1) to make certain that the facilities are as safe as
possible; and (2) to place the facility in someone else's vicinity,
if at all possible. The possibility of a major nuclear accident,
coupled with the probability of serious problems caused by
radioactive pollution and waste control, makes the correct sit-
ing of a nuclear installation imperative. To aid in the location
of facility sites, the NRC has come up with several evaluation
considerations. 108
The major factors to be considered are population dens-
ity,'0 7 meteorological conditions of the site environs, the in-
tended use of the reactor, the unique qualities of the particular
units, and geological configurations.' When more than one
reactor is proposed for a nuclear power center, assessments
should also include:
A regional evaluation of natural resources, including land, air,
and water resources, available for use in connection with nuclear
energy sites; estimates of future electrical power requirements
* . . economic impact at each nuclear energy site; and considera-
tion of any other relevant factors, including but not limited to
population distribution, proximity to electric load centers and to
other elements of the fuel cycle .... 0
These NRC siting criteria are flexible and were not intended
104. 42 U.S.C. § 2239 (1976).
105. 10 C.F.R. § 2.714 (1978). The petitioner must specifically identify those
aspects of the application to which he is opposed, and must indicate his interest in
the proceedings and the basis for his contention in a petition.
106. 10 C.F.R. § 100.10 (1978).
107. Id. at § 110.3(b). Population density includes the exclusion areas and low
population zones. The exclusion area, as defined in section 100.3, is that area immedi-
ately surrounding the reactor in which the licensee has authority to determine all
activities, including the exclusion of personnel and property. The low population zone
immediately surrounds the exclusion area, and its limited population allows appropri-
ate protective measures to be taken on its behalf in the event of a serious accident.
108. 10 C.F.R. § 100 app. A (1978). Important considerations in this area are the
probability of earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and tsunami which could
result in a failure of the facility's functions.
109. 42 U.S.C. § 5847 (1976).
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to be the final word in all situations. For instance, theoretically
there can be no minimum or maximum size for an acceptable
exclusion area, characteristics of the specific area will deter-
mine how large or small the exclusion area should be. However,
the area must be large enough so that an individual located on
its boundary would not, in the event of a postulated accident,
receive a radiation dose in excess of the safe minimum as estab-
lished by the NRC."10
E. Liability Aspects of Nuclear Power Station Siting
Human safety has been the primary reason for establishing
a large exclusion area, but the potential liability for numerous
types of possible accidents has also been a prime consideration.
In fact, it was the basic reason for the slow development of
private nuclear enterprise in the United States. Given the po-
tential liability for a nuclear mishap, it was apparent that if
Federal protection or subsidies were not provided, the public
sector might never get involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Thus, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act of 1957,' which
placed a ceiling on the amount of damages that could be re-
covered in any one incident.
The AEC now demands proof that the operator possesses,
and will maintain, adequate financial protection as set forth by
the Commission." 2 The Commission may also require that the
applicant waive any immunity from public liability conferred
by Federal or state laws."' Before 1975, liability was limited to
$560 million. As in France, the operator of a nuclear facility in
the United States must carry enough insurance to cover poten-
tial operational liabilities. However, in the U.S., coverage must
also extend to third party liability."4 Under section (c) of 42
110. 10 C.F.R. § 100.11(a)(1) (1978). The exclusion area must be of such a size
that an individual located at any point on its boundary would not receive, for two hours
immediately following the onset of the fission product release, a total radiation dose
to the whole body in excess of 25 rem. Note 2 explains that 25 rem is the amount NCRP
recommendations allow for a harmless, accidental, or emergency exposure to radiation
workers.
111. Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976).
112. Id. at (a). The Commission will determine the minimum amount of liability
insurance needed by the applicant by taking into consideration: (1) the cost and terms
of private insurance; (2) the type, size, and location of the proposed facility; and (3)
the nature and purpose of the licensed activity. Currently, the applicant must acquire
insurance coverage up to $60 million for any individual accident.
113. Id.
114. Id. at (b), (c).
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U.S.C. 2210 (1976) the Government will indemnify, up to $500
million, those licensees whose license requires less than $560
million coverage. ' 5
F. Nuclear Waste and Safeguards
Another precondition of licensing is that the builder or
licensee must determine the maximum foreseeable accident,
and prove that sufficient safety precautions have been taken to
guard against it. ' In spite of safeguards, there is always the
possibility of a serious accident."7 Waste disposal is one of the
greatest safety hazards associated with a nuclear powered
installation, since radioactive waste generated from the facility
must be carefully handled and isolated for prolonged periods
of time.' Unfortunately, isolation is an expensive and imper-
fect way to control waste." 9 Waste control must be well
planned, for as the court iterated in the Natural Resource
Defense Council case, "Once a series of reactors is operating,
it is too late to consider whether the waste they generate should
115. One of the reasons the Government is still subsidizing the nuclear industry
is that, currently, private insurance will only cover a little over $100 million worth of
liability. Until private insurance is available to substantially protect the public, the
Government will continue to subsidize those portions not covered. See 42 U.S.C. §
2210(b), (c) (1976).
116. D. INGLIS, NUCLEAR ENERGY-ITs PHYSICS AND ITS SOCIAL CHALLENGE 115
(1973). The NRC recently shut down a nuclear facility in Idaho in order to determine
if the safety precautions taken would, in fact, function properly. Wall St. J., Dec. 12,
1978, at 1, col. 1.
117. A. LovINS, supra note 2, at 104. This may be demonstrated by the Browns
Ferry incident, in which a technician, while searching for air leaks with a candle,
caused a 7 1/4-hour cable tray fire under the control room. The emergency core cooling
systems (ECCS) failed to function properly, and the only thing that prevented a core
melt was manual control of pumps and valves which were not intended as safety
functions. Another example of potential hazards is illustrated by an incident which
occurred in Idaho when three inexperienced army personnel tried to move a sticky
control rod in an "abnormal" way by hand. The three men were instantly killed by a
burst of radiation, and more than a week passed before shielded clean-up workers were
able to enter the building to remove the bodies. Id. at 116.
118. Id. at 140-41. There is a general two-step method of dealing with spent fuel
rods. The first step is to store them under water at.the facility site until the short-lived
components of radioactivity die off. Next, they are placed in special heavy caskets
designed to absorb radiation and minimize the chances of leakage while being trans-
ported either to fuel reprocessing plants or to underground storage areas.
119. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regula-
tory Comm'n, 547 F.2d 633, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The decision to license nuclear
reactors, which generate large amounts of toxic wastes and which require a special
isolation from the public and the environment for several centuries, is "a paradigm of
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which must receive detailed
analysis under § 102(2)(C)(v) of NEPA" as found in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(v).
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have been produced. '"'2 This decision is particularly significant
because it finds that the NEPA regulations require considera-
tion of the environmental effects of nuclear waste during the
initial stages of the licensing process. Additionally, the NRC
must consider the environmental aspects of the reprocessing of
nuclear waste before granting a construction permit.''
G. U.S. Public Interaction in the Siting Process
1. Case History of the Seabrook, New Hampshire Site
The Seabrook nuclear facility site was chosen from nine-
teen possible New Hampshire locations in mid-1973. From the
outset, there has been opposition to the Seabrook facility, gen-
erated principally from the Clamshell Alliance and Friends of
the Earth. The NRC waited two years for final approval of the
Seabrook site as a result of the environmentalist opposition.
In response to recent attempts to change the site, the NRC
has stated that, "the test to be employed in assessing whether
or not a proposed site is to be rejected in favor of another site
is whether an alternative site is obviously superior to the site
already approved. 12 Thus, it is apparent that a change will be
made only under unusual circumstances brought about by
time, environmental oversights, or other factors which would
make an alternative site superior.
In 1977, the Clamshell Alliance staged a successful demon-
stration against the Seabrook site. The demonstration was
planned well in advance, and nonviolence was emphasized.
Volunteers were trained in the methods of nonviolent resist-
ance and were to instruct small groups at the demonstration.1'
The protest culminated with the peaceful occupation of the
Seabrook site by over 1400 demonstrators. The resistance train-
120. 547 F.2d 633, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
121. Id. at 641. Environmental groups find this case significant because, "absent
effective generic proceedings to consider these issues, they must be dealt with in
individual licensing proceedings." This will give the opponents of nuclear power at
least one more chance to slow down, or temporarily stop, reactor construction.
122. [1977] 2 NUCLEAR REG. REP. (CCH) T 30,216.8. At least two significant
realities of the NEPA process support the use of the standard of obvious superiority:
(1) the inherent imprecision of cost/benefit analysis; and (2) the probability that more
adverse information has been developed respecting the closely examined site than any
alternative site.
123. TIME, May 16, 1977, at 59. The reason for increased participation in mass
protests was best summarized by a spokesmen for the Clamshell Alliance, "We feel
Seabrook in particular and nuclear power plants in general are life and death issues,
we are acting in self-defense."
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ing was so successful that it took police several hours to remove
the majority of the demonstrators.' 4 Then in June 1978, after
negotiations with state officials, the Seabrook demonstration
site was transformed into an "energy fair" attended by 20,000
persons.'25 The Seabrook incidents have signaled a new phase
of mass public protest against nuclear power.' 6
In 1976, public protest in the German town of Whyl forced
authorities to close that site and halt all construction of the
nuclear power plant. 27 One reason that these demonstrations
have gained such magnitude and attendance is that people are
becoming more frightened of nuclear facilities. Public fear
slows down the construction and licensing of these facilities,
thus increasing cost. In addition, every concession and every
added safeguard become a minimum demand for future facili-
ties. It is no wonder that concessions to public demands are
made reluctantly.
2. Facilities
The NRC licensing board is aware that the public desires
to participate in the siting process, but given the technicality
of the issues and the delay caused by public intervention, the
licensing commission would like to limit public involvement.
Since the NRC is an administrative body, it is able to focus on
future events and political consequences instead of being en-
cumbered by precedent.'28 This makes intervention all the
more appealing since an individual who successfully argues his
position may halt an entire project. As stated previously, an
individual may intervene if he can show a potential harm, has
standing, or lives in the vicinity of the project. He must not
124. NEWSWEEK, May 23, 1977, at 25. The "en masse" protests may have very
serious effects on nuclear facility siting. As a purely economic factor, the Seabrook
seige is an excellent example. While the demonstrators, held in the New Hampshire
National Guard armories, were awaiting trial, it cost the state more than $50,000 per
day to care for them.
125. N.Y. Times, June 25, 1978, at A18, col. 1. See also id. June 26, 1978, at A14,
col. 2.
126. NEWSWEEK, supra note 124, at 25.
127. Id.
128. The administrative process is not an entirely independent proceeding. Judi-
cial adjudication reviewing administrative functions were divided into three basic
groups in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971): (1) the court
must first delineate the scope of the agency's authority, and then closely examine the
facts to determine if the agency acted within its authority; (2) the decision made by
the agency must not be arbitrary nor an abuse of discretion; and (3) the court must
determine whether the agency adequately followed necessary procedural requirements.
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only show how his interest will be affected, but must also spe-
cifically detail the problem he wishes to remedy.
An intervenor may petition for an amendment to any ad-
ministrative regulation, for the passage of a new rule, or for the
appeal of rules through the Administrative Procedure Act 2 ' or
through 10 C.F.R. section 2.805(b) (1978). However, the peti-
tion must reflect "meaningful participation," not merely a
delay tactic. This is ensured, in part, by the NRC requirement
of proper standing.
There is ample justification for allowing public participa-
tion in the licensing process of nuclear facilities. Proponents of
nuclear energy argue that intervention lengthens the construc-
tion time and thus increases the cost of facilities. On the other
hand, opposition to nuclear energy is intense, and those who
are denied an outlet for their objections will delay projects by
various methods of demonstration, judicial intervention, and
administrative slowdowns. In reality, significant participation
by intervenors would ameliorate the entire process; issues
would be identified more readily and accurately; and the power
to influence an NRC decision would reduce unnecessary delay,
thereby saving time and money.
H. Public Interaction in Siting
The use of nuclear power is an emotional, frequently de-
bated issue. Violence and increased attendance at mass pro-
tests necessitate a constructive program of public participa-
tion. The program should serve a twofold purpose: (1) to permit
the public to participate in and contribute to the licensing
process; and (2) to disclose all information, and to identify and
resolve major issues at the preconstruction stage of develop-
ment. 110
Notice of nuclear license and site hearings is available only
to those who habitually read the Federal Register. This is an
unrealistic and ineffective way to give notice: supplemental
notices are necessary. As set forth in International Harvester
129. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1976). See also Bain, Informal Rulemaking: Quest of
Nuclear Licensing Reform, 55 DEN. L. J. 177 (1978).
130. The public is reluctant to accept the findings of the NRC or the public utility
operators of nuclear facilities on the safeworthiness of an installation. The NRC, public
utilities, and intervenors must make full disclosures in the initial proceedings if the
system is to improve.
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Co. v. Ruckleshaus,'3' adequate notice requires that the public
be informed of the proposed regulations. In addition, all issues
must be delineated, and descriptions of critical experiments
must be included in the notice.
The public must be given complete, timely, and promi-
nent notice. Since states have become more involved in nuclear
siting and regulation, they should shoulder the responsibility
of insuring adequate public notice concerning facilities within
their own jurisdiction. Local newspapers and the electronic
media could be used effectively to advertise the hearings.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The nuclear power question cannot be left to the exclusive
control of governments. Groups and individuals in many coun-
tries have demonstrated a genuine concern for their safety, as
well as a desire to effectively participate in the licensing pro-
cess. Public concern is evidenced in the legislative and electoral
processes of most nuclear powers.'32
Nuclear energy is a controversial issue which will receive
even more attention in the future. It is thus important that at
least two objectives be met in the near future: (1) the public
must be allowed to participate more effectively in the licensing
process; and (2) alternative sources of energy must be devel-
oped.
Public participation in France and the United States has
increased. Unfortunately, there are many problems yet to be
resolved. For instance, the United States could follow France's
example by expanding and diversifying public hearing notices,
and France could allow more direct public participation in the
licensing process. In both the United States and France, public
relations need improvement. Since the public is skeptical of
nuclear energy, proponents should take the offensive rather
than the defensive: the public needs to be informed of the
safety features and successes of existing nuclear programs. In-
131. International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
132. Sweet, supra note 64, at 41. The anti-nuclear sentiment was so strong in
Sweden that it culminated in victory for those politicians who espoused anti-nuclear
views.
In Austria, the anti-nuclear movement has been so successful that the 700mw
Zwentendorf nuclear facility, which was completed at a cost of $650 million, and which
is now standing idle, was rejected by Austrian voters in a national referendum. Rocky
Mountain News, Nov. 6, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
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formation must be more widely disseminated and must be
more readily available to the public in a form that is neither
too technical nor too simplistic.
France, the United States, and the world need more than
energy conservation and an alternative energy program in the
near future: that conclusion is inescapable. A complete with-
drawal from nuclear energy, even if commercially viable, would
be impractical and unrealistic. We must therefore use the re-
sources available to us, and make the best of a difficult situa-
tion.
